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1.  The objective of this study is to identify and compare policy measures that different coun-
tries adopt to promote their telecommunication markets. The analysis covers industrial 
policy measures that are relevant for the development of telecommunication markets and 
have a direct impact on incumbents. Five European countries are analysed: France, Ger-
many, Italy, Spain and the UK. 
2.  The following fields of industrial policy have been selected as significant for telecommu-
nication markets: fiscal measures, labour market conditions, competition policy, state 
support and state shareholding.  
3.  Results are presented in the form of combined indicators. Scores are attributed to reflect 
whether national policies are comparatively favourable to the incumbents. Policy meas-
ures are considered as being favourable to the incumbent if they spur demand for tele-
communication services, if they do not restrict the incumbent’s business strategies or if 
they directly affect the incumbent in a positive way.  
4.  The main results from the analysis and the ranking of the different countries can be sum-
marized as follows: 
•  The combined indicator shows France and the United Kingdom as the countries with 
the most favourable industrial policies. Spain and Italy are ranked above Germany 
which is scored lowest.  
•  This result expresses a strong willingness of the French government to use its position 
as a major shareholder to protect the incumbent. Additionally, competition policy in 
France is most favourable to the incumbent.  
•  In the case of the United Kingdom, a strong support of e-government activities, very 
liberal labour market regulations and favourable fiscal measures result in a high overall 
score. 
•  Spain’s rank can be explained by a reluctance to engage in indirect support of the tele-
communication industry, relatively restrictive labour market regulation and the ab-
sence of state ownership in the incumbent. On the other hand, competition policy in 
Spain is relatively favourable to the incumbent.  DIW Berlin: Politikberatung kompakt  44 
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•  The Italian incumbent benefits from a wide range of fiscal measures and other meas-
ures that promote telecommunication markets. However, competition policy is most 
unfavourable to the incumbent. While the state keeps a golden share in Telecom Italia, 
this involvement does not concern day-to-day decisions or strategic issues. It rather re-
flects the fact that Telecom Italia is considered a national asset. Taking all this in to 
account, we find that Italy is ranked below Spain. 
•  Germany’s scores are mostly below average. This can be explained by modest state 
support in terms of fiscal measures and state demand, as well as a rather unfavourable 
competition policy.  
5.  Analysing the different policy measures in greater detail leads to the following observa-
tions: 
•  Regarding fiscal measures, two indicators were used: ICT related tax incentives and 
the taxes paid by incumbents relative to their profits. In all countries apart from Italy 
the general attitude is that tax advantages are considered as inappropriate measures to 
enhance growth in telecommunication markets. Indirect effects might occur through 
support for innovation related activities in SMEs, for R&D and for the training of per-
sonnel in technology oriented occupations. However, the indicator for ‘fiscal meas-
ures’ shows some relevant variation among countries: Italy scores highest combining a 
wide range of tax incentives to support the diffusion of computer and communication 
technology usage with a rather unfavourable position with respect to the tax burden of 
the incumbent. In France the absence of tax incentives for ICT goods and services to-
gether with relatively high tax payments result in very low scores for this indicator. 
Germany is in a rather disadvantageous position due to the lack of ICT related tax in-
centives.  
•  Labour market conditions are measured by two indicators. The first indicator meas-
ures the overall labour market rigidity of each country’s employment regulations. The 
second indicator measures the flexibility each incumbent has concerning its personnel 
strategies to optimize its productivity. Considering the combination of these indicators, 
the UK labour market conditions are most favourable to the incumbent. Germany and 
Spain are the countries which are ranked lowest in this respect.  DIW Berlin: Politikberatung kompakt  44 
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•  Competition policy: We started the generation of our competition policy indicator 
with a country-wise investigation of merger cases. Overall, we found that competition 
regimes differ substantially from country to country. This observation holds both with 
regards to political influence and procedural issues. Overall, the competition policy 
environments under which mergers in the telecommunications sector have to be con-
templated and executed differ considerably. While we have to deal with unobserved 
heterogeneity, our assessments based on the facts collected in the country studies allow 
us to rank the countries according to whether competition policy is more or less fa-
vourable to the incumbent. Countries in which merger activity of the incumbent has 
not been inhibited by competition measures obtain a relatively higher score. The high-
est scores are reached in France and Spain. In those countries none of the major acqui-
sitions of the incumbent has been blocked or restricted by the imposition of unduly ob-
ligations. Taking the political climate into account, we found that competition policy in 
France (and - with some qualifications – in Spain) appeals most strongly to the idea of 
“big is beautiful” and the building of national champions. Accordingly, we consider 
competition policy as most favourable to the incumbent in France with Spain follow-
ing in close distance. In the case of the United Kingdom we observed a rather lenient 
policy, but the absence of major merger cases, makes it almost impossible, to come to 
a decisive conclusion. The United Kingdom, therefore, ranges between France and 
Spain on the one hand and Italy and Germany on the other hand. Italy obtains the low-
est score and Germany a slightly better one. In Italy, the competition authority virtu-
ally blocked the proposed takeover of a very small firm by Telecom Italia while merg-
ers among competitors were never challenged. With respect to Germany, we found that 
competition policy in the form of merger control in the telecommunications industry 
takes a restrictive pattern when the core business of the incumbent is involved. More-
over, our analysis of merger control in Germany vis-à-vis competitors has shown that 
the competition authority is willing to let otherwise anti-competitive mergers go 
through if they create a threat to the incumbent’s assumed dominant positions tele-
communications markets; a fact which we regard as unfavourable to the incumbent. 
•  State support: Measures that promote the use of telecommunication services are rep-
resented in three sub-indicators. ‘Infrastructure aid’ measures the extent to which the 
state promotes telecommunication infrastructures. In addition, government priorities DIW Berlin: Politikberatung kompakt  44 
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for the promotion of ICT and the success of government policies in this field have 
been measured (‘ICT support’). State demand has been approximated by an indicator 
for the realisation of e-government. Italy stands out from the rest of the countries due 
to a vast range of programmes that promote ICT infrastructure and diffusion. The UK 
is next in line with decisive infrastructure support and relatively high state demand as 
factors driving this score. Germany shows relatively low scores. This is true for ICT 
support as well as state demand.  
•  State as shareholder: The shareholder indicator observes the development of debt of 
the incumbents in the reference countries and the level of state ownership. In addition 
qualitative evidence has been used to answer the question of whether governments 
would tolerate a foreign takeover of the incumbent. Figures show that those firms with 
a major share of state ownership show higher debt over the years. The net debt / 
EBITDA ratios present a less pronounced relationship between state ownership and 
debt levels. Taking the levels of indebtedness tolerated by financial markets, there 
seems to be considerable advantage in the support incumbent firms can get, if the state 
is a major shareholder. Thus, the indicator positions France Télécom at the top of the 
scale, followed by Deutsche Telekom and – followed by a lag – Telecom Italia and 
Telefónica. In the UK, the special relationship between the former monopolist and the 
state is only marginally visible.  
6.  A few points need to be mentioned when interpreting the results: 
•  The indicator system only presents relative positions and no absolute judgment on the 
adequacy of industrial policies or regulatory measures is made. 
•  The indicators are related to whether policies are favourable to the incumbent. No 
judgement is implied as to whether the adopted policies (or the support of a national 
champion) are beneficial for telecommunication markets or the economy as a whole. 
•  Results presented in the form of intensity scales tend to create greater differences be-
tween countries than results based on quantitative figures. This effect is due to the con-
struction of the indicator. Choosing a shorter scale would reduce these differences and 
result in indicators that lie even closer together.  
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I  Scope of the study and methodology 
I.1  Scope of the study 
National governments can use various instruments to enhance the growth and competitiveness 
of telecommunication markets. This study will analyse industrial policy approaches taken in 
different countries with respect to their impact on incumbents in telecommunication markets. 
The policies analysed belong to different areas such as national tax system, legal provisions 
for mergers and acquisitions, measures that directly promote the demand and/or the supply in 
specific markets. The countries considered are: France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the UK.  
The following fields of industrial policy have been selected as significant for telecommunica-
tion markets: 
1. Fiscal  measures 
2.  Labour market conditions 
3. Competition  policy 
4. State  support 
5. State  shareholding 
The results from comparing the policy measures in each field will be presented in form of 
indicators that allow the ranking of different countries’ policies with respect to their impact on 
incumbents. High scores are attributed to policies measures that are comparatively more fa-
vourable to national incumbents. 
I.2 Methodology 
The study will rely on two methodological approaches: (1) starting with indicators for specific 
policy measures a combined indicator will be developed to express the relative position of a 
country’s policy; (2) quantitative and qualitative analysis will be used to present detailed 
background information about policies that affect the incumbent’s position in telecommunica-
tion markets. 
The indicators are calculated from data sets that allow the comparison of countries. We use 
international studies and data collected by the project team. Indicators based on qualitative 
information have been derived on the basis of intense discussions and evaluations by the pro-DIW Berlin: Politikberatung kompakt  44 
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ject team. This approach allows us to take into account quantitative as well as qualitative 
information providing background information.1 
For each policy measures, one indicator has been constructed. In order to cover different topics, 
several sub-indicators have been used to derive the final indicators. Indicators or sub-indicators 
are normalized such that the maximum value is equal to ten. The indicator values for the other 
countries are calculated according to their proportion to the maximum value. The country 
with the highest score for an indicator or sub-indicator has been attributed the value 10 and 
the other countries have been ranked accordingly. 
Figure I-1 
Indicator values for policy measures that are relative favourable to the incumbent 
least                                          increasingly more                                                             most 
favourable                                                   favourable                                                                        favourable    
                                
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10 
 
In comparison to other more easily manageable ranking system(s), this scoring procedure 
allows us to document the relative distances between countries for each indicator more accu-
rately (see Grupp and Mogee (2004)). 
In order to take into account the varying importance of different policy measures for the in-
cumbents the indicators have been weighted. Weights express the relative importance of dif-
ferent policy measures and reflect the different impact that more or less favourable policies in 
the respective fields could make for the incumbent. 
The scoring and weighting procedures result in a combined indicator which can be expressed 




     ...   with   1 j nn Ii a i a i a i a a =⋅+ ⋅+ ⋅ + ⋅ = ∑ ,  
                                                                          
1 The sources of information that are publicly accessible have been given in the list of references at the end of 
this paper. Additional information has been gained from informal sources on which much of the expertise of the 
authors is based. These are, for example, newspaper articles published over many years, discussions in peer 
groups, informal conversations with representatives of regulatory authorities or market players.   DIW Berlin: Politikberatung kompakt  44 
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where I is the combined indicator, ii , i = 1, …, n, are sub-indicators and ai are the weighting 
factors. In some cases sub-indicators ii have been differentiated into further detail, and a com-




              ...      with   1 ij ii i i ii i i n i n ii ai ai a i a a =⋅+⋅ +⋅ + +⋅ = ∑ . 
Since we use an weighting scheme, only sub-indicators have been normalized. This allows us 
to construct the aggregated indicators from sub-indicators in a straightforward manner. Fur-
thermore, it gives us the opportunity to combine several sub-indicators such that overall indi-
cators covering different aspects can be easily constructed.  
II Industrial  Policy 
While industrial policy can generally be more or less favourable towards a specific type of 
enterprise, several aspects have to be considered when evaluating different policies. First, 
industrial policy is embedded in country-specific styles of market economies that differ with 
respect to the market dynamics, economic and political institutions, innovation patterns and 
governance styles.2 Thus, the impact of specific measures can differ across countries. Second, 
while governments may deliberately decide to act in favour of a group of companies (or even 
an individual company) such policies may have no or counterproductive effects. For example, 
public support of investment in competing infrastructures may not lead to the intended in-
vestments if there are no clear rules governing the post investment use of new infrastructures. 
Third, the effects of economic policy depend on market conditions. Policies that act in favour 
of the incumbent in one situation can be neutral or even negative if exercised in a different 
market situation. 
Additionally, ‘best practice’ in terms of policies that are most favourable to the incumbent can 
never be attributed to a country as a whole or advertised as exemplary for others, as each 
country has to adopt policies suitable for its own strategic aims, its current state of develop-
ment, structural composition of the economy and political priorities. Moreover, no judgement 
will be made in this report as to whether policies that favour the incumbent are beneficial or 
detrimental for the telecommunication markets or the economy as a whole. The purpose of 
this analysis is only to identify the impact of industrial policy measures on the incumbents. 
                                                                          
2 See Hall and Soskice (2001) DIW Berlin: Politikberatung kompakt  44 
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II.1  The industrial policy indicator system 
Two types of indicators have to be distinguished, those that refer to policies that support and 
stimulate telecommunication markets in general and those that are related to policies which 
are favourable to the incumbent in a more narrow sense. We assume that all measures that 
support and enhance the development of telecommunication markets will also be beneficial 
for the incumbent – at least in those markets, where it holds more than a 50% market share. 
Hence we regard all initiatives that promote the supply and the use of telecommunication 
technologies as favourable to the incumbent.3 In addition to that there are industrial policy 
measures that have a direct impact on the position of the incumbent in telecommunication 
markets. Examples are the tax burden of the incumbents, the incumbents’ flexibility with 
respect to their employment decisions and competition policy. 
The weighting scheme adapted is intended to expresses the relative importance different pol-
icy measures have for the incumbents (see Table II-1). State support in terms of infrastructure 
aid, ICT support and state demand have been given the highest weight. Competition policy, 
i.e., decisions about mergers, vertical integration or disintegration affects companies directly. 
Accordingly, competition policy has been given the second highest weight. In contrast, fiscal 
measures are valid for the market in general, and given the tightness of state budgets, their 
impact is considered to be rather low, thus they have the lowest weight. 
This indicator system is ‘indicative’ in the sense that it does not give a complete representa-
tion of all features favouring one market participant or another. Instead the system documents 
issues that express trends and attitudes of industrial policy. 
The indicators are calculated from data sets that allow the comparison of countries and from 
intense discussions and evaluation of qualitative information by the project team.4 Many indi-
cators cannot be substantiated by ‘hard facts’. Whether a certain share of civil servants is a 
burden for an operator, cannot be said by only comparing the related figures, many other 
circumstances have to be considered in order to judge the meaning of this quantitative indica-
tor. Similarly, whether a certain decision by competition authorities is particularly favourable 
                                                                          
3 This assumption is not unproblematic, as promoting growth in telecommunication markets can provide a strong 
incentive for potential competitors to enter the market.  
4 The sources of information that are publicly accessible have been given in the list of references at the end of 
this paper. Additional information has been gained from informal sources on which much of the expertise of the 
authors is based. These are, for example, newspaper articles published over many years, discussions in peer 
groups, informal conversations with representatives of regulatory authorities or market players.   DIW Berlin: Politikberatung kompakt  44 
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to an incumbent depends on the legal situation, the individual case and the decisions made in 
comparable cases. Therefore, attributing a ‘score’ to indicators in terms of country compari-
son requires expert judgement based on knowledge of the economic and political context. 
Furthermore, the impact of specific policy measures on either the market or the incumbent 
can only be roughly estimated in various cases. The scoring will show only small differences 
between countries whenever the available information does not allow for precise assessment.  
Table II-1 
Indicators: Definition, data sources, weights 
Indicator Definition  Type of 
indicator  Data source  Weight 
Fiscal measures  0.1 
tax burden  Effective average tax rates quantitative  Klemm  (2005)  0.25
  tax rate based on aggregated tax 
payments and profits for the 
last three year 
quantitative   incumbents 
annual reports 
0.25
tax exemptions  deductions from taxable income 





tax laws  0.5
Labour market conditions  0.2 
employment  
protection 
flexibility of labour markets  quantitative, 
relative scores
OECD 0.25
  flexibility of labour markets  quantitative, 
relative scores
World Bank  0.25
employment 
flexibility  
development of main lines per 
employee 




Competition policy  0.25 
merger control  cases decided against/in favour 
of the incumbent 
    
State support    0.3 
infrastructure aid  State spending on infrastructure 








ICT support  measures to promote the diffu-





e-government  number of services available 
online 









  number of services available 







State as shareholder  0.15 
  control exercised versus protec-
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Finally, as weighting is subjective to a certain extent and plays a significant role for the over-
all indicator, two sets of weights have been tested. The results did not differ significantly 
showing that the weighting scheme does not dominate indicator values. The results are pre-
sented in section III. 
II.2 Fiscal  measures 
National tax policies can be used in several ways to influence market outcomes and industry 
structures. Low marginal and average tax rates on firms’ profits generally tend to increase 
investment incentives and economic growth. Specific tax exemptions and tax credits as well 
as depreciation rules can be designed to promote investment in particular sectors, technolo-
gies or regions. Additionally, tax reductions for small and medium sized enterprises can foster 
market entry which may lead to less concentrated market structures and higher innovation 
rates.  
Considering personal income tax, policy measures can lead to the stimulation of demand for 
goods and services provided by the incumbent. Furthermore, tax deductions which support the 
demand for specific goods or services can be particularly important if new products and mar-
kets are characterized by network effects.  
Applying this general reasoning to the telecommunication sector, our indicator for fiscal 
measures consists of two sub-indicators: The first of which refers to the tax burden of incum-
bents. The second indicator captures tax reductions aimed at promoting demand for telecom-
munication services.  
While national tax measures affect the incumbent directly when corporate income tax or in-
vestments in specific regions or technologies are considered, fiscal measures result merely in 
a shortening of depreciation periods which in the case of standard equipment, i.e. computers, 
does not contribute substantially to lowering the overall tax burden. Moreover, taking into 
account that the tax burden carried by large and internationally operating firms depends cru-
cially on where profits are realized, the impact of the national tax system in the home country 
becomes increasingly less important. Similarly, the overall magnitude of tax related incen-
tives can be considered of minor importance for the demand for telecommunication services.  
Overall, it is not expected that fiscal measures will substantially affect the position of the 
incumbent. The indicator for ‘fiscal measures’ has been given the weight ‘0.1’.  DIW Berlin: Politikberatung kompakt  44 
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II.2.1 Country  comparison 
Starting with the sub-indicator for the tax burden a comprehensive calculation of effective tax 
rates would require an in depth analysis of national tax laws, i.e., an analysis of the corporate 
tax base definition, allowances for capital expenditure, deductibility of contributions to pen-
sion reserves, the valuation of assets, etc. Since it is not feasible to present a measure which 
reflects all of these factors we focus on effective average tax rates (EATR) as calculated by 
Klemm (2005) (see Box II-1) and complement the analysis by taking into account the actual 
tax expenses by incumbents.5  
Box II-1 
Calculation of effective average tax rates (Devereux, Griffith, Klemm  (2002)) 
“EATR denotes the proportion of total profit taken in tax. It is defined for a particular pro-
ject and takes into account only the broad structure of the tax system as it applies to a mature 
firm. The treatment of losses or other forms of tax exhaustion is not considered. 
The project is a simple one period investment, in which a firm increases its capital stock for 
just one period. Investment by 1 at the beginning of the period, and reduced by 1- δ at the 
end of the period, where δ represents economic depreciation.  
The higher capital stock generates a return at the end of the period of p+δ , where p is the 
financial return. The discount rate is r. Inflation is ignored. 
One unit of capital generates a tax allowance with a net present value (NPV) of A.  
Introducing tax reduces the cost of the asset to 1- A, while the saving from the subsequent 
reduction in investment becomes (1-δ )(1-A). Total return p +δ  is taxed at the tax rate τ .  
The NPV of the investment with tax is therefore: R=[(p+δ)(1-τ )−(r +δ)(1-A)]/(1+r) . 
The cost of capital is the value of p, denoted p
v , for which the investment is marginal, i.e., 
for which R = 0 .  
Effective average tax rate (EATR) - for a given value of p - is defined as the NPV of tax 
payments expressed as a proportion of the NPV of total pre-tax capital income, V* = p/(1+ r). 




The following Table II-2 shows the development of the nominal and effective average tax 
rates in the five countries. 
Although nominal and effective tax rates decreased during the period 2000 to 2005 in Ger-
many, the German nominal and effective tax rates were still the highest. Tax rates in UK and 
                                                                          
5 The method to calculate EATR was first developed by Devereux, Griffith, Klemm (2002) and focuses on nominal 
tax rates and the tax base as implied by possible depreciation. DIW Berlin: Politikberatung kompakt  44 
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Spain have been stable over time and are the lowest in Spain. In Italy the tax rate increased in 
2004 and was the second highest in 2005 but still much lower than in Germany.  
Table II-2 
Nominal and effective average tax rates in % 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Tax rates 
nom. eff. nom. eff. nom. eff. nom. eff. nom. eff. nom. eff. 
Germany  52,0 37,0 38,9 32,0 38,9 32,0 40,2 33,0 38,9 32,0 38,9 32,0 
France  37,8 27,0 36,4 27,0 35,4 27,0 35,4 27,0 35,4 27,0 35,0 25,0 
Italy  37,0 22,0 36,0 21,0 36,0 21,0 34,0 20,0 33,0 26,0 33,0 26,0 
Spain  35,0 21,0 35,0 21,0 35,0 21,0 35,0 21,0 35,0 21,0 35,0 21,0 
UK  30,0 24,0 30,0 24,0 30,0 24,0 30,0 24,0 30,0 24,0 30,0 24,0 
Sources: OECD (2006), Klemm (2005) 
 
Comparing the EATR with the actual profits and tax expenses of the incumbents shows that 
the EATR does not reflect the actual tax burden of the incumbents in all countries.6 Firstly, 
tax expenses by incumbents vary substantially as they depend on depreciation strategies and 
extraordinary influences, such as major investments or acquisitions. Secondly, overall tax 
expenses depend also on international activities. Taking these two observations into account, 
aggregate average tax expenses and profits of incumbents over the years 2003-2005 provide 
only a rough picture of the incumbents’ tax burden (detailed numbers are given below):  
Table II-3 







Italia  Telefónica  British 
Telecom
Average tax rate in %  25  42  44  29  25 
Source: Deutsche Telekom (2003 to 2005), France Telecom (2003 to 2005). Telecom Italia (2003 to 2005), 
Telefónica (2003 to 2005) British Telecom (2003 to 2005a) and own calculations 
 
While the BT figures correspond quite well with the EATR, tax rates in France, Spain and 
Italy are higher than the respective EATR. However, the high tax rate for FT is mainly driven 
by the year 2003 in which FT paid extraordinarily high taxes. The average tax rate for 2004 
and 2005 corresponds quite well to the EATR measures. Lastly, the low average tax rate for 
                                                                          
6 Tax expenses include both actual tax payments and deferred taxes. DIW Berlin: Politikberatung kompakt  44 
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Germany results from very low tax expenses in 2005 whereas the tax rates for 2003 and 2004 
were 40,4% and 43,5%.  
Germany 
The reduction of German nominal and effective tax rates since 2000 was due to tax reforms 
aimed at lower tax rates and simplified tax systems. In 2001, the corporate tax system was 
changed from a full offset system to a classical system with partial inclusion where 50% of 
received dividends are included as part of taxable income at the shareholder level. While in 
the course of this reform tax rates were generally decreased, the financing of the reform was 
partially based on a reduction of allowed depreciation rates.7  
Considering tax payments by Deutsche Telekom, the following table shows profits and tax 
expenses by Deutsche Telekom.8  
Table II-4 
Profit, taxes and tax rates of Deutsche Telekom 
  2003 2004 2005 
Profit  4226 3569 6212 
Taxes 1709  1552  196 
Tax rate in %  40,4  43,5  3,2 
Sources: Deutsche Telekom (2003 to 2005); Profits = profit/income before taxes in million €.  
 
While the average tax rates in 2003 and 2004 exceed the EATR, the low tax expenses in 2005 
are mainly due to a tax loss carry-forward and do not reflect reductions in actual tax pay-
ments.  
Using tax reductions to promote demand, we find that there are no tax incentives directly 
related to the purchase of ICT goods or services. An analysis of tax benefits lists all privileges 
accruing to economic sectors, but no such privileges occur in the telecommunication industry 
(Institut für Weltwirtschaft (2003)). The relatively short depreciation period for computers (3 
years) has to be seen as adequate in terms of the average usage period for such equipment. 
                                                                          
7 Later tax reforms followed a similar approach. 
8 Tax expenses include actual tax payments and deferred taxes. DIW Berlin: Politikberatung kompakt  44 
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Plans to increase depreciation time in order to restructure the German tax system9 will lead to 
inadequate and unrealistically assumed usage times. 
France 
When France Telecom was a state administration, and later a para-statal entity (before 1997), 
the entity benefited from a special tax regime (for example: no VAT; no local taxes were 
imposed). During the long transition stage all these fiscal exemptions disappeared. As part of 
the transition, the European Commission obliged France Telecom to pay the tax dues owed to 
the French state. Currently France Telecom follows the rules applied to all public companies. 
Table II-5 
Profit, taxes and tax rates of France Telecom 
  2003 2004 2005 
Profit  1137 5687 7928 
Taxes  2591 1998 1568 
Tax rate in %  227,9  35,1  19,8 
Sources: France Telecom (2003 to 2005); Profits = profit/income before taxes in million € 
 
The general possibility to consolidate losses and profits of French subsidiaries (when holding 
more than 95% of shares) affected Orange and Wanadoo only as long as they were France 
Telecom’ subsidiaries. The ISP activity of Wanadoo was effectively absorbed within Orange 
in 2006, which is to become FT’s umbrella brand in most markets. These fiscal measures, 
however, cannot be counted as measures that are specific to telecommunications markets, 
when considering that large conglomerates have similar possibilities in all countries. The 
same applies to tax credits granted for investment in R&D. 
Italy 
While the EATR for Italy is lower when compared to the EATR in Germany, the actual tax 
expenses of Telecom Italia are rather high:  
 
                                                                          
9 A stepwise abolishment of advantages deriving from depreciation rules in favour of a general reduction of tax 
rates is part of tax reform strategies.  DIW Berlin: Politikberatung kompakt  44 
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Table II-6 
Profit, taxes and tax rates of Telecom Italia 
  2003 2004 2005 
Profit  3442 4956 5535 
Taxes  1014 2654 2395 
Tax rate in %  29,5  53,6  43,3 
Sources: Telecom Italia (2003 to 2005); Profits = profit/income before taxes in million € 
 
Tax incentives comprise deductions from taxable income amounting to 10% of total costs 
related to investments in R&D, digital technology and stages for students. This results in an 
overall depreciation of 110% of purchase prices. On top of this, if companies increase their 
investments in ICT compared to the 3 preceding years, 30% of the increase can be deducted 
from taxable income. These deductions apply to costs faced by 
•  companies for industrial research and pre-competitive development; 
•  consortia of at least 10 SMEs created for innovating their ICT equipment. 
The maximum amount of benefit may reach 20% of the average income from the 3 preceding 
years. 
The benefit applies only to costs sustained in 2004. According to Confindustria’s10 estimates, 
the benefit corresponds to 3.3% of the investment and could cover € 200m of costs. 
Companies involved in developing activities of e-commerce can take advantage of additional 
tax credits: The benefits cover up to 60% of the costs incurred in the projects. The resources 
available from 2001 to 2003 amounted to € 190.5m In 2004, this benefit was not renewed, 
however, € 13m of the available funds still have not been claimed.  
Spain 
Similar to the situation in Italy, Spanish EATR is low while actual tax rates for Telefónica 
during the years 2003-2005 are substantially higher:  
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Table II-7 
Profit, taxes and tax rates of Telefónica 
  2003 2004 2005 
Profit  3362,5 4866,4 6796,2 
Taxes  913,4 1512,8 1969,2 
Tax rate in %  27,2  31,1  29,0 
Sources: Telefónica (2003 to 2005); Profits = profit/income before taxes in million € 
 
According to Spanish tax laws firms were generally allowed to amortize goodwill as a fiscal 
expense till 2004. The maximum amount to be amortized per year was 5% of the goodwill 
generated from the acquisition. These rules applied to all firms with headquarters in Spain, 
regardless of the industry or sector. 
Considering Telefónica’s acquisition strategy, additions to goodwill since 2001 are shown 
Table II-8. Net goodwill as of December 2005 amounts to € 9.960m. In 2006 the acquisition 
of O2 generated additional goodwill of about € 9,316m. 
Table II-8 
Goodwill additions of Telefónica 
Year Firm Mill. € Year Firm Mill. €
2001 Mediaways 1,474.66 2004 Olympic 501.85
Endemol 268.61 Otecel 397.44
Data Brasil 233.55 Telcel 376.24
Grupo Corporativo del Norte 230.51 Portugal Telecom 344.52
Celular de Telefonía 137.86 Telefónica Móviles Panamá 252.18
Corporativo del Norte 135.14 Brasilcel 111.68
Uno e Bank 130.25 Others 247.64
Telefónica Móviles 113.21
Portugal Telecom 76.00 2005 Radiocomunicaciones Móviles 547.22
Other 218.93 Telefónica Móviles Chile 219.40
Cesky Telecom 912.66
2002 Telefónica Móviles México 598.44 Eurotel Praha 443.56
Brasilcel 268.69 Telefónica Móviles México 90.95
Endemol 89.98 Others 239.08
Telefónica Centr. Guatemala 41.40





Antena 3 TV 63.91
Terra 58.57
Other 66.34
Main additions to Telefónica´s consolidation goodwill (2001-2005)
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Goodwill amortisation has contributed to the reduction of Telefónica’s debt burden over the 
last years. While there is no data about how high these reductions were, tax savings can be 
estimated by analysing the financial statements of Telefónica from 1995 onwards. The highest 
benefits came from the acquisitions of Endemol and the mobile operators that Bellsouth sold 
to Telefónica. Moreover, it could be said, that these circumstances, although they were advan-
tageous for Telefónica, they were not decisive for the success of the strategy. This advantage 
was not enjoyed by France Telecom or Deutsche Telekom.  
For acquisitions made since January 2004, Telefónica registered the losses of goodwill ac-
cording to a fair valuation, using methods of discounted cash flows to assess the firm which 
generated the goodwill. Data on goodwill amortisations since 2001, as well as the corporate 
taxes saved by Telefónica due to goodwill amortisation, are shown in Figure II-1 and Figure 
II-2. 
Figure II-1 
Goodwill amortization in Telefónica 








Goodwill amortization 841.6 665.4 442.5 432.6




Corporate tax savings for Telefónica 








Taxes saved 294.56 232.89 154.875 151.41
2001 2002 2003 2004
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However, the requirements for tax savings due to reductions of goodwill have become more 
restrictive since 2005. Although the new legislation does not allow goodwill amortization, 
reductions of goodwill may nevertheless generate tax savings with the same quantitative lim-
its established as before. Tax savings can be realized if the following three requirements are 
satisfied: First, the goodwill has to be based on an acquisition in the market. Second, the ac-
quiring firm must not have the majority in the government of the acquired firm. Third, the 
acquiring firm must have created a reserve to absorb the deterioration of the goodwill. 
Thus, while Telefónica may still be able to take financial advantage of goodwill reductions, 
the second requirement just mentioned reduces the possibility of tax savings considerably. 
The financial reports of Telefónica have not stated any tax savings due to goodwill deteriora-
tions since 2005.  
In addition, it should be noted that in 2002 Telefónica wrote off third-generation mobile tele-
phone operations outside Spain. This asset write-off, plus the expenses of restructuring the 
UMTS business in Germany, Austria, Italy and Switzerland, amounted to an extraordinary 
negative net result of € 4.958,2m Likewise, Terra-Lycos made some net write-offs in 2006 (€ 
420.7m). These extraordinary losses were also considered as expenses for corporate fiscal 
purposes and Telefónica saved about 35% of these expenses in tax payments. This year Tele-
fónica registered a negative net profit. However, the fiscal credit could be applied (for) in the 
following years reducing the fiscal burden. 
All firms and all regions benefit from tax breaks for the promotion of information and com-
munication technologies. Ten per cent of the amount invested and of other expenses related to 
the improvement of access capacity, transactions, and processes based on ICT can be de-
ducted from taxes to be paid. 
There are no fiscal incentives or direct subsidies towards customers when purchasing tele-
communications or IT products or services. Only the autonomous region of La Rioja allows 
instalment deductions when acquiring personal computers, with the objective of promoting 
the use of new technologies in a domestic environment. The amount to be deducted is € 100. 
For the Canary Islands special tax incentives hold.  DIW Berlin: Politikberatung kompakt  44 
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United Kingdom 
In contrast to all other countries, EATR in the UK and tax rates of British Telecom coincide 
quite well during the years 2003-2005.  
Table II-9 
Profit, taxes and tax rates for British Telecom 
  2003 2004 2005 
Profit
1)  3019,5 3023,3 3134,9 
Taxes
1)  809,4 759,6 753,9 
Tax  rate  26,8 25,1 24,1 
Notes: 1) As at March 31th of the following year; Profit = profits before taxation, goodwill amortization and excep-
tionals in million € 
Sources: British Telecom (2000 to 2005a)  
Currency rates: 2003: 1,5017; 2004:1,4524; 2005: 1,436 
 
Educational institutions are granted VAT related exemptions when purchasing computers and 
other ICT equipment. However, this applies only to limited area of research, such as medical 
research.  
The so-called home computing initiative was launched in 1999. It is underpinned by an annual 
£ 500 tax exemption on the loaned computer, and allows companies to loan computers to 
employees as a tax-free benefit. The rules governing the scheme were clarified by Inland 
Revenue in 2004.11 
The scheme allows employees to work at home, though it does require some salary sacrifice 
on the part of the employee. At the end of the scheme, the computer can be returned to the 
employer or transferred to the employee for, what is normally, a small amount. 
The website of the Home Computing Initiative – www.ukhomecomputing.co.uk – highlights 
the popularity of the scheme. 18 case studies are listed on the website, ranging from Air Prod-
ucts on the one end to BT, Siemens and the Royal Mail on the other. These cases illustrate 
some of the benefits of the scheme such as: 
•  Increased IT literacy 
•  Attract and retain employees 
•  Potential reduction in training costs 
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•  Improved employer-employee relations 
•  Reduced National Insurance contributions 
•  Enhanced productivity 
•  Accelerated implementation of other salary sacrifice schemes 
•  Employees save on the purchase of a computer 
•  Cost-neutral delivery model12 
Many of the schemes proved to be more popular than expected. For instance, 38% of eligible 
Siemens employees signed up for the scheme in the UK whilst BT’s scheme attracted 6,500 
people or 6% of the company’s workforce in its first year of operation (Sept 2002 – Sept 
2003).13 25% of Air Product’s UK employees joined their company scheme.14  
Despite the popularity of the scheme, the tax credit underpinning the home computing initia-
tive was removed in early 2006. In his budget statement of the 22 March, the Chancellor 
scrapped the scheme effective from 6 April 2006. Existing arrangements would be allowed to 
continue, as would those that have been signed and awaiting delivery of the computer.15 After 
April 2006, employees could use employer owned equipment at home for work related activi-
ties and private use as long as it is not significant. Presumably significant private use would 
necessitate a tax declaration of a benefit in kind to be made, though ‘significant’ is not de-
fined. 
It is worth noting that possible explanations for the scrapping of the scheme are provided in 
the House of Commons debate on the budget. The Paymaster General stated in the Parliamen-
tary debate that 1) take-up of salary sacrifice schemes was often low 2) it did not directly help 
those on low pay 3) the cost of equipment has dramatically fallen since the scheme was 
launched.16 
Interestingly the HM Revenue & Customs notification of the withdrawal of tax credit also 
mentions mobile phones. The Budget changes introduced, for the first time, a limit on the 
                                                                          
12 See Home Computing Initiative (2006b)  
13 See Home Computing Initiative (2006b)  
14 See Home Computing Initiative (2006b) 
15 See HM Revenue & Customs (2006)  
16 See Hansard (2006)  
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number of mobile phones that an employer may loan to employees and that no financial limit 
is set on its use. The number of mobile phones per employee for tax-free use is now limited to 
one.17  
II.2.2 The  Indicator 
Since it is difficult to make a conclusive statement about the actual tax burden of incumbents 
in the different countries, we decided to construct the indicator values based on an ordinal 
comparison of the average EATR for 2003-2005 and the incumbents’ actual tax rates and to 
weight these two indicators equally (lower tax rates and tax expenses are valued as being 
more favourable to the incumbent):  
Table II-10 
Tax burden indicator 
Indicator Germany  France  Italy  Spain  UK 
Eff. average tax rates  7,0  8,0  9,0  10,0  9,0 
Tax payments  10,0  8,0  7,0  9,0  10,0 
Tax  burden  8,5  8,0 8,0  9,5 9,5 
 
Turning to the second sub-indicator, namely tax deductions, policy instruments adopted differ 
considerably. Germany and France have yet to establish measures specifically targeting the 
telecommunication sector. In Spain, only the region La Rioja admits tax deductions for per-
sonal computer purchases but there are no nationwide measures. However, the UK and Italy 
provided tax advantages in order to foster the usage of computers, the adoption of ICT tech-
nologies and the development of e-commerce.  
These observations lead to the following figures for the tax deduction indicator: 
Table II-11 
Tax deductions indicator 
Indicator Germany  France  Italy  Spain  UK 
Tax deductions   3,0  3,0  10,0  7,0  7,0 
 
Combining the two sub-indicators and weighting them equally, we obtain the following ag-
gregate indicator for fiscal measures. 
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Table II-12 
Fiscal measures indicator 
Indicator Germany  France  Italy  Spain  UK 
Fiscal measures indicator  5,8  5,5  9,0  8,3  8,3 
 
The indicator shows some variation among countries: Italy scored the highest having the most 
decisive programmes to support the diffusion of ICT. In the UK and Spain, a rather favour-
able tax system is combined with specific measures supporting the adoption of computers. 
The absence of tax incentives for ICT goods and services together with relatively high tax 
payments result in low scores for Germany and France.  
Figure II-3 




Germany France Italy Spain UK
 
 
II.3  Labour market regulation 
Incumbents are affected by labour market regulations in two ways: First, as a large employer 
in a country, their personnel strategies are constrained by labour laws and collective employ-
ment contracts that govern labour relations in large enterprises. Second, incumbent telecom-
munications operators often have to deal with particular constraints on labour relationships, as 
for example in the case of civil servants and/or public employees inherited from the former 
state-owned monopolist. For these employment relationships specific rules with respect to 
dismissal procedures, salary scales, pension arrangements and other fringe benefits typically 
exist.  DIW Berlin: Politikberatung kompakt  44 
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A comparison of all relevant labour market institutions and regulations in the five countries is 
far beyond the scope of this study. We therefore rely on standardized data to construct our 
indicator for labour market regulation. We use two sub-indicators: The employment protec-
tion sub-indicator measures the overall labour market rigidity of each country’s employment 
regulations. This indicator is based on two indicators published by the OECD and the World 
Bank. Our second sub-indicator – which we call “employment flexibility indicator” – meas-
ures the incumbents’ actual ability to increase their labour productivity in the time period 
between 2000 und 2005. Labour productivity is measured in terms of main lines per em-
ployee. Our summary indicator for each country’s labour market regulations then integrates 
both sub-indicators into one single indicator. 
Additionally, we provide some information about the specific labour market conditions the 
incumbents face in their countries. Here, besides other things, we will also touch on the con-
tentious issue of the alleged burdens incumbents may face when a significant share of their 
workforce owns a civil servant status. 
II.3.1 Country  comparison 
Employment protection and employment flexibility 
The employment protection sub-indicator measures rigidities associated with restrictive la-
bour market regulations, in particular, employment protection legislations. We derive this 
indicator from recent comparative studies provided by the OECD in the Employment Outlook 
(OECD (2004 and 2006)) and the World Bank in its “Doing Business” report (World Bank 
(2006)). 
Employment Protection Legislation  
The OECD collects information on labour market regulations in all its member states. This 
information is compiled and summarised in the form of an Employment Protection Legisla-
tion (EPL) index. This index summarizes the extent to which employment protection regula-
tions effectively restrict employers’ lay-off policies. More precisely, it covers i) procedural 
inconveniences, ii) the overall difficulty of dismissal, iii) timing constraints, iv) possible 
claims to severance pay, and iv) restrictions on fixed-term employment contracts. DIW Berlin: Politikberatung kompakt  44 
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The EPL index itself consists of three sub-indices which refer to regular employment, tempo-
rary employment, and to collective dismissals. In the case of regular employment relation-
ships the index includes regulatory measures concerning notification procedures, notice peri-
ods, severance payments, procedures related to dismissals and trial periods. With respect to 
temporary employment, the conditions for fixed-term contracts and rules for temporary work 
agencies are considered. The index for collective dismissals includes notification require-
ments, delays and special costs imposed on employers in case of collective lay-offs. 
The OECD index ranges between zero and six and represents the intensity of regulation. A 
low score means little regulatory intensity while a high score indicates that regulations impose 
heavy constraints on firms’ personnel policies. Table II-13 presents the relevant information 
of the latest OECD 2006 study. The Employment Protection Legislation (EPL) index is the 
sum of the three indices for regular employment, temporary employment, and collective dis-
missals, respectively.  
Table II-13 















Germany 1,12 0,73 0,63  2.5  2.6 
France  1,03 1,51 0,35  2.9  2.8 
Italy  0,74 0,89 0,81  2.4  3.1 
Spain  1,09 1,46 0,52  3.1  3.0 
UK  0,46 0,16 0,48  1.1  1.0 
Source: OECD (2006) and Statlink: http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/280428587352) 
 
In Table II-13 we also compare the 2003 results with the EPL of the year 1990. As can be 
readily seen, the EPL index does not change much over time within each country. Only the 
score for Italy has decreased significantly, so that Italy ranks second place among the five 
countries in 2003. UK performs best with an index of 1.1 while the remaining four countries 
obtain rather similar scores with values ranging between 2.4 and 3.1.  
Rigidity of Employment  
In 2006, the World Bank published an alternative index, the Employment Regulation and 
Legislation index – or in short, the Rigidity of Employment index. The construction of the DIW Berlin: Politikberatung kompakt  44 
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World Bank Index rests on a particular employee-employer constellation where the worker 
and the employer have some specified characteristics. For instance, the worker is a nonexecu-
tive, full-time male employee who has worked in the same company for 20 years and earns a 
salary plus benefits equal to the country’s average wage during the entire period of his em-
ployment. On the business side it is assumes that the firm belongs to the manufacturing sector 
and is a domestically owned limited liability company. Moreover, it is supposed that the firm 
operates under collective bargaining agreements.  
The rigidity of employment index is the average of three sub-indices: a difficulty of hiring 
index, a rigidity of hours index and a difficulty of firing index. All the sub-indices have sev-
eral components taking values between 0 and 100, with higher values indicating more rigid 
regulation.  
The difficulty of hiring index measures – besides other things – the ease to hire workers on a 
temporary basis and minimum wage requirements. The rigidity of hours index mirrors con-
straints on working time, e.g. concerning night work or weekend work.  
The difficulty of firing index has eight components which touch all sorts of dismissal restric-
tions imposed by law and collective agreements. Precisely, it checks (i) whether redundancy 
is not considered as a fair ground for dismissal; (ii) whether the employer needs to notify the 
labour union or the labour ministry to fire a redundant worker; (iii) whether the employer 
needs to notify the labour union or the labour ministry for group dismissals; (iv) whether the 
employer needs approval from the labour union or the labour ministry for firing a redundant 
worker; (v) whether the employer needs approval from the labour union or the labour ministry 
for group dismissals; (vi) whether the law mandates training or replacement before dismissal; 
(vii) whether priority rules apply for dismissals; and (viii) whether priority rules apply for re-
employment.  
Table II-14 presents the relevant information from the 2006 World Bank study. The overall 
rigidity of employment index is the arithmetic mean of the three sub-indices that measure the 
difficulty of hiring, rigidity of hours, and difficulty of firing.  
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Table II-14 
The World Bank Employment Regulation and Legislation Index (2006)  
  Difficulty of 
hiring 




Rigidity of  
employment 
index 
Germany  44 80 40 55 
France  78 80 40 66 
Italy  61 80 30 57 
Spain  67 80 50 66 
UK  11 20 10 14 
Source: World Bank (2006) 
 
The World Bank index basically confirms the ranking presented in the OECD study. In par-
ticular, the unique position of the UK is confirmed by the World Bank study, and again, the 
other four countries follow after a large distance while the differences between the other 
countries are relatively small.  
There are, however, some differences. The EPL index of the OECD ranks Italy slightly better 
than Germany, which is reversed in the World Bank report. In addition, the World Bank index 
tends to exhibit more pronounced differences between the countries. For example, Germany’s 
labour market rigidities appear to be relatively more stringent under the World Bank Index 
than under the EPL index of the OECD.  
Employment flexibility indicator  
Our second sub-indicator approximates the labour productivity developments of the incum-
bent operators over the last years. Specifically, we take the change in the number of main 
lines per employee in the fixed-lines business between 2000 and 2005 as our employment 
flexibility indicator. The variable main lines counts the number of access lines to the incum-
bent’s network including internet connections. This rather broad definition (which comprises 
more than the standard cooper lines to the customer) intends to cover not just the size and 
extent of the incumbent’s network but also the overall services offered through the incum-
bent’s network. Therefore, our variable of main lines includes narrowband and ISDN lines 
(S0x2 and S2Mx30 for ISDN lines) as well as DSL connections. We also incorporated un-
bundled and wholesale lines, as the associated relevant network elements remain operated by 
the incumbent in those cases.  DIW Berlin: Politikberatung kompakt  44 
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Our employment variable includes mainly the share of the incumbents’ workforce that deals 
with fixed-line businesses and not other branches as, e.g., mobile services or other IT busi-
nesses.  
Table II-15 depicts the development of main lines per employee in the broadband/fixed line 
segments over the period 2000-2005 for the five countries.18  
Table II-15 
Main lines per employee: Development 
  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Deutsche Telekom  341,6  336,2 356,2 416,9 482,8 497,4 
France Telecom  262,1  279,6 302,1 335,1 375,1 470,6 
Telecom Italia   408,3  475,1 523,6 574,3 611,2 574,7 
Telefónica 493,2  505,4  460,1 542,4 542,4 623,5 
British Telecom  346,6  362,6 383,7 420,7 529,3 554,4 
Source: Deutsche Telekom (2000 to 2005), France Telekom (2000 to 2005), Telecom Italia (2000 to 2005), 
Telefónica (2000 to 2005), British Telecom (2000 to 2005a), own calculations. 
 
Country specific labour market conditions  
The labour market conditions and regulations in the five countries differ in many regards. One 
such feature is the presence of civil servants as part of the incumbent’s workforce. However, 
civil servants are only an issue in France and Germany. Table II-16 presents the number of 
civil servants in Deutsche Telekom and in France Telecom.  
Germany 
Even before the first reforms in the telecommunication sector (Postreform I)19 were realised, 
civil servants were considered as an obstacle for the flexibility of a private company. The 
second part of the reform (Postreform II) regulated the conversion of the German Federal 
Postal enterprises into stock corporations20 and covered particular provisions concerning civil 
servants employed by the former state monopolist. 
                                                                          
18 See the Appendix for more detailed information. 
19 The German Federal Post was organised as a state monopoly. The Postreform I regulated the fragmentation of 
the monopoly into three organisational units: postal service, bank and telecommunication. 
20 The Postreform II is based on the Post and Telecommunications Reorganisation Act (Gesetz zur Neuordnung 
des Postwesens und der Telekommunikation – Postneuordnungsgesetz (PTNeuOG) from September 1994. DIW Berlin: Politikberatung kompakt  44 
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Table II-16 
Civil servants in Deutsche Telekom and France Telecom 
       2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
DT  Employees  Germany  179,2 178,3 177,8 173,3 170,8 167,9 
  Number of civil servants 
active 
ISB* 

























  Share of civil servants   45,1  43,2  41,8  41,4  41,4  41,4 
FT
 **  Employees  France  148,8 145,3 141,1 130,1 123,8 118,4 
  France  Telecom  SA  130,5 123,4 117,5 111,0 106,9 102,2 
 Domestic  Subsidiaries  20,9 22,8 23,5 19,1 16,9 16,2 
  Number of civil servants  n.a.  108  102  94  87  85 
  Share of civil servants 
(France Telecom SA) 
n.a. 87,5 86,8 84,7 81,4 83,2 
* ISB (Insichbeurlaubung) = on temp. leave from civil-servant status 
** Average number of employees (full time equivalent) 
Sources: Deutsche Telekom (2000 to 2005), France Telecom (2000 to 2005)  
 
While the civil servants status was to be maintained, it had to be adapted to the conditions of a 
privately organized enterprise. To achieve this goal, the German Constitution and the postal 
employee representation act (Postpersonalvertretungsgesetz) was changed and a new legal 
basis for labour relations was introduced: Deutsche Telekom AG was entitled to exercise the 
rights and duties of the Federal Republic as the employer of civil servants (Dienstherrenbe-
fugnisse). However, the supervision (Dienstaufsicht) over the fulfilment and compliance of 
the responsibilities remained with the regulatory authority (Aufsichtsbehörde).  
Civil Servants and Personnel Measures of Deutsche Telekom AG 2000 – 2005 
To foster restructuring and efficiency Deutsche Telekom and the union agreed in 1999 that 
there would be no dismissals due to rationalization till 2004. Job cuts had to be carried out 
mainly by outsourcing logistic activities. Furthermore, the collective bargaining round in 
2000 led to the introduction of a variable income component. This was the first step towards a 
new market-and demand-orientated pay scheme (Neues Bewertungs- und Bezahlungssystem, 
NBBS) within Deutsche Telekom. DIW Berlin: Politikberatung kompakt  44 
II Industrial Policy 
25 
Till 2001 23.000 employees were transferred to expanding subsidiaries with the right of return 
to Deutsche Telekom. Furthermore, Deutsche Telekom ended payment conditions adjusted to 
the public sector for employees covered by collective labour agreements. Factors such as 
family status, age or seniority in the company no longer had any influence on wages. Payment 
was to be dependent only on the function actually performed. The intention of the new pay-
ment system was to enhance performance of the labour force and to make personnel costs 
more transparent. However, the new scheme was applicable to non civil-servants only. 
In 2002 Deutsche Telekom announced that the company had to follow a stringent consolida-
tion course because of its bad economic shape. Traditional and classical instruments of per-
sonnel reduction such as compensations for voluntary leave and early retirement programs 
were adopted to a large extent. In mid-2002, Deutsche Telekom and the unions signed a col-
lective agreement on protection against rationalization (till 2004). The agreement protected 
employees with collectively agreed employment relationships and junior staff in training 
within Deutsche Telekom. Furthermore, an in-house Personnel Service Agency (PSA) was 
established.  
The primary intention of the PSA was to absorb employees who were affected by rationaliza-
tion and to reintegrate them into jobs in- and outside of the company after retraining. Employ-
ees without appropriate job offers would be assigned to temporary21 jobs. The employees kept 
their contractual rights. Apprentices who successfully completed their education were also 
transferred to the PSA for a period of one year. 
The PSA was reorganized and – renamed Vivento, the personnel and business service pro-
vider of Deutsche Telekom. Additional services were added to the agency’s tasks. They in-
cluded arranging contracts and temporary work agreements (in- and outside of the company), 
providing Vivento employees with individual support, retraining and placement in permanent 
jobs. As in 2002, Vivento’s activities were based on the collective agreement on protection 
against rationalisation. The corresponding regulations also applied to civil servants within 
Deutsche Telekom. At the beginning of 2003 the activities of TTC und T-Systems Training 
GmbH were bundled in Telekom Training which is now the group-wide full-service provider 
for training and development. In addition, the service provider developed its own business 
line (call center market and network infrastructure services on the internal and external mar-DIW Berlin: Politikberatung kompakt  44 
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ket). Additionally, some other arrangements should be mentioned. Firstly, Deutsche Telekom 
made an agreement with the Ministry of Finance (BMF) which allowed the placement of civil 
servants from Deutsche Telekom in jobs at the federal administration. Secondly, civil servants 
from Deutsche Telekom supported regional agencies of the Federal Employment Services 
(Bundesagentur für Arbeit) during the implementation of an unemployment pay reform (Hartz 
IV-Reform).  
In March 2004, Deutsche Telekom and the union (ver.di) concluded an alliance for ‘innova-
tive employment at Deutsche Telekom’ to ensure employment within the company. The 
agreement covers the following aspects:  
•  Shortening of weekly working hours (from 38 to 34) for both, non-civil-employees and 
civil servants, accompanied by a partial reduction in salaries and no increase of income in 
2004. As a result, approximately 9800 employees should gain secure employment. 
•  In addition to the alliance, the Act concerning the Legal Provisions for Staff of the Former 
Deutsche Bundespost (Postpersonalrechtsgesetz – PostPersRG) was amended (November 
2004). A complete cancellation of the year-end bonus was introduced. Combined with the 
reduction of vacation allowances this was to fund the reduction in work-time. Furthermore, 
the amendment gave Deutsche Telekom the option to delegate civil servants to other com-
panies and to eliminate the time limit for temporary leave (Insichbeurlaubungen). 
Till 2005 about 34.200 employees had entered Vivento. 18.900 of them successfully moved to 
other jobs so that Vivento had about 15.300 employees in 2005. 700 were ranked as perma-
nent staff/management and about 7.200 were employed in the business lines of Vivento 
(Vivento Technical Services GmbH (VTS) and Vivento Customer Services GmbH (VCS)). 
4.700 employees were moved to subcontracted labour or temporary work positions. However, 
in its decision on the 22th of June 2006, the Higher Administrative Court (Bundesverwal-
tungsgericht) declared the transfer of civil servants to Vivento as illegal. 
During 2006 Deutsche Telekom launched a staff restructuring program. The main goal was a 
further reduction of employees on a voluntary basis and without the need for compulsory 
redundancies. According to the program, around 32.000 employees in Germany are expected 
to have left the Group by the end of 2008. The program provides measures like partial retire-
                                                                          
21 This provision is based on the German Law Concerning Employee Secondment (Arbeitnehmerüberlassungs-
gesetz - AÜG). DIW Berlin: Politikberatung kompakt  44 
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ment arrangements, voluntary redundancy and severance payments. On May 31, 2006, the 
Federal Cabinet adopted a “Draft Second Bill to Amend the Act for the Improvement of the 
Staff Structure at the Residual Special Asset of the Federal Railways and the Successor Com-
panies of the Former Deutsche Bundespost” and introduced it into the legislative process. The 
act entered into force on November 16, 2006 and enabled Deutsche Telekom to include civil 
servants in staff restructuring measures. Civil servants who are working in areas where there 
is a surplus of staff and for whom employment in another area is not possible or cannot rea-
sonably be expected in line with civil service legislation, will be able to apply for early re-
tirement from the age of 55.  
Pensions regulations for civil servants of Deutsche Telekom  
Civil servants employed by Deutsche Telekom are entitled to pension benefits provided by 
the Federal Republic pursuant to the German Civil Servant Pension Act (Beamtenver-
sorgungsgesetz). In accordance with the provisions of the Post and Telecommunications Re-
organization Act (Gesetz zur Neuordnung des Postwesens und der Telekommunikation) in the 
context of the privatisation of Deutsche Telekom, the company is required to make annual 
contributions for pensioners to a special pension fund (Unterstützungskasse). The pension 
fund makes pension and allowance payments to retired employees and their surviving de-
pendents who are entitled to pension payment as a result of their civil servant status. From 
1995 through 1999 Deutsche Telekom was obliged to make annual contributions to this pen-
sion fund to the amount of € 1.5bn. From 2000 on, Deutsche Telekom had to make annual 
contributions equal to 33 % of the gross remuneration of its active civil servant employees 
(including civil servant employees on unpaid and temporary leave).22 As a result of the new 
arrangement, Deutsche Telekom expected a significantly lower annual contribution than was 
required from 1995 to 1999. The Federal government complements the special pension fund 
for differences between payment obligations and the fund’s capacity.  
 
                                                                          
22 In 2000 the special pension funds Deutsche Telekom, Deutsche Post AG and Deutsche Postbank AG were 
merged to the joint pension fund (Bundes-Pensions-Service für Post und Telekommunikation e. V. (BPS-PT)). 
The BPS-PT works for the funds of all three companies and also handles the financial administration for the 
Federal Republic on a trust basis. DIW Berlin: Politikberatung kompakt  44 
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Table II-17 
Contributions by Deutsche Telekom to the pension fund (estimates) 
  1995-1999 2000 2001 2002 2003  2004  2005 
million  €    1.500  895 845 838 809  911
  862
 
Source: Deutsche Telekom (2008a)  
 
France  
Civil servants represented 84,2% of the staff of France Telecom in 2005. In 2003 the FT 
group shrank by 7% (in comparison to 2002) while staff with private contracts increased by 
5.1% over the same period of time. The trend is presently levelling. However, accelerated 
retirement of civil servants is expected to take place during 2006-2010, due to numerous re-
tirements of baby-boomers hired in the early seventies, during a period of rapid take-off of 
telephony in France accompanied by staff extensions. 
France Telecom has some personnel with temporary contracts. However, their share is smaller 
than one per cent and has decreased since 2001.  
The transition of France Telecom from state administration to private enterprise was a long-
run affair. Concerning the “civil servant status”, a decision was made in 1990 (2nd July 1990 
law), that FT would not recruit any civil servants after 2001. All civil servants in FT would 
stay until retirement (Collective Agreement of July 9
th 1990 for a new employee policy: 
“Volet social de la Réforme”). A new Employee Status was negotiated in July 1992 including 
a new classification for employees. High-level managers were classified in 1993, and other 
employees were classified in 1994.  
On November 18th, 1993, “Conseil d’Etat”, the Government counsel and French higher ad-
ministrative court, decided that civil servants could work in a private company only if (1) the 
government still held the majority of shares directly or indirectly and (2) the company was in 
charge of a public service (Conseil d’Etat (1993)). 
Two majors decisions were taken for civil servants: 
•  First, the new 1992 status offers specific positions and incentives for senior management. 
If senior managers accept this new status (with rules for appreciation, promotion, etc. al-
most like those in the private sector) s/he receives a new retribution with a substantial bo-
nus. DIW Berlin: Politikberatung kompakt  44 
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•  Specific dispositions were taken to help transfers to other French administrations (and 
education) or firms. Details for this specific arrangement are shown below. 
In the meantime an enormous training effort was made to transfer staff to commercial posi-
tions (60 000 people transferred in 5 years) since there was an agreement that no lay-offs 
would be imposed. 
Back in 1997, more than 80% of France Telecom personnel were civil servants and France 
Telecom met the two conditions imposed by Conseil d’Etat. However, in 2003 two changes 
appeared. On the one hand, the new European telecom regulatory package was enforced, 
demanding that Universal Service be tendered. Therefore, France Telecom could, in theory, 
lose Universal Service (Journal Officel de la République Française (2004b)). On top of that, 
the Raffarin government (centre-right) opened the way to a sale of more France Telecom 
shares. The law voted in Parliament at the end of 2003 (Journal Officiel de la République 
Française (2004a)) allows, in a derogatory way, civil servants who still worked in France 
Telecom at the time to remain in the company until they retire. 
Even though the status of civil servants is now stable in France Telecom, this situation clearly 
creates a management problem in terms of costs and flexibility of labour. Several steps have 
been taken to decrease both the number and the cost of civil servants for France Telecom. 
1. In 1997, France Telecom paid € 5.7bn to the state as a lump sum to be used to pay the extra 
costs of the pensions of its retiring civil servants: the government was happy to receive 
funds lowering the budget deficit while France Telecom was happy to get rid of an enor-
mous pension debt looming in the future. 
2. Civil servants aged 55 or more were encouraged to take early retirement leave (“Congé de 
fin de carrière, or CFC). On November 30, 1995, an agreement was signed with the major 
trade unions (CFDT, CFTC, CGT, FO) so that France Telecom civil servants using the 
CFC system kept 70 % of their wages between 55 and 60 years and do not have to work. 
3700 civil servants left for a CFC in 2001, 4200 in 2002 and 4400 in 2003. From a finan-
cial point of view, this represents large expenditures. In 1997, France Telecom estimated 
the total cost of CFC to about € 27bn At the end of 2004, the corresponding provisions 
made in the consolidated accounts were equal to € 3.5bn The “Congé de Fin de Carrière” 
early retirement scheme ended in 2006, but a similar plan is expected to substitute it. DIW Berlin: Politikberatung kompakt  44 
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3. France Telecom encourages its civil servants to leave for “regular” civil service jobs. In 
2003, an agreement was signed with the trade unions to help civil servants willing to leave 
the company by the end of 2005. France Telecom pays them (1) training; (2) any wage dif-
ferential between France Telecom and their new job over a two-year period; (3) a bonus 
equivalent to four monthly wages (France Telecom (2004)). The law adopted at the end of 
2003 (Journal Officiel de la République Française (2004a)) gives similar benefits to civil 
servants leaving France Telecom for other government jobs till the end of 2009. Further-
more, administrations accepting former France Telecom civil servants also receive addi-
tional benefits (including an amount equivalent to 4 monthly wages). In 2004, 711 civil 
servants have left France Telecom and joined other government jobs (2/3 in state admini-
strations and 1/3 in local administrations). At the end of 2004, 12 % of France Telecom 
civil servants (that is, 11,000 employees) were listed on the company intranet, devoted to 
job mobility towards other public jobs (France Telecom (2004)). This endeavour, as a 
whole, has had limited impact. 
Italy 
Italy’s Telecom Italia never had civil servants as part of its workforce, because SIP, the 
predecessor of Telecom Italia exclusively relied on private employment contracts.  
Telecom Italia’s labour productivity (as measured by main lines per employee) has increased 
from 2000 to 2005 considerably (see below). One of the main explanations for this develop-
ment is linked to Telecom Italia’s business strategy to eliminate inefficiencies, duplications, 
and thus, to increase the overall productivity of the company. A second reason relies on or-
ganisational changes, in particular, the spinning-off and outsourcing of several activities, 
while new activities have been become part of Telecom Italia’s business activities. A realistic 
estimate is that at least two-thirds of the decrease in the company’s employment is attributable 
to productivity improvements, while one-third comes from spin-offs, outsourcing and other 
unspecified sources. 
Law 30/2003 on the reform of labour market regulation - the so-called “Biagi law” – has 
given some momentum towards more flexible forms of employment. In most cases, the social 
partners are to agree on the conditions under which companies may use these forms of em-
ployment, which include new forms of part-time work (alongside forms such as on-call work, 
'project' work, staff leasing and job-sharing). According to the law, these conditions must be DIW Berlin: Politikberatung kompakt  44 
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set by collective bargaining either at national/sectoral level or at the regional level (i.e. at the 
level of a geographical unit such as a province). While the Biagi law can be seen as a recent 
attempt to remove restriction on temporary and fixed-time employment, latest developments 
in the policy arena are ambiguous.  
More specifically, until the beginning of the new century, it was very difficult in Italy to hire 
temporary workers: rules governing temporary employment were very restrictive, such that 
the associated costs of temporary labour were too high to make this form of employment 
attractive. In sum, those regulations largely discourage any hiring of workers on a temporary 
basis. As a result, all sorts of illegal employment flourished – typically, in call centres. 
The “Biagi Law” intends to promote more flexible labour relations. It also aims at making 
temporary work easier to handle and to implement so as to make it more attractive from a 
pure cost perspective. It can be attributed to the Biagi law that temporary and fixed-term em-
ployment relations greatly increased in call centres and other sorts of telecommunication 
based information centres, which are run by Telecom companies. Recently, however, the new 
government has declared to cut back those liberalizations in order to transform temporary 
occupations into permanent employment relations. As these latest developments have been 
causing a great uproar among telecommunication service providers, the future direction of 
Italy’s labour market policy in this domain remains rather unclear. 
Spain 
Telefónica never had civil servants as employees, even when it was a public firm. From 1945 
to 1996, the Spanish State had enough of stake to control Telefónica. It was considered as a 
public firm because the State was the main shareholder, but Telefónica never was a public 
administration. 
Telefónica suffered an overcapacity problem due to technological progress. However, the 
number of employees has been reduced through three main initiatives: 
•  Anticipated retirements, 
•  incentive and voluntary dismissal and  
•  by moving people to other subsidiaries, such us Telefónica Móviles, subsidiaries in Amer-
ica, etc. DIW Berlin: Politikberatung kompakt  44 
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It is not extremely difficult to get rid of employees in Telefónica, if proposals for employees 
are attractive. From the beginning of the 1990s, Telefónica has carried out a strategy of reduc-
ing personnel in traditional business in Spain, namely fixed communications. This business is 
now operated by “Telefónica de España”, a 100% subsidiary of Telefónica S.A. In the table 
below there is an evolution of the number of employees in Telefónica de España. 
Table II-18 
Development of personnel 
Telefónica  de  España  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Employees  (end  of  year) 43.009 42.245 43.952 38.464 36.425 35.055 
Source: Telefónica (2000 to 2005) 
Note: Telefónica has made some changes in the personnel statistics. We include the note provided by Tele-
fónica: “In 2003, Katalyx and Emergia became part of Telefónica Empresas Group, and in 2004, Telefónica 
Empresas became part of Telefónica de España and Telefónica Latinoamerica. As a consequence of this 
reorganization and in order to have comparable figures for prior years , we have re-classified certain employ-
ees to Telefónica de Espana (1779 in 2002, 1878 in 2003, and 2091 in 2004) and to Telefónica Latinoamerica 
(2346 in 2002, 2621 in 2003 and 2571 employees in 2004). 
 
Considering labour market reforms, Spanish stakeholders, trade unions, central government 
and entrepreneurial associations were in contact since March 2006 in order to get a general 
agreement that allows the improving of labour conditions in Spain, especially the promotion 
of initiatives that may increase the percentage of workers with a permanent job contract. By 
mid 2006, 30% of the workers had a temporary contract. This rate is very high if compared to 
the about 13% that represents the European Union. 
The agreement was reached at the beginning of June and a Royal Decree (a legislative norm 
elaborated by the central government) was released on the First of July. The main changes of 
this new norm are as follows: 
•  The new regulation established a limit of 30 months to employ a worker with two or more 
temporary contracts that imply at least 24 months of work during that time. If that limit is 
reached, the firm must convert the temporary contract into a permanent one.  
•  In order to promote permanent employment contracts, the Royal Decree has increased the 
allowance to be received by the firms that hire new workers of certain categories with 
permanent contracts (see Table II-19 below).  
•  Workers fired will receive a cash compensation of 33 days of salary for each year of con-
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•  The contribution that the firm pays to the Unemployment Fund for every permanent job 
contract is reduced by 0.50 points of the salary. Before the Royal Decree the rate was 6%. 
After the modification the new rate is 5.75%, and there will be a new reduction in July 
2008 at 5.5%.  
Table II-19 
Labour Market Reform in Spain 
 Category Description Yearly allowance
Duration of the 
allowance
Unemployed, and those that have been
victims of gender violence 850 euros 4 years
For contracts for women within 24 months
after the childbirth
For contracts for women after 5 years of
labour inactivity, and only if the women
worked before 3 years at least.
For contracts for women with contract
interrupted (permanent or temporary) that are 
willing to reincorporate after the maternity
period.
1.200 euros
Duration of the 
contract
Young people  Between 16 and 30 years old 800 euros 4 years
Unemploided people during, at least 6
months and esocial excluded people 600 euros 4 years
Conversion into permanent of learning and
substitutions contracts 500 euros 4 years
Disabled people 
3.000 euros and 3.200 euros if 
it is a case of severe disabled 
capacity
Duration of the 
contract
People aged more than 45 years
Other cases
Allowances to be received by the firms for new permanent job contract
Women




In UK labour market regulations do not constrain the incumbent’s business practices much. 
There are no civil servants employed at BT. The transition occurred before the period of this 
study begins. It is worth noting that BT downsized its labour force without a strike being 
called and more or less entirely through voluntary redundancy schemes.  
II.3.2 The  Indicator 
We now turn to the construction of our labour market regulation indicator. We transform the 
2003 EPL Index of the OECD and the World Bank rigidity of employment index (see Table 
II-13 and Table II-14) according to our normalization method. The aggregated indicator for 
the countries’ employment protection is presented in Table II-20.  DIW Berlin: Politikberatung kompakt  44 
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Table II-20 
Employment protection sub-indicator 
 Germany  France  Italy  Spain  UK 
Employment 
protection indicator   3,2 2,9 2,9 2,7  10,0 
 
The indicator gives UK the highest score with the other countries following after a consider-
able distance.  
The employment flexibility sub-indicator approximates the labour productivity developments 
of the incumbent operators over the last years. As it was extremely difficult to harmonise data 
for employment and for main lines23, the indicator will be based on changes in main lines per 
employee between 2000 and 2005. Since this approach does not take into account initial dif-
ferences in absolute labour productivity, the indicator tends to overestimate flexibility if ini-
tial employment was inefficiently high and technological progress was roughly the same in all 
countries. However, any adjustment with respect to initial values would require an implicit 
comparison of absolute values which in turn would require adjustments with respect to coun-
try specific effects like geographic conditions. In order to avoid these difficulties we rely on 
the development of main lines per employee and consider the changes between 2000 and 
2005. Using Table II-15, calculating the differences between the main lines per employee for 
the years 2005 and 2000 and transforming the results according to our normalization proce-
dure we arrive at the results presented in Table II-21. 
Table II-21 
Employment flexibility sub-indicator 
 Germany  France  Italy  Spain  UK 
Employment 
flexibility   7,5 10,0 8,0  6,2 10,0 
 
The employment flexibility indicator shows that UK and France perform best in this regard. 
Italy ranks third with a score of 8,0, while Germany and Spain obtain values of 7,5 and 6,2, 
respectively. 
                                                                          
23 Employment data differed with respect to annual averages or year-end date, full-time equivalents or head 
counts, concern or company data, national or international coverage. Main lines were counted as access lines in 
some countries and as channels in other (adjusting for the incidence of ISDN and broadband lines). The pub-
lished figures did not allow for a complete harmonisation of figures.  DIW Berlin: Politikberatung kompakt  44 
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Combining the two sub-indicators we get the ranking shown in Table II-22. The ranking summa-
rises the two sub-indicators presented above assuming that both affect the incumbents’ flexibility 
with respect to personnel strategies roughly to the same extent. The weights are therefore one-
half for each sub-indicator. 
Table II-22 
Labour market regulations 
Indicator Germany  France  Italy  Spain  UK 
Labour market  
regulation   5,3 6,4 5,4 4,5  10,0 
 
Our overall ranking shows that the incumbent in the UK benefits from its high ranking with 
respect to both sub-indicators. France – which follows at significant distance – obtains the 
second best score of 6,4. Germany, Italy and Spain suffer from both their low rankings with 
respect to employment protection and their relatively low increases in labour productivity.  
Figure II-4 
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II.4 Competition  policy 
Competition policy affects incumbents mainly by challenging their merger and acquisition 
activities. In some countries anticompetitive behaviour of the incumbent is also dealt with by 
competition authorities, while in the majority of cases it remains exclusively under control of 
the national regulatory authority. In this section we focus on competition authorities interven-
tions in non-regulated markets, so that our competition policy indicator addresses the re-DIW Berlin: Politikberatung kompakt  44 
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sponses of competition authorities to mergers, purchases and re-integrations of firms into the 
incumbent operator.  
Overall, our indicator mirrors the restrictions competition policy imposes on the incumbent’s 
strategies that involve selling, purchasing, separating and re-integrating firms or parts of firms 
as well as mergers with other firms in the sectors. The indicator also covers merger cases that 
affect the incumbent’s competitors. In those instances we analyse how the competition au-
thority’s decisions of mergers between competitors affect the competitiveness of the incum-
bent.  
The next section presents key facts about competition authorities’ activities in the five coun-
tries, where we also assess those actions in terms of being favourable to the incumbent. 
Thereafter, we derive our competition policy indicator which summarizes the results of the 
country studies. 
II.4.1 Country  comparisons 
Germany 
In the telecommunications sector market power and the abuse of market dominance is typi-
cally controlled by the regulatory authority for telecommunications, while merger control is 
part of the competence of the Federal Cartel Office (Bundeskartellamt).24 To understand how 
the practice of competition policy in Germany affects the competitive environment of the 
incumbent in the telecommunication sector, we will have a closer look at stage II merger 
decisions which occurred in the last years in the telecommunications industry and the closely 
related cable business. The following Table II-23 shows that there were only 7 cases in the 
last seven years. 
 
  
                                                                          
24 The Federal Cartel Office is also responsible for the prosecution of cartels in the telecommunications industry. 
The delineation of competencies between the Federal Cartel Office and the National Regulatory Authority are 
described in Schroeder (1999), p. 27. Though, cartels have not been a problem the telecommunications industry 
so far.  DIW Berlin: Politikberatung kompakt  44 
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Table II-23 
Phase II merger decisions of the German Cartel Office (2000-2006) 
Industries  Number of cases  Number/percentage  
of prohibited cases 
Cable   2  1 / 50 % 
Telecom   5  0 / 0% 
Source: Bundeskartellamt (2008), own calculations. 
 
As Table II-23 shows, no major merger was prohibited in the telecommunication sector while 
one out of two phase II mergers in the cable industry was blocked by the cartel office. We 
will examine merger cases in the telecommunications and the cable sector more closely and 
we consider both mergers where the incumbent was involved and those between competing 
firms. We will focus on stage II merger. In those instances, the cartel office undertook in-
depth investigations which allow us to learn more about the authority’s attitude towards the 
telecommunications industry, and in particular vis-à-vis the incumbent.  
In 2000 the acquisition of the software IT-service firm debis Systemhaus by Deutsche Tele-
kom was approved by the German cartel office. While there were some concerns that 
Deutsche Telekom may gain an informational advantage through the merger, the overall as-
sessment was that the competitive pressure in the software service market will counter possi-
ble anti-competitive effects, so that neither competition in the software service market nor in 
the incumbent’s core businesses would be harmed.  
In 2001 the German cartel office approved the acquisition of Netcologne - which is a city 
carrier in the area of Cologne - by Callahan Nordrhein-Westfalen GmbH (CNRW) which 
provides access for cable television channels. It was asserted that the merger would lessen 
competition in the cable transit level. However, the German cartel office took the view that 
competition in the fixed telephony market and the broadband access market would increase, 
so that the positive effects of the merger would outbalance the anticompetitive effects of the 
undertaking. In its biannual report, the German cartel Office expressed the view that the pro-
competitive effects in the local loop market vis-à-vis the dominant position of the incumbent 
should outweigh the anticompetitive effects in the cable market. Hence, the decision to let the 
merger go through was mainly driven by an argument that relied on the alleged positive com-
petitive effects resulting from strengthening the merging firms and weakening the market 
power of the incumbent.  DIW Berlin: Politikberatung kompakt  44 
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In 2002 the cartel office approved the acquisition of 49 % of the shares of Nexnet GmbH by 
T-Venture which is a subsidiary of Deutsche Telekom.25 The acquired firm serves as a clear-
ing house for telecommunication services – a market with only three major firms at the time 
of the proposed acquisition. T-Ventures provides venture capital for new firms entering new 
markets in the telecommunication industry. In its decision the cartel office stated that the 
market for clearing services is still in its very early stages and that Nexnet faced considerable 
problems. Moreover, the cartel office argued that Deutsche Telekom would not gain an in-
formational advantage as all relevant customer data must be made available to all competitors 
on a non-discriminatory basis. As a consequence, no additional potential for an abuse of 
Deutsche Telekom’s dominant position in the telephony market was assumed.  
Overall, these cases may indicate that the German cartel office is prepared to take a balanced 
approach in cases where the incumbent intends to acquire firms that do not belong to the core 
businesses of the incumbent. In other words, there are little signs that competition policy 
restricts the incumbent’s activities significantly, when conglomerate mergers are at stake. The 
balanced approach the German cartel office took in those cases seems to indicate that an ac-
quisition is likely to be approved whenever it is very unlikely that such a merger will 
strengthen the incumbent’s market power in its core businesses. However, the attitude ex-
pressed in the Netcologne takeover also shows that the cartel office is willing to neglect com-
petitive harm caused by mergers among rival firms which may threaten the incumbent’s mar-
ket position. 
To obtain a more complete grasp of the overall approach of the German cartel office vis-à-vis 
merger activities where a dominant network operator is involved, it is instructive to examine 
the merger decisions in the cable market. The German cable market is rather fragmented. 
Deutsche Telekom controlled the cable operator Kabel Deutschland GmbH (KDG) but the 
German cartel office has demanded Deutsche Telekom to sell its shares of KDG.  
Because of its fragmented structure the German cable market is characterized by intense con-
solidating activities. Consolidation takes place between cable operators operating in the same 
stage of the value chain, and mergers are therefore often horizontal in nature. While many 
mergers between rather small operators have been approved by the cartel office in Germany, 
there were also two phase II cases. Most prominently, in 2001 the German cartel office pro-
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hibited the takeover of VIOLA Kabelgesellschaft (which controls the Kabel Deutschland 
GmbH, which in turn is the cable network operating subsidiary of Deutsche Telekom) by the 
Liberty Media Corporation, an international media and communication technology firm. In 
this case the cartel office argued that the merger would diminish remaining competition for 
accesses between cable operators. At the same time possible efficiencies due to higher net-
work investments were played down.  
An interpretation of the decision could be that the cartel office cares mainly about dominance 
in the short run and is not much inclined to consider possible positive effects on dynamic 
competition. This view is somehow reassured by a 2005 press announcement concerning 
takeover of the cable operators ish, KBW, and iesy by KDG, where the cartel office has re-
vealed a similar reasoning. Namely, substantial mergers between network operators are re-
garded as not constructive for the dynamic development of the cable market.  
We obtain additional information about the attitude of the cartel office in Germany by looking 
at mergers that did not reach the second stage of investigation. Those cases are summarized in 
the biannual reports of the Federal Cartel Office, and it is instructive to notice that all of those 
mergers among competitors of the incumbent were approved without further in-depth investi-
gations (for illustrative purposes, the takeover of o.tel.o communications’ fixed line business 
by Mannesmann has been approved without further investigations). 
Overall, we can conclude that competition policy in the form of merger control in the tele-
communications industry takes a balanced approach conglomerate cases, while in horizontal 
cases between network operators a more restrictive pattern has been revealed. However, re-
garding the incumbent this statement only follows from observed cases which reached the 
cartel office. We can only speculate about the deterrence effects the cartel authority exerts on 
the incumbent’s integration and merger strategies. There are some indications that those de-
terrence effects are real and potentially quite large. Finally, our analysis of merger control vis-
à-vis competitors demonstrates that the cartel authority is willing to let otherwise anti-
competitive mergers go through if they create a threat to the incumbent’s assumed dominant 
positions telecommunications markets. Taking everything together, it appears to be fair to 
evaluate competition policy as rather unfavourable to the incumbent in Germany, in particu-
lar, with regard to its core business.  DIW Berlin: Politikberatung kompakt  44 
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France 
The relative assessment of the situation in France depends first of all on the observation that 
governmental as well as competition policy is in general merger-friendly. This is true for the 
entire economy and also for the telecommunications industry. This statement is validated by 
merger investigations led by the European Commission, where the French authority has al-
ways sided with the merging parties (see, e.g., Legrand /Schneider and Sanofi-Synthelabo / 
Aventis involving French companies falling EC jurisdiction).26 As is widely acknowledged, 
the political establishment in France seems to appeal to the idea that “big is beautiful” and 
“national champions” even more so. It is, therefore, not surprising that no objection has been 
raised against France Telecom re-folding its Internet access subsidiary Wanadoo and the mo-
bile unit Orange within the FT Group. Interesting though, this attitude also has been applied 
towards mergers among firms which compete with the incumbent operator. Namely, a signifi-
cant number of smaller mergers occurred in the telecommunications sector, in particular, 
Telecom Italia/Tiscali and Cegetel/9Telecom. Relatedly, we observe no interventions in the 
media sector in the heydays of Vivendi taking over Canal+ and Universal.  
Overall, we obtain the impression that competition policy neither restricts the incumbent’s 
acquisition strategies nor the competitors’ merger decisions much. As a consequence, we 
cannot regard competition policy in France, as being unfavourable to the incumbent. The 
general appeal to the idea that large national champions are desirable rather point towards the 
opposite conclusion that competition policy must be evaluated as favourable to the incum-
bent. The only qualifier to this assessment – from the incumbent’s perspective – however, is 
that the “big-is-beautiful” reasoning has also been applied to the incumbent’s competitors.  
Italy 
In order to understand the attitude of the Italian competition authority towards the incumbent 
operator in the telecommunications business, the most relevant observation is the proposed 
merger between Telecom Italia and Megabeam, examined in 2003. Telecom Italia intended to 
acquire Megabeam, a very small company at that time, which provided R-LAN infrastructure 
and Wi-Fi services. The R-LAN (Radio Local Area Network) allows the connection of a final 
user to fixed networks via radio technology and it is crucial for providing Wi-Fi services. The 
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competition authority assumed that the proposed merger will strengthen Telecom Italia’s 
dominant position in the market for access to Wi-Fi services. In addition, it argued that the 
merger will strengthening Telecom Italia’s dominant position in the backward market of ac-
cess services, in the market for broadband connectivity, and in the market for final broadband 
services. 
Even though the market size of the takeover target was negligible from a standard market 
structure point of view, the competition authority did not let the announced acquisition go 
through without imposing substantial obligations as preconditions for an approval of the 
merger; in particular: 
a) Telecom Italia had to renounce to all exclusive rights belonging to the same firm or 
Megabeam. Telecom Italia should separate all the activities related to the provision of Wi-
Fi services from its other activities. 
b) Telecom Italia and Megabeam had to agree to roaming conditions on a non-discriminatory 
basis by adopting the principle of internal-external parity. 
As direct result of those obligations imposed by the competition authority, Telecom Italia 
decided to give up the proposed acquisition of Megabeam.  
Quite generally, this case highlights the conviction of Italy’s competition authority that struc-
tural separation between the network operator and providers of services is a necessary pre-
condition for achieving effective competition in markets that rely on network access. Accord-
ingly, competition policy has been friendly to mergers among rival firms, in particular, when-
ever a weakening of the incumbent operator’s business was part of the assessment. We are, 
therefore, left with the assessment that competition policy appears to be particularly unfa-
vourable to the incumbent in Italy.  
Spain 
In Spain – and quite similar to France – we first of must acknowledge that political interests 
heavily influence competition policy when it comes to large national firms. While competi-
tion policy can be regarded as rather neutral vis-à-vis the incumbent, such an assessment is 
premature in the case of takeovers concerted by foreign firms. In those instances, the decision 
to approve or block the merger may depend eventually on the central government. Not sur-
prisingly, political criteria likely to be higher, and neutrality may not be assured.  DIW Berlin: Politikberatung kompakt  44 
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In line with that observation we find cases where interests of national groups over those of 
foreign origin have been favoured. Some recent mergers have gone through this process, as 
e.g., the proposed merger of digital satellite platforms, cable mergers, and LDMS merger.  
While the so-called “golden share rule” has been abolished recently,27 it has been used (or, 
threatened to be used) to abort the merger Telefónica/British Telecom and Telefónica/KPN 
mergers. As a consequence, both mergers were not realized.  
Digging deeper into the Spanish competition policy system we are confronted with the Servi-
cio de Defensa de la Competencia. It is part of the Ministry of Economic Affairs, and serves 
as a first instance in competition cases. This authority, however, does not exert tight restric-
tions on businesses. In 2003 alone it analysed a total of 79 proposed mergers across the econ-
omy. Of that total, 72 were authorized in a first instance, one was archived, five were sent to 
the Tribunal de Defensa de la Competencia and four were resolved as a decision of the Coun-
cil of Ministers (Central Government).  
Since 1999 there were three major merger cases in the telecommunications industry. All have 
been approved under conditions. First, in 2003 (case no. N-0303) the acquisition of Retevi-
sion by Abertis Telecom was eventually approved, however with conditions to guarantee 
competition in Catalonia. This case involved competitors of the incumbent. Second, in 2002 
(case no.N-280) the merger of Sogecable and Via Digital, two digital satellite TV platforms, 
was approved with minor conditions. Again, that case involved competitors of the incumbent. 
Third, in 2000 (case N-093 BBVA) Telefónica acquired Movilpago, a takeover which was 
approved subject to conditions. 
Overall, the competition policy environment under which the incumbent operates is rather 
unfavourable. Competition policy – backed by the central government’s hostility against for-
eign takeovers – does not restrict the incumbent’s integration and merger decisions much. 
Takeover threats by foreign firms targeting the incumbent firm have been successfully 
blocked.  
                                                                          
27 In a famous ruling by the European Union Court of Justice on June 4, 2002 the Spanish golden share rule has 
been abolished in 1995. Nevertheless, the central government succeeded in retaining the possibility of blocking 
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United Kingdom 
Looking back over the period under study, it is evident that most mergers go through without 
an in-depth investigation. This observation is validated by the fact that proportion of referrals 
to qualifying cases is quite small and can be found to range between 5% and 10% per year. 
However, after allowing for the negotiation of undertakings by the affected parties, it is 
clearly very uncommon for a proposed merger to be struck down as being ‘against the public 
interest’. Nevertheless, it should also be borne in mind that some mergers are abandoned once 
it is evident that they will be struck down, or because the delay in examining the case has put 
off the buyer, so it is perhaps fair to say that 1 in 20 or so of qualifying mergers are prevented 
one way or another.  
Insofar that network industries are concerned, these are mostly transportation and power 
cases, rarely involving communications. So we are left with the fact that the United Kingdom 
did not produce significant empirical evidence for our investigation. Overall, we can conclude 
that a proposed merger in the telecommunications industry is almost certain to be allowed 
subject, in some cases, to acceptance of certain conditions. We refer to the case of the Voda-
fone Group/Project Telecom merger which is reassuring. Vodafone Group offered £ 155 mil-
lion to buy Project Telecom, an ISP. This potentially affected competition in the market for 
retail mobile communication services, and met the minimum turnover test for qualification 
under the Enterprise Act 2002. However, it made little difference to the degree of concentra-
tion in a well-supplied market and there were few objections of any consequence, so the 
merger was cleared. 
The following list summarizes decisions of the Office of fair Trading concerning the commu-
nications sector:  
•  18/09/03: Allowed without remedies [Vodafone/Project Telecom] 
•  24/10/01: Allowed without remedies [NTL/Viatel Global & UK] 
•  16/08/01: Allowed without remedies [Marconi/Easynet Group]  
•  08/05/01: Allowed with remedies imposed [BSkyB/BIB] 
•  23/01/01: Allowed without remedies [Wanadoo/Freeserve] 
•  08/11/00: Allowed without remedies [Microsoft/Telewest (23.6%)]  DIW Berlin: Politikberatung kompakt  44 
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•  18/04/00: Allowed without remedies [Vivendi/BSkyB (24.4%)] 
•  22/03/00: Allowed without remedies [NTL/C&W Communications] 
Quite obviously, we observe a rather lenient policy in the United Kingdom. However, the 
absence of major merger cases, makes it almost impossible, to come to a decisive conclusion 
regarding the incumbent-friendliness of competition policy in the United Kingdom. The ab-
sence of large merger cases involving the incumbent operator could also be the result of a 
deterrence effects exerted by the competition authorities so that acquisitions are not even 
considered as a business strategy at the incumbent’s top management level. 
II.4.2  The indicator  
We started the generation of our competition policy indicator with a country-wise investiga-
tion of merger cases. Overall, we found that competition regimes differ substantially from 
country to country. This observation holds both with regards to political influence and proce-
dural issues. Overall, the competition policy environments under which mergers in the tele-
communications sector have to be contemplated and executed differ considerably. While we 
have to deal with unobserved heterogeneity, our assessments based on the facts collected in 
the country studies allow us to rank the countries according to their incumbent friendliness as 
summarized in Table II-24. 
Table II-24 
Competition policy indicator 
 Germany  France  Italy  Spain  UK 
Competition policy  3,0  10,0  2,0  8,0  5,0 
 
Countries in which merger activity of the incumbent has not been inhibited by competition 
measures obtain a relatively higher score for incumbent friendliness. The level of incumbent 
friendliness of competition policy reaches the highest levels in case of France and Spain. In 
those countries none of the major acquisitions of the incumbent has been blocked or restricted 
by the imposition of unduly obligations. Taking the political climate into account, we found 
that competition policy in France (and - with some qualifications – in Spain) appeals most 
strongly to the idea of “big is beautiful” and the building of national champions. Accordingly, 
we consider competition policy as most favourable to the incumbent in France with Spain 
following in close distance.  DIW Berlin: Politikberatung kompakt  44 
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We found that the idea of national championship does not play a significant role in the re-
maining countries. In the case of the United Kingdom we observed a rather lenient policy, but 
the absence of major merger cases, makes it almost impossible, to come to a decisive conclu-
sion regarding the incumbent-friendliness of competition policy there. The United Kingdom, 
therefore, ranges between France and Spain on the one hand and Italy and Germany on the 
other hand. Italy obtains the lowest score and Germany a slightly better one. In Italy, the 
competition authority virtually blocked the proposed takeover of a very small firm by Tele-
com Italia while mergers among competitors were never challenged.  
With respect to Germany, we found that competition policy in the form of merger control in 
the telecommunications industry takes a restrictive pattern when the core business of the in-
cumbent is involved. Moreover, competition policy appears to exert significant deterrence 
effects on the incumbent’s integration and merger strategies as it is also the case in Italy. 
Finally, our analysis of merger control in Germany vis-à-vis competitors has shown that the 
competition authority is willing to let otherwise anti-competitive mergers go through if they 
create a threat to the incumbent’s assumed dominant positions telecommunications markets; a 
fact which we regard as unfavourable to the incumbent. 
Figure II-5 
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II.5 State  Support 
Although state aid that distorts or threatens to distort competition is generally declared to be 
incompatible with the common market in the EU if it affects trade between member states 
(see European Union (2006), art. 87 (1)), several exemptions exist under which public inter-
vention is or may be accepted (see European Union (2006), art. 87 (2) and (3)). These exemp-
tions include, in particular, measures that aim to promote the economic development of less 
developed areas and state aid to facilitate the development of certain economic activities or 
areas without adversely affecting trading conditions. More specifically, the Commission has 
underlined the existence of a geographical digital divide in Europe and highlighted the need 
for a growing information society. In this regard, the scope for public intervention has also 
been emphasised (see for example the eEurope 2005 action plan28).  
This chapter is based on a selection of some measures through which governments can sup-
port the development of markets, technology diffusion and innovation:  
•  Infrastructure aid (including public private partnerships (PPPs) targeted at infrastructure 
investments) 
•  ICT support  
•  State demand 
II.5.1 Infrastructure  aid 
The supply of broadband access is considered of vital interest for the economy and for citi-
zens’ participation in social life in many countries. However, the extent to which national 
governments support infrastructure investments differs considerably. For example, investment 
in telecommunication infrastructure is regarded as an issue for the private sector in Germany 
whereas in Italy, particularly in the southern regions, infrastructure investment is considered a 
public task, for which public financing should be available. Differences between countries 
also exist with respect to the extend to which PPPs are used to spur infrastructure investments. 
PPPs are not relevant in Germany, while they are used in the other countries.29  
 
                                                                          
28 See Commission of the European Communities (2002) 
29 Information about PPPs is based on Lattemann (2006) and a report commissioned by the French regulator, 
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Box II-2 
Public Private Partnerships 
Broadly defined, public private partnerships can be considered as co-operations between 
governments and private firms. PPPs can differ with respect to the share of responsibility 
between the private and public sector. Goods and services may be provided by the private 
sector while the state provides basic infrastructures, or the state may support investments by 
tendering projects and sharing investment costs. 
The private sector can contribute to the success of PPPs through: 
•  Commercial incentives increasing efficiency of investments and the supply of goods and 
services.  
•  Harnessing of private sector innovation by the public sector. 
•  Increased customer awareness and focus. 
By sharing risks of conducting large projects, such as those derived from delays in building 
time, from exceeding budget limits or from problems in the operation of plants, private in-
vestment incentives can be aligned with overall economic efficiency considerations or po-
litical goals.  
The main reason for risk sharing is that private enterprises are better able to assess business 
risks. The basic principle is to attribute risks where they can best be dealt with and to make 
sure that there is a balanced distribution of risk among partners.  
“Risks should be transferred to the party that may deal with them in the best possible way.” 
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II.5.1.1 Country  comparison 
Germany 
As just mentioned, investment in telecommunication infrastructure is regarded an issue for the 
private sector in Germany. The stimulation of infrastructure investment is supported only DIW Berlin: Politikberatung kompakt  44 
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indirectly by telecommunications regulation, the promotion of competition and measures 
which increase the demand for telecommunication services.  
Additionally, there are no PPPs that focus on infrastructure investment explicitly. While dif-
ferent studies indicate a strong increase of PPP-solutions in Germany, their amount is rela-
tively small compared to other European countries and there are only initiatives, while con-
crete financial programmes are observed in other countries.30  
In June 2005, a bill to speed-up the implementation of public private partnerships (‘ÖPP - 
Beschleunigungsgesetz’) was discussed and later approved by the German Parliament with 
the exception of amendments concerning tender, allocation and investment law. The law was 
designed by a special PPP Task Force composed of representatives from the political system 
and industry. The Task Force also intends to allocate an extensive research assignment within 
the scope of the ‘Aufbau-Ost’-Programm.  
One of the most important initiatives in Germany is the “Initiative D21”. This initiative aims 
at improving Germany’s competitiveness in the information and knowledge society. How-
ever, until now no PPP focusing on broadband infrastructure has been implemented.  
France 
There does not exist a national program that supports infrastructure investments in France. 
However, in 2004 local governments were authorised to put in place broadband deployment 
plans. Some of the related projects were financed via European structural funds, while others 
have been implemented as PPPs. Most notably, some of the French PPPs in the broadband 
sector aim at an intensification of competition in regions where France Telecom acts as a 
monopolist, and at an improvement of availability of broadband technologies in rural areas.31  
In January 2004, France Telecom launched its planned "Département innovant" convention 
aimed at local and regional administrations. The convention takes the form of a straightfor-
ward declaration of intent by the signatories: France Telecom indicates the calendar for im-
plementing ADSL in its distribution frames and the extra measures it might consider taking, 
whilst the département specifies its priorities in terms of ADSL requirements. While France 
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Germany.  
31 Information about PPPs is based on Lattemann (2006) and a report commissioned by the French regulator, 
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Telecom has refused to provide copies of the conventions that have already been signed, 
France Telecom confirms that no signed or prepared convention entails payment of any sub-
sidies. 
The financial effort of France Telecom represents a supplement of € 100m for investments in 
ADSL for the period 2004-2005. The global plan of complementary investments for ADSL 
reached € 700m during 2003 – 2005, in addition to the € 3bn of investment designed for re-
newing and modernising fixed networks in France during 2003 – 2006. 
Given the extent of the operation (by April 2004 some 50 départements had already signed 
conventions), the ART asked for the Conseil de la concurrence's opinion from the point of 
view of competition law.  
The observations of the Conseil de la concurrence's are the following: 
•  The standard convention is quite unclear concerning the exclusivity or privileges in terms 
of information, promotion and financial assistance that France Telecom might receive. 
•  A "Département innovant" partnership may affect local competition conditions, because 
France Telecom may gain a competitive advantage by collecting data on local demand. 
•  For any potential call for tender the construction of certain infrastructures or the provision 
of certain services France Telecom may benefit in terms of access to information on local 
requirements, the way specifications are defined and the conditions under which the local 
or regional administration might decide to grant subsidies. 
Public Private Partnerships 
PPPs between public authorities and private enterprises are realised as SEM – mixed-
economic municipal enterprises. This concept cannot be compared to the classic PPP-model 
because SEMs are only corporate enterprises where French cities and communities partici-
pate. The maximum municipal shareholding is confined to 85%. The private partner holds at 
least 15% to 49% of the shared investment capital. SEMs operate in fields like public trans-
port, effective urban development, housing, tourism, waste, water, and energy industries as 
well as in information and telecommunication technologies. In 2003, around 1200 SEMs with 
a total of 63000 employees and an annual turnover of € 13bn existed in France. The number 
of planned SEMs amounts to 2000 for the year 2003 in very different segments, such as 
community health, the operation of ports and airports, tourism and the energy industry. DIW Berlin: Politikberatung kompakt  44 




Description  Organized by SIPPEREC in the region of Ile de France 
Objectives  Establishing a ICT-based infrastructure with more than 280km linking 81 
communities; infrastructure offered to local net providers and associations in 
order to enhance competition; Irisé = manager of infrastructure; main objec-
tives = supporting local planning, enhancing local attractiveness to business 
and finally enlarging the offers of broadband services on final consumer mar-
kets 
Public  Caisse des Dépôts et Consignations (34%), Telcité (10%), Dexia (5.9%)  Actors 
Private  LDCollectivités (50.1%) = affiliate of Neuf Télécom 
Financial Dimension  € 50m, proportionally shared by project partners 
Operator Model   Until 2019 the technological infrastructure will be owned by Irisé and then 
devolves to the community 
Results  Successful – enhanced competition and faster connections, innovative services 
developed by schools and universities, model not sufficient for regions with 
less inhabitants than in the region of Ile de France, LDC opens the net for 
other providers leading to intensified competition for Neuf Télécom; but better 
services than provided by France Telecom 




Description  Rural area with 133 inhabitants/km2;  
Objectives  Establishing a broadband infrastructure in order to make the suburban area of 
Paris more attractive to business; Potential customers in particular net and 
service providers and local authorities; reasons for the PPP: improving quality 
and efficiency of the project, access to private capital and knowledge  
Public  CDC (private Fonds for financial support of projects)  Actors 
Private  LDCollectivités (Marketing, Negotiations about user rights and the develop-
ment of the passive infrastructure), Sogretel (Conception, construction, main-
tenance), Crédit Argricole (long-term credits) 
Financial Dimension  In total € 50m shared equally by private and public partners, EU not involved, 
direct subsidies to private firms prohibited but in the framework of “public 
services” and “public contracts” financial support possible. After break-even – 
profits are equally shared between public and private partners. 
Operator Model   Teloise remains the right-holder of the network for the next 22 years. After the 
PPP cycle, the infrastructure will be passed on local authorities. The network 
will not be operated by Teloise but by other parties. Thus, Teloise acts as the 
licensor. 
Results  Demand of network usage by Free, Neuf Télécom, Cegetel, Option Service, 
Completel, Bouygues Telecom and Sanef Telecom; Competition enhanced, 
full provision of broadband in so called white areas difficult to achieve, thus 
even if passive infrastructure is available in remote areas, alternative net pro-
viders are more interested to invest in areas with higher population densities  
Source: Lattemann (2006). 
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Considering telecommunication infrastructures, the main objectives of French PPPs are re-
lated to an intensification of competition in regions where France Telecom acts as a monopo-
list and an improvement of availability of broadband technologies in rural areas. 
According to article L.1425-1 CGCT, communities are allowed to establish their own tele-
communication infrastructures if infrastructure construction by private firms is limited for 
certain reasons. The adoption of article L.1425-1 CGCT has increased the willingness of 
communities to invest in broadband technologies since the communities are now allowed to 
construct, administrate and take advantage of active infrastructures. 
The extent of PPPs differs substantially from low-budget projects to projects with an invest-
ment volume of € 50m. At the beginning of 2006, a total of € 827m has been invested in 
broadband PPPs. 
Table II-27 
Pau Broadband Country 
Description  Introduction of high-speed internet (100Mbit/s) for the first time in France, in 
the communities “Pau-Pyrénees” with a population density of 150 inhabi-
tants/km2 in average.  
Objectives  Realisation of high-speed internet, improving attractiveness to business of the 
region 
Public  Agglomération Pau Pyrénées and the region « Pyrénées-Atlantiques » ; EFRE  Actors 
Private  Axione (« neutral » provider, marketing, SPTHP (French concern producing 
high technology products) 
Financial Dimension  Total investment: € 35m thereof subsidies of € 7.5m (EFRE) and € 1.1m of the 
region.  
Operator Model   After the end of the PPP, ownership of the network will be passed to the pub-
lic authorities who will then decide whether to self-provide or delegate main-
tenance of the network.  
Results  Numerous criticisms – delayed creation of infrastructure; the potential of the 
project referring to the increase in the regional attractiveness to business has 
been overestimated – no enhanced employment; insufficient quality of ser-
vices and inadequate price 
Insufficient demand for provided services; thus expectations not fulfilled, 
although demand is increasing 
Existing infrastructure have not been considered in the planning such that an 
alternative net provider could enter the market and offers ADSL-access with-
out using the new established infrastructure; thus effects of the PPP in terms of 
broadband diffusion were slight as the region has been partly opened up by 
France Telecom 
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Italy 
The realisation of broadband access throughout the country is a major concern for the Italian 
government. The government intends to promote the creation of a broadband network in less 
developed areas of the South (Sicilia, Puglia, Basilicata, Calabria, Sardegna, Abruzzo, 
Molise). Infrastructure investment in these areas is considered a public task, for which public 
financing should be available. The rationale of this policy is guided by continuous attempts to 
integrate less developed regions into the national economy. EU funding plays a major role, 
especially in Target I regions. Furthermore, PPPs have been used to stimulate infrastructure 
investment. There is no ex ante exclusion with respect to the participation of Telecom Italia in 
PPPs.  
Infratel Italia (Infrastructures and Telecoms for Italy) aims at reducing the technological gap 
among the different areas of the country through the roll-out of broadband infrastructures. 
Infratel Italia is a company created by the Ministry of Communications and by Sviluppo 
Italia, a public Agency, whose task is to attract investments and favour the creation of new 
companies in underdeveloped areas of Italy. Infratel has started the procedure for laying down 
1800 km of optical fibres in 265 municipalities of the South with the aim of reducing the 
technological gap of 20% existing in the southern regions. The project intends to build a 
MAN (600 km) in 30 cities of the South and a link connecting the various backbones and 
those municipalities that still lack a broadband network (1200km). Telcos will then be able to 
hire the network at market prices and without discrimination. This first project costs € 127m. 
Over a 3-year period € 930m will be spent. 
Public Private Partnerships 
Considering PPPs in telecommunications, several projects have been launched since liberali-
sation (1998). The most famous and innovative one was created by the AEM (the electricity 
and gas utility of the Milano Municipality) and a group of private investors in 1999. The aim 
was the provision of telecom services through optical fibres. The venture was based upon two 
companies: the first one, Metroweb, was created by AEM in order to exploit the ducts of the 
electricity and gas networks and to deploy naked optical fibres throughout the city of Milan. 
The second one, E-Biscom, was created by a group of financiers and managers (led by Silvio 
Scaglia, former CEO of the mobile company Omnitel) with the aim of providing triple play 
services (voice, data and video) on the Metroweb’s network. Six months after the creation of DIW Berlin: Politikberatung kompakt  44 
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E-Biscom and before it became operative, the company was listed through an IPO on the 
Milan Stock Exchange, and got a huge amount of resources (3,237bn lira). E-Biscom invested 
this sum in the network and strengthened its own structure, becoming one of the most interest-
ing competitors active in Italy. E-Biscom was incorporated into Fastweb in 2004 and has 
become the most successful Italian city operator. 
The Fastweb business model has been very successful, though the company has never made 
profits, but it has provided Milan with the largest network of fibre optics in Italy. Further-
more, Fastweb replicated the model experienced in Milan in a few other towns, like Genoa, 
where, creating a partnership with AMGA, the Municipality controls electricity and gas util-
ity. 
Fastweb is certainly the most popular Telco of the country and can be considered a very good 
example of a PPP, aimed at achieving two important objectives: deploying fibre on the one 
hand, and increasing competition on the other hand even within the local loop. In June 2006, 
the Milan Municipality sold 75% of Metroweb’s shares to the Sterling Square private equity 
fund, maintaining a 25% participation in the company. The Municipality has kept the right to 
use 15% of the fibre for 10 years, for the provision of public services. 
The Fastweb experience has been imitated by many other utilities, which were unfortunately 
unable to exploit the euphoria experienced by the Stock Exchange, and therefore had to limit 
their expansion to their own areas which had mixed results. 
Projects with limited success include the ambitious project of ACEA, the Rome multi-utility, 
Fiat and Spanish Telefónica. The project aimed to deploy 280 km of fibre in the city of Rome, 
and to expand into the local loop, putting it in direct competition with Telecom Italia. The 
venture was not successful and a few years later Telefónica and Fiat withdrew from it. 
More successful was the PPP developed by Acegas, the Municipality of the city of Trieste, 
which deployed 41 km of fibre, connecting public buildings, the University, shopping malls 
and the Port Authority.  
The utility of La Spezia (Acam) created Acamtel, through a partnership with Edisontel, to 
deploy fibre within the city and the province. 
In some of these cases, the partners (public and private) have jointly built the infrastructure, 
and then hired it out to the Telcos, (as in the case of Cremona electrical utility, which created 
AEMCOM, deployed the fibre and then leased the network to Fastweb). Often, the partners DIW Berlin: Politikberatung kompakt  44 
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build the infrastructure together with an OLO and then provide the service in competition 
with Telecom Italia i.e. Albacom.Amps Parma (see Table II-28). The number of projects 





Description  AMPS is a multi-utility offering public services in Parma. In 1999, AMPS 
formed a joint venture with the national operator Albacom (represented by 
British Telecom, ENI, Mediaset and BNL – since 2004 100% British Tele-
com) in order to accelerate the diffusion of ICT. Since 2000, Albacom.Amps 
holds a licence as operator of telecommunication.  
Objectives  ICT support, provision of broadband technologies and Parma and its surround-
ing.  
Public  AMPS (access to existing infrastructures and knowledge about local markets)  Actors 
Private  Albacom (knowledge about the telecommunication industry) 
Financial Dimension  Turn-over (2003): € 341,54m 
Results  Increased competition, realisation of alternative access to infrastructure; 
hardly lower prices; favouring the development of ICT-based services pro-
vided by local authorities (e-government) due to the existence of a local opera-
tor 
Source: Art Telecom (2005). 
 
Table II-29 
Lepida – Region Emilia-Romagna 
Description  With about 4m inhabitants and 360.000 firms, the region Emilia-Romagna 
constitutes one of the most important and dynamic regions in Italy. 
Objectives  Constructing a private broadband infrastructure favouring the development of 
innovative service (in particular e-government); Increasing public demand; 
Increasing the attractiveness to business;  
Public  341 communities; 9 provinces; 5 universities; public utilities  Actors 
Private  Telecom Italia (providing HSDL connections and satellite), presently no other 
operators are joining the project 
Financial Dimension  The total investment account for roughly € 58m out of which 40% are fi-
nanced by public funds. 
Results  Development of a market for telecommunication services in public administra-
tion; Provision of broadband technology at lower prices compared to the mar-
ket price; competition is enhanced in peripheral areas, where operators nor-
mally are not interested in developing infrastructures and providing services. 
Source: Art Telecom (2005). 
 
A new interest for PPP, however, has emerged since 2004/2005 when public opinion and the 
politicians, in regional governments and municipalities, became aware of the digital divide 
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territory. Local governments have decided to promote initiatives aimed at reducing this gap in 
different ways. Private enterprises or private resources as well as public funds and funds from 
European Union are regularly involved. One example within in this group of projects is the 
Lepida-Region Emilia-Romagna project (see Table II-29). 
Another project has been promoted by the province of Florence, which intends to deploy a 
broadband network connecting 16 villages located on the upland area of the province, 6 small 
towns located in the surroundings of Florence and a large part of Florence itself. The connec-
tion of the 16 villages on the mountains implies the deployment of an optical backbone. The 
main partner of the Province in the project is Infracom, a joint-venture created by the com-
pany running the motorway Brescia-Padova, the Saving Bank (Cassa di Risparmio) of Padova 
and Verona, and by a big insurance company (Cattolica Assicurazioni). The technological 
partners are Siemens and Selex Communications. The services offered by the new network 
include Internet, VPN, Voice Telephony, IP and VoIP, videoconferences and security. 
The province of Brescia aims at reducing the digital divide in a number of villages and small 
towns of the province, where no broadband is available. The project involves the participation 
of Megabeam, a very small company, specialized in the deployment of wireless networks, 
based on Wi-Fi and Wi-Max technologies. Megabeam is supposed to provide broadband in 80 
villages of the province which cannot be reached by ADSL. The new network will be totally 
wireless. 
The main PPP involving Telecom Italia is a project in the Piemonte region. Last June, the 
regional government and Telecom Italia reached an agreement for developing broadband 
networks and services in 900 villages with 1 million people and 125.000 companies. The 
investments will be completed in 3 years and is estimated at € 30m, half of which will be 
funded by the Region and the other half by Telecom Italia. 
Finally, a new investment fund, named PPP Italia, was established in December 2006. The 
fund is run by Fondaco Sgr, a company created by a number of outstanding banking institu-
tions, such as Fondazione San Paolo (40%), Fondazione Cariparo (23%), Fondazione Caribo 
(17%) and Ersel Finanziaria (20%). The Fund has a capital endowment of € 120m. DIW Berlin: Politikberatung kompakt  44 
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Spain 
In line with the EU Treaty, the Spanish Telecom Act (2003) contains an explicit rule stating 
that direct subsidies to specific telecom operators, in order to develop a technology, can dis-
tort market competition and are against the principles of the Telecom Act.  
Despite the general reluctance to finance infrastructure with public funds, regional govern-
ments provided funding to Telefónica when the company extended basic telephone services to 
rural areas. These telephone lines required a huge amount of investment to be deployed and 
the revenues subsequently generated were very low. The technological solution was to im-
plement mobile networks with fixed handsets. The costs were shared between Telefónica and 
the Spanish regional governments. 
Project no. ITC/701/2004/17 aims at providing broadband access to rural and isolated areas 
through 
•  infrastructures and equipment investments and 
•  net infrastructures installation costs and access to final user 
Beneficiaries are network providers, users and the suppliers of electronic communications 
services; individual or business associations can take advantage of their support. However, 
only SMEs are eligible for funds (with some exceptions) and investments are to be made in 
target zones according to the European Commission’ definition. The modalities of the project 
were  
•  refundable credits at an interest rate of 0%, with 10 years for the recovery of instalments 
and a 3-year lag as well as  
•  and a 3-year lag non-recoverable subsidies 
PPP initiatives are not used in Spain for telecom infrastructures. Nevertheless they have been 
implemented in order to develop other public works and infrastructures, such us railroads, 
highways and hospitals. Central and regional governments, as well as some municipalities, 
are involved in these initiatives. Additionally, there are many initiatives in the Spanish re-
gions not based on network investment but on training and consulting for SME. One good 
example is Centro de Competencia in Galicia, whose aim is to promote e-commerce among 
all the Galician SMEs. Its main tool is dissemination through free training courses (see 
www.e-negociogalicia.com). DIW Berlin: Politikberatung kompakt  44 
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The following reasons may explain why PPPs targeted at telecom infrastructures have not 
been initiated: First of all, CMT, the Spanish regulator very strictly monitors any initiative 
that could distort competition. Secondly, the Spanish regulator tries to protect consumers 
using an indirect approach consistent with the encouragement of market entry and competi-
tion.32 Therefore, the implementation of PPP initiatives seems to be very difficult as such 
initiatives are assumed to distort the competitive environment.  
Nevertheless, some public initiatives have been implemented:  
1.  Some public initiatives targeted at establishing Wi-fi areas have been implemented by 
some municipalities. In some cases, CMT was obliged to dismantle them. The most sig-
nificant case is “Sensefils BCN”, the Wi-Fi area of Barcelona’s City Hall. The Spanish 
regulator went against this network because the network operated without a licence and 
because there was public funding for its maintenance. It should also be noted that the Wi-
fi area allowed only access to the municipal web and to other public administration webs. 
2.  The case of Euskaltel deserves some specific comments: Euskaltel is a global carrier of 
telecom services in the Basque Country. Three savings banks (Cajas de Ahorros) have 
control over the firm with a 64% stake (See Euskaltel (2008)). These savings banks have 
a very special status. They are neither public entities nor private banks. But according to 
the Spanish normative, the regional government can decide to participate in the manage-
ment of the banks. The law allows regional governments to control up to 50% of the cor-
porate board. All the Spanish regional governments have decided to make use of this pre-
rogative and, therefore, the regional government of the Basque Country is involved in the 
management of Euskaltel, which is the leading operator in that region. 
3.  There are only a few infrastructure projects in Spain. All of them are located in very con-
crete areas, such as Andalusia (2), Catalonia (2) and Pais Basque. The projects in Catalo-
nia have been either stopped by the regulators or they experienced difficulties before 
reaching the commercial stage. The ENS Gestor project in Catalonia is not a genuine case 
of collaboration between public and private partners since the purpose is to build the net-
work using public funding only.  
One of the projects located in Andalusia is the Proyecto Mercurio. Sandetel (entity of the 
Regional Government of Andalucía) collaborates with Iberbanda (private company). This 
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firm received funding from Sandetel to carry out network deployment in order to try and 
reach the objective of making broadband available to rural areas (see Sandetel (2008)). This 
provides an example of Spanish State subsidies. 
Table II-30 
ENS Gestor Project 
Description  Developing a fibre network in Catalonia to link the region’s population centres 
with Barcelona 
Objectives  Promoting and allowing the delivery of advanced broadband services to all 
citizens and businesses of Catalonia; fostering the final operators to do it. This 
is perceived as imperative in context of the region remaining competitive in 
Europe. 
Public  Generalitat de Catalunya, Centre de Telecomunicaciones i Tecnologies  Actors 
Private  As the network is expected to be built by the public sector, there is a limited 
role of the private sector in the project. 
Financial Dimension  Approximately € 50m per year for four years with an expected internal rate of 
return of more than 7% over 25 years. The risk is expected to be minimized by 
covering the largest population first where there is already proven demand for 
broadband services. The network is expected to be funded with public debt.  
Operator Model   Uses the infrastructure that is already owned by the Generalitat. The regional 
railway company which is owned by the Generalitat will provide access to 
ducts and rights of way along the railway lines to build the network. It is also 
expected that the big companies located in the region will agree to provide 
rights of way or to use their duct infrastructure.  
Once the network is constructed, it will be managed by the limited liability 
company created by the Generalitat and the Localret strictly as an operator 
neutral network and providing open access to all interested parties. The plan is 
to avoid putting switches in the network and provide only dark fibre services 
in the first stage. 
Source: Art Telecom (2005). 
 
The other project in Andalusia is Guadalinfo. The main characteristics are included below. As 
common to Mercurio, private firms received financial subsidies to develop public centres. 
Funding came from Junta de Andalucia (regional government), 50%; Diputaciones Provincia-
les (provincial institutions), 24%; and municipalities, another 25% (see Guadalinfo (2008)). DIW Berlin: Politikberatung kompakt  44 





Objectives  Response to the lack of broadband coverage in rural areas in Andalusia. Pro-
motion of economic development in rural areas by providing a broadband 
infrastructure which is assessed to be necessary for local firms to remain 
competitive 
Public  Sandetel – formed by the Instituto de Fomento de Andalucía and Radio Tele-
vision de Andalucía 
Actors 
Private Iberbanda 
Operator Model   The project started in October 2003 and the objective was that in the first year 
of development Iberbanda would reach 60% of the target towns. The company 
has already reached almost 80% in the first year. Iberbanda is using a combi-
nation of satellite with WiFi distribution and LMDS on the 3.5 GHz band (pre 
WiMAX technology).  
Results  At the end of October 2004, there were 1200 customers, 867 residential and 
320 businesses. At present all services are similar to those provided nationally 
for ADSL. The initial connection fee is higher than for ADSL, but the monthly 
fee is comparable. A range of products are on offer with different bandwidths 
and contention ratios.  
Sandetel is already starting to think of the next phase of intervention in the 
broadband market in Andalusia and is examining whether there is a require-
ment to invest in fibre optic backbones in the region. 




Description  Pilot stage for 26 public centres for Internet access in rural areas of Andalusia 
with less than 20.000 inhabitants. Populations in the locations that were cho-
sen ranged between 223 to 13.000 inhabitants.  
Objectives  Economic development in rural areas of Andalusia by enabling web-based 
activities 
Public  Sadesi, a public company owned by Sandetel which in turn is owned by the 
Government of Andalusia. 
Actors 
Private  Telefónica de Espana, British Telecom, Iberbanda, and Auna 
Financial Dimension  € 3.9m provided by ERDF, € 2.0m provided by Junta de Andalucia 
€ 3.1m provided by private sector 
Operator Model   Software at the centres is all based on open-source software, in each centre 
two full-time members of staff were appointed to manage and promote the 
centre. Additionally, a range of services are provided via the portal “guan-
dalinfo.net” designed by Sadesi: 
Digital maps of towns in which centres were established 
E-administration services from local authorities such as building and planning 
applications 
Services available from central government which were designed for a urban 
population have been adapted to the needs of a rural audience including: 
health cards, hunting and fishing licences, benefits to retired people 
Source: Art Telecom (2005). DIW Berlin: Politikberatung kompakt  44 
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United Kingdom 
For the UK, the Department of Trade & Industry publishes ‘The State Aid Guide’. This 
document defines what is meant by state aid, and details the circumstances under which it 
may be provided. Whilst industries such as coal and shipbuilding are mentioned, telecommu-
nications is not. The only exception to this is broadband – the government provided £ 30m in 
assistance via the regional development agencies to form the Broadband Fund. Furthermore, 
there are several PPPs aimed at infrastructure investments where British Telecom is partly 
involved.  
The aim of the Broadband Fund is to develop broadband networks and run pilot projects. 
Although the total size of the fund is repeatedly stated in government publications, financial 
support for specific projects is rarely stated. Having said this, the following was stated: 
•  Wales received £ 2.67m and Northern Ireland £ 1.46m from the Broadband Fund, 
•  £ 12.5m was given under EU objective one status to Cornwall ActNow. This will provide 
broadband to SMEs in Cornwall. 
Several demand stimulation grants were mentioned in connection with London. It was, how-
ever, unclear whether or not the sums mentioned were the entire amount, or that provided by 
the Broadband Fund. The broadband fund also supports the Remote Area Broadband Inclu-
sion Trial (RABBIT).  
The government has announced that it will spend £ 1bn on ensuring public sector broadband 
connectivity (Department for Business Enterprise & Regulatory Reform (2003), p. 1). There 
is also a broadband aggregation programme. The aim of this is to aggregate demand for 
broadband so that public sector parties benefit from the scale economies that emerge. Interest-
ingly this is all done at the regional level.  
Public Private Partnerships 
Although PFI (which is mainly a procurement tool) and PPP have been widely adopted in the 
UK, relatively few projects involve ICT. As of September 2006 the Partnerships UK database 
contained 743 PFI & PPP projects, of which 81 were ICT related. While 48 ICT related pro-
jects are characterized as infrastructure projects, it is clear that a range of projects fall under 
this one heading. Projects vary from computerisation of functions to the management of desk-
top computers within a government agency, provision and maintenance of shared computing DIW Berlin: Politikberatung kompakt  44 
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facilities and community broadband in Cambridge. A useful distinction that can be made is 
between those projects that provide a specific service/function and those that provide an infra-
structure that supports a range of services/functions. The first is illustrated by the project 
providing document imaging services to Derby City Council whilst the latter is exemplified 
by projects in Northern Ireland that will bring connectivity to schools.  
All of the infrastructure projects are PFI projects with relatively small financial values. The 
collective capital of all PFI projects amounts to £ 1.719m, whereas BT plans to spend £ 10bn 
to build its 21 Century Network across the UK. Cable operators have also invested consider-
able amounts in the past to build their networks. 
Infrastructure assistance in the Western Isles as well as the Highlands can be described in 
more detail. The main points from these cases are as follows: 
•  The projects intend to improve the quality of infrastructure that is available in rural and 
remote areas of Scotland. PFI has been used to provide infrastructure without breaking 
budgetary limitations (at both national and local levels). 
•  Funding is drawn from a variety of sources, with individual contributions often being rela-
tively small. This highlights the limited financial support available from each body.  
•  The financial size of the Connected Communities project is relatively small when com-
pared to BT’s spending in rural and remote areas. However, the Highland Council Partner-
ship for IS/IT services and Pathfinder North are reasonably sized, especially when the en-
tire period of the contract is taken into consideration. The long-term nature of some PFI 
contracts has led them to be described as mortgaging the future. 
•  The projects combine private and public stakeholders, with each undertaking a different 
role. In the case of the Connected Communities project, the public sector acts as hubs that 
private sector users connect to. In the case of the Highlands, the role of the public sector is 
largely one of being the project’s client.  
•  The sustainability of the projects can be questioned. Price reductions due to national com-
petition may undermine the Connected Communities project’s ability to generate funds to 
pay for activities such as maintenance. In contrast, the PFI projects in the Highland may 
strain the general council budget. DIW Berlin: Politikberatung kompakt  44 
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•  The delivery of infrastructure through the PFI/PPP process is not immediate. Where in-
formation is available, the period between advertising and delivery is around three years. 
•  The  project structure is often complex, either to accommodate the range of interested 
stakeholders or the variety of funding sources. 
Additional infrastructure initiatives are also very small in comparison: 
•  The 2001 funding awards of the UK Broadband Fun amounted to £ 27.863m33. 
•  Regional Development Agencies (RDAs) have used their Single Pot Funding allocation to 
provide broadband funds. Although the RDAs have been limited by the need to evenly 
split funding between capital and running costs, some have funded broadband schemes. 
For instance, £ 5m was set aside by South East of England Development Agency. 
Table II-33 
Connected Communities – Western Isle (Infrastructure) 
Description  The Western Isles consist of 55 individual islands inhabited by 26.620 per-
sons. The region is characterized by a decreasing and ageing population.  
Objectives  The projects intend to improve the quality of infrastructure that is available in 
rural and remote areas of Scotland. In particular on the five main islands, the 
project aims at providing a wireless broadband technology with regard to the 
remoteness of the islands. PFI has been used to provide infrastructure without 
breaking budgetary limitations (at both national and local levels). 
Public  Deparment of Trade and Industry, Scottish Executive, Western Isles Enter-
prise, Comhairle nan Eilean Siar, EFRE 
Actors 
Private  among others British Telecom 
Financial  Dimension Funding is drawn from a variety of sources, with individual contributions 
often being relatively small. This highlights the limited financial support 
available from each body. With € 7.5m, the financial size of the Connected 
Communities project is relatively small when compared to BT’s spending in 
rural and remote areas. Half of the investment is paid by EFRE, while the 
other half is afforded by the other public actors involved.  
Operator Model  The projects combine private and public stakeholders, with each undertaking a 
different role. In the case of the Connected Communities project, the public 
sector acts as hubs that private sector users connect to. In the case of the High-
lands, the role of the public sector is largely one of being the project’s client.  
Results  The sustainability of the projects can be questioned. Price reductions due to 
national competition may undermine the Connected Communities project’s 
ability to generate funds to pay for activities such as maintenance. In contrast, 
the PFI projects in the Highland may strain the general council budget. 
Source: Lattemann (2006). 
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Table II-34 
Cambridgeshire Community Network (Infrastructure) 
Objectives  Developing a county-wide telecoms network for the public sector in addition 
to a community network: It was intended that the development of this network 
would help to address inequalities between the wealthy population centres and 
the isolated and socially deprived rural areas. Furthermore, the project focuses 
on aggregating demand for the public sector. The original plan was to focus on 
delivering services only to the County Council but the project then expanded 
to support other local government needs in addition to developing the commu-
nity network. The intention to support e-government initiatives by building the 
underlying infrastructure was also important. 
Public  Cambridgeshire County Council   Actors 
Private Ntl 
Financial Dimension  Total budget of the project was £ 29m of which £ 12m was funded trough PFI 
credits.  
Operator Model   If the public sector is satisfied with service performance by the private firm, it 
can draw an amount from the fund to pay the private contractor, which de-
creases with time and lasts for 25-30 years. The county council gets access to 
ntl`s financial model. There are annual reviews when tariffs can be renegoti-
ated according to a number of key performance indicators. Ntl has to demon-
strate acceptable levels of profitability from this project, although the meaning 
of acceptable levels is not clearly defined.  
Results  The council is already thinking about the next phase for the project. It is look-
ing to extend the network to other public sector bodies such as the police or 
fire brigade. The council believes that the CCN has had a positive impact in a 
few areas such as: social inclusion though the provision of community outlets 
and the provision of broadband to schools that hitherto did not have access to 
the fast Internet.  
Source: Art Telecom (2005). 
 
II.5.1.2 The  Indicator 
Converting these observations into an indicator, one has to take into account several aspects. 
First, while state aid increasing infrastructure investments is obviously beneficial for the firms 
involved, network effects may also lead to an increase in the overall demand for services 
which in turn benefits other network operators. On the other hand, the case of France shows 
that PPPs can be used to foster market entry and competition. Hence, the evaluation of 
whether or not state aid and PPPs are favourable to the incumbent depends on both the mone-
tary value of the respective measures as well as the basic parameters set by governments. 
PPPs in France have to be evaluated as being rather unfavourable to the incumbent, while 
PPPs favour the incumbents in Italy, Spain and the UK.  DIW Berlin: Politikberatung kompakt  44 
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In addition to the PPP approach chosen in the respective countries, the indicator for infra-
structure aid is also based on the support for specific infrastructure projects, the establishment 
of dedicated agencies and the conditions under which capital is made available. 
Table II-35 
Infrastructure aid indicator 
Indicator Germany  France  Italy  Spain  UK 
Infrastructure  aid  5,0  3,0 10,0 9,0  9,0 
 
Italy ranks highest due to the extension to which infrastructure investment is promoted by the 
state. While in Spain and UK policy measures to spur infrastructure investment are used the 
financial volume of the respective programs are rather limited. The low rank of Germany is 
due to the absence of any infrastructure programs. The French incumbent suffers from PPPs 
targeted at increasing competition.  
II.5.2 ICT  support 
ICT support defined for the purpose of this study comprises state aid given to individuals or 
firms in order to enhance the diffusion of technology. In addition, general measures to raise 
information levels and awareness of new technologies and their adoption, such as e-business 
or broadband access, have to be considered. 
Most policy instruments adopted are confined to awareness programmes. Competence centres 
and consulting offices spread information to small- and medium-sized enterprises. Relatively 
small amounts of money are spent on competitions which are supposed to have demonstration 
effects and induce a larger number of applicants to conceive programmes and projects related 
to ICT adoption.  
In order to cover these relatively heterogeneous topics in an comparable manner our indicator 
builds on two sub-indicators published by the World Economic Forum (2006) as well as on 
assessment of country specific information. 
II.5.2.1 Country  comparison 
The first second sub-indicator is based on the assessments of ‘government success in ICT 
promotion’ and of ‘government prioritisation of ICT’34 published by the World Economic 
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Forum (World Economic Forum (2006)). A comparison of the countries monitored in the 
present report leads to the scores given in Table II-36. The scores are organised as follows: 1 
stands for not very successful, and 7 for highly successful programmes and activities.  
Table II-36 
ICT support  
 Germany France  Italy  Spain  UK 
Government prioritization of 
ICT
1) (Score)  5,0 4,9 4,1 4,7 5,6 
Government success in ICT 
promotion
2) (Score)  4,4 4,8 3,7 3,6 4,2 
Notes: 1) Def.: “Information and communication technologies are an overall priority of the government (1 = 
strongly disagree; 7 = strongly agree. 2) Def.: “Government programs promoting the use of ICT are (1 
= not very successful; 7 = highly successful). 
Source: World Economic Forum (2006) 
 
Germany 
The Federal Government supports the development of ICT and e-business practices in two 
major ways. One way is to support innovative multimedia services and another is to acceler-
ate the diffusion of ICT and reinforce the framework of the information society. This kind of 
state support does not address the telecommunication sector directly, but aims at supporting 
disadvantaged regions or SMEs. Hence these measures have an impact on the demand for 
telecommunication services and software solutions. 
Supporting innovative multimedia services 
The rapid diffusion of internet communication standards together with technological progress 
in the production of ICT, drive the process of convergence of media and ICT. As a result, new 
media services emerge. One of the objectives of the “Information society Germany 2006” 
action plan is to support the development and assessment of new multimedia-based applica-
tions and services. In 2005, federal state financed multimedia projects belonging to the fol-
lowing areas:35 
•  Multimedia start-ups and user-friendly and safe multimedia technology (€ 7m), 
•  Major multimedia projects such as MEDIA@Komm-TRANSFER, VERNET, LERNET or 
WissensMedia (€ 14.5m), DIW Berlin: Politikberatung kompakt  44 
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•  Mobile multimedia services (MobilMedia) and other value-added services (€ 8m), 
•  Related research, evaluation and monitoring (€ 1.6m), 
•  Other (€ 1.75m). 
Accelerate the diffusion of ICT and reinforce the framework of the information society 
The Federal Government regards e-business as a way of improving the competitiveness of 
SMEs. A large share of companies have already realized the benefits of e-business and begun 
to use simple ICT applications such as internet and e-mail. However, they face a challenge to 
move beyond passive usage of ICT tools and ensure extensive use of ICT in all business proc-
esses. This requires the implementation of comprehensive, interconnected solutions instead of 
separate stand-alone applications. The Federal Government has for several years been imple-
menting various schemes to support this move. The regional and sector-related Centres of 
Excellence in Electronic Commerce, for instance, offer neutral consulting and training.  
One of the most important initiatives in Germany constitutes “Initiative D21”. This initiative 
aims to improve Germany’s competitiveness in the information and knowledge society. The 
focus is on the use of ICT in schools, government agencies, associations and enterprises. 
“Initiative D21” is engaged in supporting the diffusion of broadband-technologies in Ger-
many by creating a study on broadband strategies, preparing policy documents, conducting 
workshops and taking part in the activities of Germany’s federal states in various international 
broadband events.36 The initiative concentrates on four subject areas: 
•  Growth and competitiveness, 
•  Information and Communications Technologies in Healthcare, 
•  Education, Qualification and Equality of Opportunity, 
•  eGovernment / Security and Trust in the Internet. 
In 2005 (2006), € 15.2m (€ 16.2m) were granted in support of ICT adoption and to reinforce 
the framework of the information society.37 The program aims in particular at the following 
areas: 
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•  Modernization and expansion of electronic information systems in the area of technology 
and materials: € 1.7m (€ 1.9m), 
•  Improving the awareness of SMEs’ on technology, economy and knowledge management 
€ 2.8m (€ 3m), 
•  Facilitating the process of setting e-commerce standards € 1.7m (€ 2m), 
•  Supporting e-commerce competence centres, networks and e-business € 4m (€ 4.1m), 
•  Improving the security of commercial IT use € 2.8m (€ 2.9m), 
•  Developing and supporting digital integration of the society € 1.3m (€ 1.5m), 
•  Consulting and administrative support € 0.9m (€ 0.8m). 
Although there has been an increase in state spending supporting the diffusion of ICT among 
SMEs in the last two years, the amount of money devoted to some determinants of e-business 
development was reduced. For example, despite the fact that IT-security is still regarded as a 
key driver of the ICT and e-business diffusion, the amount of money devoted to this aim was 
reduced compared to the 2004 budget (€ 3m). 
France 
The French government does not finance technology adoption directly. Some support arrives 
in the country via European structural funds while measures are also taken to promote the use 
of the internet, mainly by making usage safer. However, most programmes regarding IT secu-
rity that have been undertaken in France so far, aim at ensuring a functioning economy, na-
tional security and the promotion of e-commerce. The most important initiatives include: 
•  The Information Society Act, which is intended to clarify the legal framework for e-
commerce as well as to reinforce the level of network security. For example, it has been 
proposed to totally liberalize the use of encryption mechanisms (compared to a limitation 
to 128 bits today). Most of articles of the Act concerning cyber crime have already been 
adopted just after the September 11th events. 
•  Adoption of electronic signature: The electronic signature is recognized and has been used 
since March 2000. It is used in a growing number of public online services, such as tax 
declaration for companies and residential, administrative online procedures or medical in-
surance transactions. DIW Berlin: Politikberatung kompakt  44 
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Italy 
The Italian government supports the industry in various ways. However, due to the EU rules 
opposing state aid, state aid has been substantially reduced, compared to the past. The most 
important law is 488/92 which provides grants for capital investment realised in the areas of 
Objective 1 (Calabria, Puglia, Basilicata, Campania, Sicilia and Sardegna) and, in a more 
limited way, for industries located in the areas of Objective 2. A second important instrument, 
which has been crucial for the industrialisation of the country and for this reason has always 
been refinanced, is Law 1329/65, the so called Law Sabatini. It finances the purchase or the 
leasing of machine tools and other industrial machinery. The law provides a rebate on the 
interest, while more recently the regional governments have also introduced grants. It must be 
pointed out, however, that these forms of state support towards industrial investments, have a 
negligible impact on telecommunication markets. More significant are the following policy 
measures: 
•  The state awarded a grant of € 75 to each new subscriber of broadband lines for the years 
2003 and 2004. In 2005 the contribution amounted to € 50, with the exception of less de-
veloped areas (European Council (1999), Objective 1) where the contribution continued to 
be € 75. The table below presents the development of broadband access support. 
Table II-37 
Support of broadband access 
Grants to customers  Number  Total costs 




2003 360000  27 
Wind 5.83 
2004 400000  30  Tiscali  5.54 
Others 6.33  2005 480000  30 
Total 100.00 
Affecting incumbent  As the figures show, this measure has affected heavily the incum-
bent. 
Source: Telecom Italia (2005) 
 
•  The state awarded a grant of € 150 for purchasing a decoder for Digital Terrestrial Televi-
sion in 2004. In 2005, the amount of the grant was reduced to € 70. DIW Berlin: Politikberatung kompakt  44 
II Industrial Policy 
69 
Table II-38 
Support of digital television decoder 
Grants to customers  Number  Total costs (million €) 
2004 733333  110 
2005 1541430  110 
Affecting incumbent  This contribution affects the incumbent negatively since it 
increases competition among different platforms. 
Source: Telecom Italia (2005) 
 
•  The state awards a grant of € 172 to young people (16 years) for the purchase of a com-
puter and € 172 for getting ECDL (European Computer Driving Licence) (total budget 
€ 90m in 2004) 
•  Grant of € 200 to households with an income of less than € 15000 for purchasing a com-
puter (total budget € 30m in 2004).  
•  Teachers can buy portable computers at the same favourable conditions that the State 
Agency for Public Procurement (Consip) offers to the public administrations. 
•  The state is creating a network of public internet access centres and of centres of tele-
working in less developed areas of the country. The centres of tele-working provide oppor-
tunities for e-learning (total budget € 80m). 
These measures clearly set Italy apart from other countries in terms of indirect state support 
for the use of telecommunication services. However, compared to last year, grants for the 
purchase of decoders for Digital Terrestrial Television have decreased. In 2006, the total 
amount made available for purchasing the decoders was established at € 10m, and it was allot-
ted to the people living in 2 regions; Sardinia and Aoste Valley, where the introduction of 
DTT had to be anticipated at the end of 2007. 
Furthermore, the new government has decided to postpone the introduction of DTT to 2012, 
and as a consequence, the grants for the purchase of decoders have been discontinued as of 
2007. In the meantime, the new Financial Law for 2007, envisages a fiscal deduction of a 
maximum of € 200 (€ 149 on average) to families that buy a new digital TV set. 
Spain 
There are some projects that aim at the promotion of ICT and internet usage:  DIW Berlin: Politikberatung kompakt  44 
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•  Project (CTE/249/2004/10) supports organisations that provide a capital base for techno-
logical firms. It provides interest free loans to high tech start ups during the first and sec-
ond year. Loans are provided without collateral or additional guarantees. 
•  Another project provides a training programme for the use of telecommunication services. 
It provides funds nationwide. Last year € 6.5m were provided for users’ training, € 6.8m 
for professional training (23
rd March 2005). 
•  The @rte program (February 8th 2001) subsidises small- and medium-sized organizations 
in order to integrate them into the Information Society. It is implemented by co-financed 
projects based on electronic commerce incorporating SAT (Advanced Telecommunications 
Services).  
•  The PISTA programme (Advanced Telecommunications Emerging Services Identification 
Promotion) helps to realise the effective implementation of Information Society services in 
the government, public services and other areas of public interest. The total budget for 
2003 was € 4.66m. 
•  The Digital Cities Programme promotes the Information Society and its implementation in 
a local environment, based on high speed telecommunication networks. Beneficiaries are 
communities and self-governing cities. The budget for the period 2000-2006 was € 51.3m. 
United Kingdom 
In the UK the support for adopting telecommunication technology shows mainly in the initia-
tives for the promotion of broadband adoption. These measures have been included in the 
infrastructure aid indicator. However, aspects of the programmes also address the diffusion of 
broadband technology among users (support of access for SMEs). Some of the major meas-
ures include: 
•  In 2000, the Government acknowledged that its existing cyber crime initiatives were in-
adequate and launched a new £ 25m package of initiatives.38  
•  Part 1 of the Electronic Communications Act 2000 introduced digital signatures. The Act 
gave the secretary of state powers to establish a statutory body. These powers have not 
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been invoked as tScheme, an industry self-regulatory body, was established in May 2000.39 
tScheme approves providers of trust services, evaluating them on five criteria – is the pro-
vider properly established and resourced, is the service sufficiently defined, is the service 
fair and reasonable, is the service being delivered according to its definition and is it secure 
enough?40 The intention is to increase the security of electronic transactions and provide 
voluntary regulation for cryptographic services. 
•  The Cyber Crime Knowledge Transfer Network was established in April 2006 to act as a 
single national platform that draws security expertise together from industry, academia and 
government.41 The network has an initial budget of £ 1.8m. Industry appears to promi-
nently feature in the project, which will be chaired by Roberta Ghanea-Hercock from BT.42 
•  Internet Watch Foundation (IWF) was established to protect children on the Internet. The 
IWF is a joint venture between industry and law enforcement agencies focusing on remov-
ing indecent images of children from the Internet.  
The relationship between these and other initiatives can be understood through reference to 
Connecting the UK: the Digital Strategy, which was published by the Cabinet Office in April 
2005. This document identifies 8 actions grouped under three headings:  
•  Making the UK a world leader in digital excellence  
•  Constructing a robust strategy to achieve our vision and  
•  Tackling social inclusion and bridging the digital divide.43 
II.5.2.2 The  Indicator 
Translating the indicators published by the World Economic Forum (see Table II-36) into our 
scoring system and using equal weights leads to results shown in Table II-39. 
Table II-39 
ICT prioritisation 
Indicator Germany  France  Italy  Spain  UK 
ICT  priorities  and  policy  success  9,1 9,4 7,5 8,0 9,4 
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The country specific information is transformed into a sub-indicator for ICT support by using 
an intensity scale where we focus on measures that involve financial support rather than on 
information and awareness measures. This restriction and the use of an intensity scale are due 
to the fact that it was not possible to investigate all policy measures adopted in a country that 
might contribute to the diffusion of telecommunication services and to estimate the impact 
they have on markets. 
Table II-40 
ICT support measures 
Indicator Germany  France  Italy  Spain  UK 
ICT  support  measures  3,0  3,0 10,0 3,0  5,0 
 
Italy takes the first position due to the grants awarded to households for broadband subscrip-
tions and the purchase of computers. Favourable to the further development of telecommuni-
cation markets are also the state initiatives focusing on internet access centres and the promo-
tion of tele-working. Policies of similar to these measures do not exist in the other countries. 
In Germany the focus is on multi-media services, the promotion of e-commerce and security. 
Many programmes, however, focus on awareness. While security issues are also very promi-
nent in France, there are no national policy measures that support technology adoption in the 
field of telecommunications directly. ICT support in Spain comprises training programmes for 
the use of advanced telecommunication services, subsidies for SMEs as well as support for 
implementing digital services in local governments. In the UK, main initiatives are devoted to 
cyber crime and internet security. However, considering the financial dimensions of the dif-
ferent programmes in Germany, France, Spain and the UK shows that there are no big differ-
ences between these countries when direct financial support is considered. The slightly higher 
score for the UK can be justified by the recent investments in security related issues.  
Combining the ICT support measures sub-indicator with the World Economic Forum’s indi-
cators for ICT prioritisation and for success of ICT promotion yields the following aggregate 
indicator for ICT support (equal weights have been used):  
Table II-41 
ICT support indicator 
Indicator Germany  France  Italy  Spain  UK 
ICT  support  6,0 6,2 8,8 5,5 7,2 
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II.5.3 State  demand 
The state is itself a major customer for telecommunication companies. At various levels, the 
national, regional and local level, the endowment of public entities with communication 
equipment and the running of routine procedures leads to substantial demand for telecommu-
nication services. An early and comprehensive adoption of new technologies by government 
entities has several benefits for telecommunication markets: 
•  it increases demand and, thus, helps to reach critical mass 
•  it induces communication partners to start using ICT as well 
•  it creates demonstration effects which stimulate usage and reduce barriers to adoption 
•  it accelerates the search for solutions for technical, legal, political and economic problems, 
such as digital signatures, intellectual property rights, consumer protection etc. 
There are no complete statistics on state expenditure that allow the identification of the 
amounts spent on telecommunication services and equipment. Often the costs for telecommu-
nications are integrated in other budget items, for example, the modernization and restructur-
ing of public buildings. Therefore, it has been decided to take the degree of realisation of e-
government as an approximation. It can be assumed that this indicator expresses the willing-
ness of governments at various administration levels to invest in advanced telecommunication 
systems. Furthermore, the level of realisation of e-government shows to which extent money 
has actually been invested.  
Data for the indicator was derived from two studies on e-government realisation conducted by 
Capgemini (2006) and Accenture (2005). Both studies primarily emphasise the supply side 
and do not take into account the actual usage of public services. Nevertheless, they are used 
for the purpose of this study because they allow for a comparison between the studied coun-
tries. 
II.5.3.1 Country  comparison 
The survey conducted by Capgemini (see Capgemini (2006)) entails two indicators.44 The 
first one, the online sophistication indicator, assesses the degree of online sophistication of 
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basic public services available online. Services providing information only are ranked lowest 
while the possibility of full electronic case handling corresponds to the highest degree of 
sophistication. The second indicator, the full online availability indicator, assesses the share 
of public services that are fully available online. 
The 20 public services are divided into two groups: 8 services for business and 12 services for 
citizens. With a maximum score of 100 for each service category, the results are presented in 
the Table II-42. The UK seems to have the most advanced e-government services infrastruc-
ture. In contrast, out of the five countries, Germany ranks as the lowest in terms of online 
sophistication and the percentage of services fully available online. 
Table II-42 
e-Government 2006 
Indicator Germany  France  Italy  Spain  UK 
Online  sophistication  74  85 80 79 89 
Full  online  availability  47  65 58 55 71 
Source: Capgemini (2006) 
 
In order to ascertain an objective picture of e-government advancement in the analysed coun-
tries, the results discussed above are compared with a similar study, which was conducted by 
Accenture (2005). The scoring of the Accenture study consists of two components. The first is 
service maturity, which measures the level to which a government has developed an online 
presence. Service maturity takes into account service breadth (the number of national services 
available online) and service depth (the level of completeness at which the service is offered 
(publish-, interact- or transact-level service). The second component is customer service ma-
turity, which measures the extent to which government agencies manage interactions with 
their customers (citizens and businesses) and deliver service in an integrated way. The cus-
tomer service maturity score considers how well governments have addressed the four dimen-
sions of leadership in customer service: citizen-centered, multi-channel, cross-government 
service delivery and proactive communications about the services to the citizens and busi-
nesses that are the end recipients. By combining these two elements of maturity into an over-
all maturity score, a ranking of all 22 countries was developed. Countries whose overall ma-
turity scores were within two percentage points of each other were allocated a joint ranking. 
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Because the focus was expanded beyond the e-government-only aspects of governments’ 
service programs, the multiple facets of leadership in customer service across all channels 
were included in the analysis. 
It has to be noted that both, i.e. Capgemini and Accenture, studies derive data from a web-
based survey of public institutions. This method already bears the danger of overestimation of 
e-government efforts, as a certain bias can be expected, because service suppliers that are 
reluctant to use the internet, and thus, have no interest in realising e-government in the de-
partments they control, will not participate in the survey. In addition, managers in charge of 
establishing e-government solutions will tend to overstate the sophistication and the degree of 
online availability of online services in order to make their projects appear successful.  
Table II-43 
e-Government development in selected countries.  
Indicator Germany  France  Italy  Spain  UK 
Service maturity breadth  86  99  86  89  92 
Service maturity depth  73  67  57  64  63 
Overall customer service  
maturity  32  45 41 32  38 
Overall maturity scores  48  55  45  45  48 
Source: Accenture (2005) 
 
Germany’s low rank in the Capgemini study cannot be attributed to low spending on e-
government development. Table II-44 exhibits IT spending for e-government across all stud-
ied countries. In 2004, Germany spent the highest amount of money. According to the data, 
this will not change in the immediate future. In 2008, Germany will spend € 1.1bn on e-
government development and, will thus hold the leading position.  
Table II-44 
IT spending for e-government (2004 and 2008) in million € 
 Time   Germany  France  Italy  Spain  UK 
2004  795 791 299 161  668 
2008  (estimated)  1.100  1.050 420 242  968 
Source: Epractice (2004) 
 DIW Berlin: Politikberatung kompakt  44 
II Industrial Policy 
76 
Germany 
The German Federal Government’s e-Government strategy is defined in the BundOnline 2005 
initiative. It is designed to ensure that citizens, industry, academia, as well as other admini-
strations, can use the services of the federal administration more simply, rapidly and cost-
efficiently.45 
By the end of 2005, the BundOnline 2005 scheme made it possible to place online around 400 
public services.46 Many of the new online services are quite popular, as a comparison between 
the number of persons using offline and online services demonstrates. For example, compared 
to its 136,600 conventional, paper transactions each year, the Federal Securities Administra-
tion handles 36,100 electronic transactions using a fully automated process, already account-
ing for 21% of all transactions. It also recorded 456,000 online account enquiries. Every 
month, the Federal Court of Justice receives 916 offline requests for expert information, com-
pared to 100,000 online requests. And publications from the German Patent Office are or-
dered online frequently: 450 offline orders, as compared to 1.75m internet downloads. But not 
all federal e-government offerings have such high user numbers. One important reason is that 
many people are not aware of these services. According to an online user survey carried out 
by the BundOnline Project Group, 54% of individuals and 41% of businesses surveyed said 
that lack of awareness was a key factor limiting the use of e-government services. Another 
reason for low numbers of online users is a lack of acceptance of electronic services. Fur-
thermore, legal framework conditions continue to pose obstacles to designing user- and 
agency-friendly electronic services and thus reduce user numbers. Another obstacle to the 
comprehensive integration and optimisation of administrative processes – on and across all 
administrative levels – is the heterogeneous IT landscape. Different offices have developed 
different IT applications for the same purposes; the federal government, federated states and 
municipalities operate over 7,000 websites that are minimally integrated; consistent electronic 
processes between the federal government, federated states and municipalities are still the 
exception rather than the rule; and the fragmented public investment in IT is not being used 
optimally. Such fragmentation, if not addressed, could lead to the development and imple-
mentation of expensive, isolated and redundant technology solutions and processes. 
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Main e-Government components in Germany include:47 
•  Portal: Bund.de is the German e-government services portal, providing central access to 
the online services provided by the Federal Authorities and the Federal Administration, as 
well as an entry to German States and Municipalities.  
•  Network: The infrastructure supporting internal communications between the federal au-
thorities is the Berlin-Bonn Information Network (IVBB). The IVBB provides the main 
federal authorities with central internet access and networking services. On 24 July 2006 
the IVBB intranet was replaced by the Federal Intranet (Intranet des Bundes). Besides the 
services offered by its predecessor, the new intranet portal features new content, services 
and workflows, such as a person and federal agencies search engine, a travel management 
system and access to information and document databases. The Federal Administration In-
formation Network (IVBV) is a private IP-based communication network, which serves as 
intranet between the different public administration departments. It has been introduced 
with the target to become the comprehensive communications platform for the whole Fed-
eral Public Administration. The network allows access only to pertinent authorized users. 
Its infrastructure facilitates the incorporation of the Berlin-Bonn Information Network 
(IVBB) as well as of other networks of the Federal Administration into a comprehensive 
IP-based network. The IVBV network connects over 300,000 employees in the Federal 
Public Administration. 
•  National electronic identification system: There is currently no central e-Identification 
infrastructure in Germany. 
•  e-Procurement: Federal e-Procurement platform (e-Vergabe), launched in May 2002, 
allows authorities to publish and notify calls for tender electronically, and enables bidders 
to submit offers completely and bindingly over the Internet. It also comprises electronic 
catalogues enabling public bodies to procure goods and services electronically from a se-
ries of pre-concluded framework contracts and without the need for calls for tender. In ad-
dition to the e-Vergabe, all public tenders are published online in the national gazette of 
public contracts (Bundesausschreibungsblatt). 
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•  Knowledge Management: There is currently no central knowledge management infra-
structure in Germany. However, a number of knowledge tools are available through the 
Federal Government Information Network (IVBB/IVBV), such as tools for closed user 
groups or a portal of (for) federal libraries, which makes documents of federal authorities 
accessible to federal employees over the federal Intranet. 
In order to enhance the use of new media in the education sector, a support programme “New 
Media in Education” (Neue Medien in der Bildung 2000-2004) has been issued by the Federal 
Ministry for Education and Research (BMBF) including more than 100 projects.48 In addition, 
about thirty projects are observed which are financed by other institutions. Most of them are 
addressed to content providers of e-learning programmes. But the financial support for most 
of the projects ended in 2004. In 2005, a second round of projects supporting the diffusion of 
e-learning programmes has been initiated by the Federal Ministry of Education. Under this 
umbrella 20 projects are financed in order to implement a sustainable e-learning framework. 
Furthermore, other projects – particularly in universities – have been started. Among them so 
called business models for e-learning at universities constitute a strategic element to develop 
universities` profiles and to improve their competitiveness. To save money, several pioneers 
are already working in this field among domestic and international universities:49 
1.  One example for the implementation of new support structures can be found at Ulm Uni-
versity. Here, the computer center, the media center and the library have been merged into 
a single “communication and information center”. Through the synergy effects contrib-
uted by all three partners the services have been bundled and improved for the benefit of 
users, i.e. lecturers and students. The range of services will be extended in the field of 
new media. 
2.  At the Deutsche Sporthochschule Köln (German Sports University Cologne), a univer-
sity-wide knowledge management system has been installed. Here, existing knowledge is 
made available via an intelligent management system connected not only to the university 
itself but also to professional associations, schools and, through an appropriate interface, 
also to individual users who can be won as external customers. 
                                                                          
48 See Revermann (2006). 
49 See Hoyer (2005).  DIW Berlin: Politikberatung kompakt  44 
II Industrial Policy 
79 
3.  With the “Dual Mode University” concept of Darmstadt Technical University, students 
are supported in their learning process on campus, at home and on the way. This gives 
Darmstadt Technical University a profile which meets the expectations of the “gameboy 
generation” – the students who are now entering the universities accompanied by their 
own laptops. 
4.  The FernUniversität in Hagen a distant learning institution has developed the “Virtual 
University Learning Environment”, proceeding directly from the university’s 30 years of 
success in distance education. Thanks to its didactic skills and far-reaching experience in 
network-supported teaching, this university has become a pioneer in developing multi-
media and online study materials and thus set an example of a university, providing op-
portunities for mobile learning to a mobile society. This model, which has already been 
tested in practice in all its essentials, is especially suited for executive programs. The Vir-
tual University Learning Environment model goes beyond currently available approaches 
to multi-user, media-supported study courses by integrating the university’s whole range 
of teaching facilities and making them available via communication networks, thus being 
the first institution to implement a complete, homogeneous system. 
In the healthcare sector, information based management processes, i.e. controlling, admini-
stration etc., become more and more important. Between 20% and 40% of the achievements 
in healthcare account for data collection and communication processes, indicating a high 
potential for rationalization.50 Considering the demographic development of Germany, this 
potential will become even stronger in the near future. Despite the potential rationalization 
effects of e-health, the German healthcare sector does not tap the full potential of ICT based 
technologies. However, e-health constitutes one major task in the agenda of “Information 
Society Germany 2006” (Informationsgesellschaft Deutschland 2006). In this framework the 
development of a standardized ICT-based infrastructure and a sectorwide medical documenta-
tion, the implementation of both electronic receipts and electronic business in the field of 
pharmaceuticals are intended. Furthermore, almost all members of the healthcare sector 
should be part of the healthcare network.  
Under this umbrella, lots of projects have been started. One of the most important e-health 
projects in Germany states the forthcoming introduction of the Electronic Health Card, a new 
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patient insuring card that facilitates the cooperation of all members in the health care sector by 
connecting over 80m patients with approx. 270,000 physicians, 77,000 dentists, 2,000 hospi-
tals, 22,000 pharmacies and more than 300 health insurance companies. The card will be used 
for both medical and administrative purposes. Thereby, it is supposed to increase the effi-
ciency of the healthcare system in Germany by protecting against unnecessary double exami-
nation, recognizing adverse reaction to medication faster and by strengthening data security. 
Medical information will be stored in the system.  
However, the distribution of the Electronic Health Card, expected to be completed in 2006, 
has been delayed. This is due to the fact that the funding of necessary equipment in medical 
practices is still an open question. Furthermore, it is not clear if the implementation of the 
health card really leads to the expected reductions of administrative expenses.51 Moreover, the 
introduction of the card is heavily disputed for privacy reasons since the collection of medical 
information about individual patients will be transferred from medical practices to a central 
server.52 At present, the electronic health card has been introduced in eight different regions 
for testing purposes. 
France 
The French eGovernment strategy was set in the ADELE (ADministration ELEctronique) 
programme in February 2004.53 It provides a detailed roadmap for the coherent and coordi-
nated development and implementation of electronic services. With a total budget of € 1,8bn 
for its four years of implementation, the ADELE programme represents an opportunity to 
generate important productivity gains. The Government estimates that ADELE will deliver 
€ 5 to 7bn cost savings in the State budget per year, as of 2007.  
The national e-government programme includes the following components: 
•  Portal: Launched in October 2000, Service-Public.fr, the French e-government portal for 
citizens and, since November 2003, for businesses. Apart from providing a unified and 
simplified access to the whole set of administrative services, it allows users to store all 
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their personal information, forms and administrative documents on a personalised and se-
cured site. This new portal should be launched at national level by summer 2007 and pro-
vides a comprehensive access point for public information and services. 
•  Network: Launched in May 2000, AdER (Administration En Réseau) is an inter-
ministerial intranet launched in May 2000. Based on a Virtual Private Network (VPN), it 
provides around 450.000 desktops in the French central administration (over 75% of the to-
tal) with secure services including messaging, directory, high-speed data transfer, docu-
ment storage as well as access to a number of information management applications. The 
AdER/SETI network is connected with the trans-European administrative network TESTA. 
•  National electronic identification system: There is currently no central e-Identification 
infrastructure for e-Government in France. 
•  e-Procurement: All French public entities are obliged to accept bids submitted electroni-
cally in response to formal call for tenders over a legal threshold published as of 1 January 
2005. All central government ministries – with the exception of the Ministry of Defence, 
can meet the new requirement by using the new government-wide e-Procurement platform 
Marches-Publics.gouv.fr. The platform allows public sector bodies to publish call for ten-
ders online and receive electronic bids. The platform is commercialised by UGAP, an in-
ter-ministerial service. Its use by local authorities is optional. 
•  Knowledge Management: There is an extranet designed to enable joint working and 
knowledge sharing between ministries and other central administration bodies. It gives ac-
cess to a number of groupware and cooperative working tools such as document libraries, 
forum, distribution lists, etc. 
Among the recent significant steps taken with regard to the full realisation of online services, 
two seem to provide an adequate illustration of the present situation in France: 
•  The “Carte Vitale”: a health insurance and social security card, is being enhanced to carry 
more references, 
•  On-line income tax declaration, which has reached a 20% penetration in 2006. The online 
declaration mode is coupled with automated bank transfer for payments. Online taxpayers 
benefit from a € 20 deduction.  
These two cases are described in detail in Box II-3 and Box II-4. DIW Berlin: Politikberatung kompakt  44 




As a result of a two-decade long effort, the smart chipset health insurance card (“Carte 
Vitale”) is now deployed among the entire adult population (above 18). It includes personal 
data (social security number and affiliation) only. The integration of personal medical re-
cords is planned for 2006 or 2007. The card provides its holders access to third party pay-
ment at pharmacies, and automated processing of reimbursement at private medical facilities 
(already generalized at public medical facilities). 
VITALE SESAM is a system of protected electronic exchanges between health profession-
als and the health insurance agencies. It is based on a family microprocessor card technology 
(VITALE Health Insurance card) with an extensive networking element 
The VITALE card is the health insurance card. It is diffused and personalized by the Health 
insurance agencies. It allows the identification of the person and the immediate recognition 
of the rights of ensured, by indicating its agency affiliation and by attesting its rights in the 
event of third party payment. In the future, the Ministry of Health would like to add a photo-
graph on the card, allowing the physician a visual monitoring of the identity of the patient. 
The card contract is a contract which binds the insurance policy-holder to VITALE SESAM; 
the policy-holder has rights (guaranteed payment) but also duties (prohibition to lend it, to 
use it fraudulently...) It should be noted that the physician currently does not check the iden-
tity of the patient, because on the reimbursement form paper, it says "according to the indi-
cations provided by the person". 
About 80m reimbursement forms are electronically transmitted monthly in 2005. 
The objectives of Vitale 2 are: 
•  to face the evolution of the workload through an increase in productivity; 
•  to take part in the medical control of the evolution of health expenditures while facilitat-
ing and making the collection of medical and administrative information resulting from 
the coding of the acts reliable; 
•  to simplify and accelerate the administrative steps and the operations of refunding of the 
insurance policyholders. 
The ordinances envisage the introduction of the personal health record into the forthcoming 
card Vitale 2. Health records are then obligatory for all. Initially, they will be on paper, but 
in the long term, the medical file embedded in the card Vitale 2 will replace it. 
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The Ministry of the Economy, Finance and Industry (MINEFI), jointly with the Ministry of 
Health, is a main actor of the e-government effort in France.54 
On the occasion of the Ministerial Joint Technical Committee on 15 June 2004, the Minister 
vowed to transform the Ministry of the Economy, Finance and Industry (MINEFI) into a 
beacon of administrative efficiency: the “Ministry of Administrative Performance”. Conse-
quently, the ministerial strategy for reforming MINEFI has now become “Bercy ensem-
ble”(Bercy composed), a programme underpinned by a three-pronged perspective. Firstly, 
administrative performance is not an end in itself: the search for it is driven by the concern 
to improve administrative efficiency for the benefit of the national community as a whole. 
An effective MINEFI, implementing proactive economic, financial and industrial policies, is 
supposed to be a powerful force for job-creation. Secondly, this search for administrative 
performance entails overhauling the organisation and operation of services to make them 
more efficient and productive. MINEFI has a special role to play in this process by virtue of 
its central position in the State machinery both as provider and controller of all governmen-
tal resources. It thus guarantees the proper use of the taxpayers’ money. For all these rea-
sons, it has a duty to set the example and to set the benchmark for public management. One 
reflection of efficiency, in this sense, is the capacity to save money for the benefit of the 
national community through sound management of the Ministry’s main item of expenditure, 
namely its workforce.  
Reorganization, therefore, should seek, among other things, to reduce Ministry staffing lev-
els by replacing only one person out of every two retiring, overall. The Ministry is commit-
ted to a process of radical change in order to achieve this. This change is also an opportu-
nity: it spells new career opportunities, new working conditions and a new working envi-
ronment. Its success depends not only on the intrinsic quality of the programme’s compo-
nents, but also on the technical and social measures accompanying them. Hence the third 
perspective, which gives its title to the new plan instigated by the Minister: “Bercy ensem-
ble”, sending a signal of encouragement to change. Change should not be imposed from 
above, but explained and discussed. It should not come suddenly but with appropriate sup-
porting measures. It should not be one-sided; it should come with accompanying compensa-
tory measures designed to improve civil servants’ conditions and share with them the sav-
ings achieved through their efforts. Change, and the adjustments it entails, must be re-
warded. MINEFI staff that play an active part in seeing through these changes will qualify 
for an internal promotion plan recognizing their skills and experience, on the one hand, and 
also for a collective performance bonus payable to those teams that contribute significantly 
to the reforms in hand. 
Towards e-government:  
In a ministry that processes huge volumes of bulk data, with large numbers of officials deal-
ing with tens of millions of users, the deployment of new technologies is a priority. MINEFI 
is consequently introducing a wide range of online procedures for its different categories of 
users (private citizens, businesses, local authorities, other government departments) aimed at 
improving service to users. The www.impots.gouv.fr tax portal allows private citizens to 
consult their tax status online, to file their tax returns and pay their taxes online and opt in 
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for direct debit as well as to have access to comprehensive up-to-date tax information. Look-
ing to 2005, the online tax account will record taxpayers’ payments, which will be accessible 
via the Internet and call centres. The www.minefi.gouv.fr MINEFI portal now provides 
personalized access according to specific user profiles (young people, students, pensioners), 
while MINEFI’s specialized portals (customs and excise, General Directorate for Competi-
tion Policy, Consumer Affairs and Fraud Control, etc.) contain sections dedicated to indi-
vidual taxpayers. Finally, the MINEFI portal has recently deployed a new “MINEFI online” 
section allowing one-click access to an array of services geared to different user categories: 
businesses, private citizens and local authorities. Under “Your online formalities”, all of the 
Ministry’s online services are brought together in one place, enabling users to perform ad-
ministrative procedures from their own home or office.  
A dedicated site for business, provides comprehensive access to MINEFI directorates’ ser-
vices to businesses. MINEFI offers them a wide range of online services, including remote 
payment of corporation taxes, online VAT returns and payment, online declaration of trade 
in goods, paperless transit customs procedures, online access to MINEFI procurement con-
tracts, etc.) as well as free access to its legal databases (competition, tax and industry) and 
statistics (the ALISSE database and INSEE's SIRENE directory, together with SESSI’s 
industrial statistics). 
The www.colloc.minefi.gouv.fr website offers complete information on local government 
related issues (budget, public procurement, and regulations). Also, the local public sector 
administration information system is currently being remodelled under the HELIOS pro-
gramme, in order to offer high value added budgetary and financial services to local authori-
ties and other institutions.  
All MINEFI staff have access to the Ministry’s Alizé intranet and e-mail. They also benefit 
from a bunch of online services (online registration for examinations, training programmes, 
web diary, etc.). In addition, the “E-Bercy” plan now enables paperless internal exchanges 
within MINEFI. For example, exchanges of circulars within the Ministry are now 100% 
paperless. The establishment of a Ministry Human Resources Information System (SIRH) 
will modernize MINEFI’s human resources management.  
MINEFI is responsible for managing the “Accord” plan vis-à-vis other government depart-
ments. The scope and timetable for this plan were recently reformulated in order to guaran-
tee the priority for implementation of the Constitutional Bylaw on Budget Acts (LOLF) on 1 
January 2006. This inter-ministerial project is contributing to the modernization of budget-
ary and accounting processes by implementing a single EDP application for monitoring and 
controlling government expenditures and revenues, excluding income taxes and revenues 
from government properties.  
Several projects have been incorporated in ADELE e-government programme, which is 
being managed by the e-government development agency (ADAE). They may be consulted 
online via the MINEFI portal:  
http://www.minefi.gouv.fr/minefi/entreprise/nouvelles_technologies/psae/index.htm.  
Together, these projects reflect the many facets of MINEFI’s modernization drive. The 
overriding goal is to provide easily accessible services (multi-channel access, one-stop 
contacts, etc.) combining personalised access for the public with a high level of confidence 
(secure online formalities, separation of advisory and control missions, respect for profes-
sional secrecy) for all of the different publics dealing with MINEFI. “MINEFI online” is 
contributing to the provision of high value added services.  DIW Berlin: Politikberatung kompakt  44 
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Italy 
The e-Government policies were defined in the Government Guidelines for the Development 
of the Information Society’ published in June 2002.55 The Italian model for e-Government has 
been developed, and is composed of six key elements: Service provision, digital identifica-
tion, access channels, service provision agencies, efficient and low-cost back office operations 
for service providers, interoperability and cooperation, communication infrastructure. The 
national e-government infrastructure comprises the following components: 
•  Portal: www.italia.gov.it is an e-Government portal for citizens, launched in 2002. A sepa-
rate portal, www.impresa.gov.it, has been built for online services to businesses, which 
was fully launched in early 2005. 
•  Network: Unitary Network of the Public Administration (RUPA) is a broadband network 
interconnecting all public administration bodies across the country. By 2007, RUPA is due 
to be incorporated into a Public Connectivity System (Sistema Pubblico di Connettività - 
PSC). The first phase of the administration’s migration to PSC is currently being carried 
out with the transition from the former infrastructure to new broadband technologies. 
•  National electronic identification system: The Italian electronic ID card was launched in 
2001. Following the successful completion of two experimental phases in 2003 and 2004, 
the card is now being rolled out across the country and distributed to citizens older than 15. 
The card contains a set of personal data, a biometric key and a digital signature. In order to 
enable citizens to securely access e-government services even before the widespread dis-
semination of electronic ID cards, the Italian Government has also developed a National 
Services Card (CNS), a smart card allowing to securely identify citizens online. Contrarily 
to the e-ID card, the CNS does not constitute a 'proof of identity' and is not a legal identity 
document nor travel document. 
•  e-Procurement: The portal Acquisti in Rete (Public Procurement Online) provides access 
to a fully functional e-procurement platform operated by CONSIP, a company owned by 
the Ministry of Finance. The platform facilitates the use of three main tools for public e-
procurement. Furthermore the platform provides information on e-procurement activities 
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as well as newsletters, best practice cases and community on e-procurement. The system 
can be used by central as well as local administrations. 
•  Knowledge Management: There is currently no central knowledge management infra-
structure in Italy. 
Both government and local authorities pay much attention to such programs, but this interest 
clashes with the difficulties of public finance, mainly due to the increase of public deficit and 
to the amount of public debt. For example, in the financial year 2003, the Ministry of Innova-
tion and Technology had required € 2101m from the State Budget, but at the end the re-
sources made available amounted only to € 1139m.  
The resources were allotted as follows: 
•  Projects of the central public administration  € 125m 
•  Information of schools  € 285m 
•  Digitalisation of the artistic patrimony  € 585m 
•  Broadband connectivity of local government  € 144m 
To these figures, € 150m have to be added (derived from UMTS licences revenues) to be 
spent in the “electronic identity card” project. 
The resources made available at national level are relatively limited however, the more rele-
vant expenditure is that of local authorities, who spent € 1102m in 2003 for initiatives in the 
field of e-government. The financing came partially from the sale of UMTS licences (€ 250m) 
and from budgets of the regional governments (€ 852m).  
In 2004, a second phase of the e-government plan was launched by the regional and local 
authorities, who received € 200m from the central government. The objective was to spread 
online availability of public services in all regions of the country, but especially in small 
communities comprising of 11 million people. 
RUPA was planned from 1995 till 1999, and became operative in 1999. Its mission was to 
combine and rationalise all the fragmented telecommunications and information technology 
networks of the different Ministries and Agencies of the Central Public Administration 
(CPA), in order to have one unified network for the CPA. In 6 years, RUPA has managed to 
connect, through 17,000 access points, almost all the locations of CPA and also the networks 
of 15 regions (out of 20) and 80 different public agencies.  DIW Berlin: Politikberatung kompakt  44 
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For those services requiring switched access or broadband access, government institutions 
exclusively used the network of Telecom Italia which is not dedicated to government agencies 
but shared with Telecom Italia’s other business customers. This construction aimed at opti-
mising infrastructure use. Telecom Italia, as the successful bidder for carrier services on the 
RUPA network, was engaged through its subsidiary Path Net in the development and running 
of RUPA and its related carrier services, as well as their marketing. 
In 2005, a new system, called Public System of Connectivity (PSC) was promoted which was 
to absorb RUPA by 2007, and to interconnect all the Italian public administrations (central 
and local), which were to share common interfaces and a common environment for applica-
tions. 
The change originated from the need to include the Local Public Administration (LPA) i.e. 
regional governments, regional agencies and municipalities within the unified network, since 
the reform of the Constitution transferred a growing number of powers to such institutions. 
In this new situation, RUPA was clearly inadequate, since it mainly connected the CPA and 
the interoperability of the different networks of the CPA and that of the LPA was not guaran-
teed. 
In a short period of time (around one year), under the supervision of CNIPA (the National 
Agency for the information technology in the public administration), interoperability has 
almost been reached, and all networks (central and local) share the same standards of quality 
and security. The global investment for the PSC planned from 2005 till 2009 amounts to 
€ 800m, with a saving of € 400m with regard to the planned expenditure forecasted by RUPA 
(€ 1,2bn). 
The introduction of the PSC has also implied a more open procurement. RUPA had only one 
supplier for each activity: Path Net, a Telecom Italia’s subsidiary, for the transport services, 
while EDS-Infonet had to guarantee the interoperability of networks.  
CNIPA has adopted new rules for procurement, so as to have more suppliers. 
The tender, completed last May, was won by 4 competitors: 
1.  The grouping of Fastweb and EDS; 
2. BT-Albacom; DIW Berlin: Politikberatung kompakt  44 
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3. Wind; 
4. Telecom  Italia. 
Each of the winners received a decreasing share of the orders (60, 25, 10, 5%). The 4 winners 
have to create a consortium in order to build the Qualified eXchange Network (QXN), the 
infrastructure that will interconnect the networks of the 4 companies to all the Italian Public 
Administration’s Offices. 
It has been estimated that, as a result of the tender, the expenditure for the connectivity con-
cerning the CPA will decrease in 2007 from € 130m to € 65m. 
Another significant effect is that Telecom Italia has lost its leading position in the supply of 
connectivity to the Public Administration. 
Spain 
The Spanish Government’s current e-Government strategy laid down in the ‘Public Admini-
stration Technological Modernisation Plan 2004-2007’ was presented in September 2004.56 
The plan has a budget of € 84m to 2007, to be spent on 43 projects in five key areas, i.e.:  
•  CERTIFICA: The Plan aims at developing information systems supporting electronic in-
teraction between public administrations and citizens. 
•  EDNI: Implementation of the electronic national identity document. 
•  CIUDADANO.ES: A new citizen portal has been set up in order to bring the administra-
tion closer to the citizen. The portal provides access to interactive and transactional ser-
vices and a set of new services for communicating with public administrations.  
•  SIMPLIFICA: Simplification and rationalisation of public management, with a view to 
reduce costs and service processing as well as delivery times. Key projects include the de-
velopment of electronic procurement, of geographical information systems, of human re-
sources information systems, the completion of the administrative intranet linking central, 
regional and local administrations, and the establishment of an observatory of electronic 
administration. 
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•  MAP.ES: Improvement of the IT infrastructure of the Ministry of Public Administration. 
Unification and improvement of web pages of the State administration. Key projects in-
clude the implementation of a multi-services corporate network for the Ministry, of video-
conferencing, the use of electronic signatures for internal processes and the development of 
e-Learning in the Ministry. 
Main e-Government components include:  
•  Portal: www.060.es, launched in June 2006, the portal substitutes the previous portal “ad-
mistración.es”. This is part of a global network dedicated to the citizens, constituted by a 
060 office network and a 060 phone line also dedicated to the citizens, thus shaping a 
unique multi-channel system for the administrative services of the entire country. 
•  Network: MAP en Red’s main objective is to technologically modernize government 
delegations, the sub delegations and their services, ensuring that citizens have access to 
them, thus simplifying the work process and administrative procedures. 
•  Government Intranet: The design, architecture, technologies, services, and security of 
this IP-based backbone are very similar to the EU pan-European TESTA network.  
•  National electronic identification system: The Public Certification Authority issues digi-
tal certificates for use in electronic administrative transactions. The Government has intro-
duced electronic cards containing electronic signatures in 2006. The Spanish eID card will 
make it possible to digitally sign electronic documents and contracts, and to identify and 
authenticate citizens in a secure digital environment. 
•  e-Procurement: The Centralised Procurement System was developed and is operated by 
the Sub-Directorate General of Procurement in the Directorate General for Patrimony of 
the Ministry of Economy and Finance. It provides access to catalogues of generic products 
and services used by multiple public bodies. The system can be used by central, regional 
and local administrations to purchase online from any computer with a login and an ad-
vanced eSignature. Currently, 2,200 public institutions have access to this system, which 
also enables businesses to respond to tenders online. The bidders have access to their cata-
logues, so that they can easily modify the description of their goods/services or add prices, 
products, etc. 
•  Knowledge Management: There is currently no central knowledge management infra-
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In Spain, both the availability of public services and their sophistication is more advanced for 
services used by enterprises than for the ones dedicated to citizens. There are several reasons 
for this. First, enterprises have to process a number of transactions with the administration 
online (social security, taxes, etc). Second, Spanish economic policy was explicitly designed 
to reduce operational costs of enterprises. This has been done by supplying more productive 
public services and higher service quality resulting in reduced costs for enterprises. Lastly, 
citizens have not integrated the use of electronic tools in their perceptions of how to commu-
nicate with administration. Furthermore, the diffusion of personal computers in households 
and the use of the Internet has been slow.57 
Due to the active promotion of e-government services, the awareness of e-government ser-
vices among enterprises has steadily increased. For example, in 2003, 55% and 52% enter-
prises with more than 10 employees used the internet to obtain information and to get forms 
respectively. However, at the same time, only 37% of enterprises returned filled-in forms and 
27% complete electronic formalities online.58 
Recently there has been an increased interest in e-learning for regular public and private uni-
versities. Roughly one third of higher education courses use e-learning to complement class-
room teaching. Most of the infrastructure required for virtual campuses is already in place. 
There are two public universities, UNED and Ouverta from Cataluña, that offer an almost full 
range of e-learning courses. All the services are 100% online, except summer courses. A 
number of other public and private universities and teaching institutions also offer online 
courses. These include BA´s, MA´s, PhD´s courses. Continuous learning and extension 
courses are also provided.  
The market potential for e-learning courses in Spanish is very large since the market includes 
most of Latin America. However, due to the economic conditions in these countries, the ac-
tual demand is still quite low.  
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The above programmes can be regarded mostly as state demand: demand that has been in-
duced by public initiative, since private higher education institutions represent only a small 
fraction of higher education. 
United Kingdom 
The UK’s current e-Government strategy is set in the document ‘Transformational Govern-
ment - Enabled by Technology’ published in November 2005.59 
Main e-Government components include:  
•  Portal: Launched in March 2004, Direct.gov.uk is the UK Government's citizen portal. It 
provides citizens with a single entry-point to online public services. Unlike its predecessor, 
UK online, Direct.gov.uk is not organised on a “life-cycle episodes” model but on the basis 
of major public services areas (e.g. health, education, employment, etc.) and of target cus-
tomer groups (parents, disabled people, young people, etc.). Since April 2004, the Di-
rect.gov service is also available via digital TV, enabling the more than ten million UK 
households equipped with digital television to access public services information through 
their TV sets. A separate e-Government portal for businesses, BusinessLink.gov.uk, was 
launched in November 2003, providing access to government information and services for 
businesses, business owners and managers. 
•  Network: Initially launched in April 1998, the Government Secure Intranet (GSI) is the 
primary network infrastructure for connecting and joining up central government depart-
ments and agencies. An upgraded and improved version of the GSI went live in February 
2004, providing users with restricted-level access to better services and functionalities. The 
new service is based on an IP Virtual Private Network, is capable of carrying voice and 
video data, involves broadband technology, and allows for separate virtual private net-
works for closed user groups. It also expands beyond the boundaries of the previous net-
work to cover local authorities. Already connecting over 350.000 users in central and local 
government, the new GSI is designed to become a central infrastructure for e-government 
countrywide. It could be extended to organisations such as the National Health Service and 
the Ministry of Defence, and may ultimately link a million users. 
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•  National electronic identification system: The most generic central UK identification 
platform is the Government Gateway, which, launched in February 2001, is a central regis-
tration and authentication engine enabling secure authenticated e-government transactions 
to take place over the internet. Users need to register with the Gateway in order to enrol for 
using online government services and subsequently transact securely with government de-
partments. Built on open standards, the Gateway also enables the joined-up delivery of 
government services by allowing different systems in different departments to communi-
cate with the Gateway and with each other. 
•  e-Procurement: There is currently no central e-procurement infrastructure in the UK. 
However, the Office of Government Commerce (OGC) operates (through its trading arm 
OGCbuying.solutions) Catalist, a catalogue-based electronic procurement scheme. Catalist 
provides public sector organisations with a simplified means of procuring and contracting 
for a wide range of products and services, based on a series of Framework Agreements 
signed by OGCbuying.solutions with a number of suppliers. OGC and OGCbuy-
ing.solutions have set up an e-Procurement platform called Zanzibar, which went live in 
March 2006.  
•  Knowledge Management: The Knowledge Network is a government-wide electronic 
communication tool helping government departments to share knowledge with each other, 
and providing an online collaborative working environment across government. The KN 
was launched in October 2000 and is currently available to around 55.000 users through 
the Government Secure Intranet. 
That the UK has progressed and done well in the survey is no surprise given the political 
support that the move of public services online has received. The Prime Minister enthusiasti-
cally backed online services and established the Office of the e-envoy to oversee the govern-
ment’s adoption of new technologies like the Internet. Significantly, this office was located in 
the Cabinet Office and not a department such as the DTI. However, more recently the public 
support for online services has been less headline grabbing and the Office of the e-envoy has 
been absorbed within a new e-government unit (eGU) located within the Cabinet Office. The 
responsibilities of this unit are as follows: 
•  Formulating information technology strategy and policy 
•  Developing common IT components for use across government DIW Berlin: Politikberatung kompakt  44 
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•  Promoting best practice across government 
•  Delivering citizen centred online services (eGU website). 
The aim, according to the Prime Minister, is “ensuring that IT supports the business transfor-
mation of Government itself so that we can provide better, more efficient, public services” 
(eGU website). In late 2004, the head of the eGU Ian Whitmore, stated that he wanted to 
make government more efficient through IT. This will, however, involve a degree of stan-
dardisation and centralisation so that, for example, the cost of hosting 4,000 or so government 
websites is reduced (Cross (2004)). Maintenance of these websites costs around £ 500m a 
year.  
The commitment of the British government in combining e-government with the general 
promotion of telecommunication services shows in an effort to bundle demand for broadband 
services. The government has announced that it will spend £ 1bn on ensuring public sector 
broadband connectivity (Department for Business Enterprise & Regulatory Reform (2003), p. 
1). This will be an important incentive for investment in broadband networks, and it will 
stimulate the diffusion of broadband technology throughout the country. 
For the UK some figures are available for the usage of government services:  
•  In early January 2005, around 4800 people an hour were filing their tax returns online 
(Cross (2005)). It is expected that the number of people filing would break the 2002/03 re-
cord of 1.1 million 
•  40% of the eligible population of self assessment filers filed online (ibid) 
•  65% of university applications were filed online in 2004 (ibid). However, the actual num-
ber was not stated. 
•  The Public Records Office 1901 Census was placed online in January 2002, generating hits 
of 1.2 million per hour. This led to its closure for 10 months, and when it reopened it re-
ceived between 8,000 and 10,000 hits a day (ibid). 
•  The Land Registry website cost £ 1.3m to establish, and charges £ 4 for access to title deed 
and plan information so that these costs can be recovered (ibid). 
•  No medical records are yet online. It is, however, likely that a soon to be published report 
on the modernisation of the Scottish health system will recommend that medical records 
are moved wholesale online (Martin (2005)). Not only would this facilitate the movement DIW Berlin: Politikberatung kompakt  44 
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of information within the health system, but it would also give patients access to their 
medical records.  
Having said this, several caveats regarding e-government are necessary. Anecdotal evidence 
would suggest that: 
•  The central government does better than the devolved administrations of Scotland and 
Wales. 
•  Considerable variation exists with respect to the range of services that cities provide. Most 
cities have focused on informational services, though a substantial number do offer the op-
portunity for residents to pay their council tax online. 
•  UK wide IT contracts, such as those for, e.g. the NHS, Inland Revenue or Passport Office, 
often overrun in terms of both their budgets as well as the timeframe. Although the NHS 
has received substantial IT investment in recent years, it remains largely paper based.  
•  The database and service integration that e-government implies has civil liberty implica-
tions. These are at the heart of much of the discussion of IT contracts in the UK. Indeed, it 
could be argued that these are the focal points of the discussion, and issues such as effi-
ciency gains, better services etc., are very much incidental.  
The adoption of e-learning has been encouraged by JISC (Joint Information Systems Com-
mittee) which has established an e-learning programme covering four areas: e-learning and 
pedagogy, frameworks and tools, distributed e-learning and innovation. The findings are dis-
seminated through www.elearning.ac.uk. JISC has also co-sponsored research with the Aus-
tralian Department of Education, Science & Training to focus on the development and inte-
gration of computers into learning, research and education administration. The Higher Educa-
tion Academy, which seeks to support academics in their daily activities, also has an e-
learning programme.60 
According to a broad definition of e-learning of the use of computers to aid teaching and 
learning, then almost every educational institution in the UK has embraced e-learning. This is 
perhaps not a surprise given the strong emphasis that the government has placed on IT in 
education of late. The government’s strategy document – Harnessing technology – has identi-
fied six priorities: 
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1.  Integrated online information service for all citizens, 
2.  Integrated online personal support for children and learners, 
3.  A collaborative approach to personalised learning activities, 
4.  A good quality ICT training and support package for practitioners, 
5.  A leadership and development package for organisational capability in ICT, 
6.  A common digital infrastructure to support transformation and reform.61 
Whilst the first of these could be viewed as being generic in nature, the remaining five prior-
ity areas are clearly focused on education in general rather than any particular educational 
area such as schools, vocational courses or colleges. 
If we focus solely on universities, it is abundantly clear that many now view IT to be an inte-
gral part of teaching and learning. Within the university environment, e-learning takes many 
forms such as class specific websites, interactivity and online assessment. Online courses, 
whether modules, continued professional development type courses, or entire degrees, are 
also offered. On the one hand these courses allow those at a distance to participate, whilst on 
the other hand they also facilitate quick updating and customisation. The quick customisation 
means that largely the same material can be made available to different types of students. 
II.5.3.2 The  Indicator 
Transforming the e-government scores from Capgemini (see Table II-42) and the overall 
maturity scores from Accenture (see Table II-43) into a state demand indicator results in the 
following indicator (equal weights have been used):  
Table II-45 
State demand indicator 
Indicator Germany  France  Italy  Spain  UK 
state  demand  7,9 9,6 8,5 8,3 9,6 
Source: Own calculations. 
The country with the highest score is the UK, followed by France at the same level and - with 
some distance - by Italy, Spain and Germany. The high ranking of the UK results mainly from 
the fact that e-government is particularly well developed with respect to ‘online sophistica-
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‘overall maturity’ indicator developed by Accenture, UK shows the same score as Germany 
but is ranked lower than France.  
II.6  State as a shareholder 
Despite privatisation of telecommunication operators, in many countries, governments con-
tinue to have shares in the incumbent firm. These shares are being reduced gradually, but the 
state still has the possibility to influence the incumbent’s strategies. This can have the benefi-
cial effect that financial markets tolerate higher debt rates which – at least in the short term – 
gives the incumbents more flexibility to deal with excessive debt. On the negative side, state 
ownership might oblige the incumbent to integrate political and social aims in its business 
strategy. However, this aspect seems to be of minor importance, as the authors were not aware 
of any pressure exercised on the social responsibility of incumbents. If such pressure exists, it 
will be dealt with in the chapters on labour market conditions and state support in this report. 
The shareholder indicator observes the debt development of the incumbents in the reference 
countries and the level of state ownership. In addition qualitative evidence has been used to 
answer the question of whether governments would tolerate a foreign takeover of the incum-
bent. 
II.6.1  Country comparison  
The following Table II-46 shows the development of state ownership in the five countries.  
Table II-46 
Shareholding of the state 
in % 
  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Deutsche  Telekom  60,0 43,0 43,0 42,7 38,0 37,0 
France  Telecom  55,5 55,5 56,5 58,9 42,2  32,45 
Telecom  Italia  3,5  3,5 - - - - 
Telefónica  - - - - - - 
British  Telecom  - - - - - - 
Source: Bundesministerium der Finanzen (2006b) 
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The debt situation of incumbents has been analysed using net debt figures.  
Table II-47 
Development of net debt burden 
in million € 
  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Deutsche  Telekom  57.400 62.800 61.100 46.600 39.900 38.600 
France  Telecom  60.998 60.734 68.000 44.200 44.167 43.938 
Telecom  Italia  35.728 38.362 33.399 33.346 29.529 39.858 
Telefónica  26.951 28.942 22.533 19.235 23.694 30.067 
British Telecom
1)  45.126 22.351 13.882 12.652 11.464 10.818 
Notes: 1) As at March 31th of the following year; conversion ₤ into €: annual rates.  
Sources: Deutsche Telekom (2000 to 2005), France Telecom (2000 to 2005), Telecom Italia (2000 to 2005), 
British Telecom (2000 to 2005a) and: France Telecom (2008), Telecom Italia (2008) 
 
Table II-47 indicates that those firms with a major share of state ownership show considerable 
levels of debt during the period since 2000. However, it should be noted that debt levels of 
Deutsche Telekom and France Telecom decreased during the last four years while the debt 
levels of Telecom Italia and Telefónica were higher in 2005 than in 2000. Moreover, the ma-
jor difference between these countries and the UK is that British Telecom had to reduce its 
debt level drastically.  
The incumbents’ indebtedness has resulted in the following debt/EBITDA rates:62 
Table II-48 






Italia  Telefónica  British 
Telecom 
net debt/EBITDA rates as 




Notes: 1) Based on OIBDA (operating income before depreciation and amortization). 2) In the 2006 Annual 
Report BT states on p.31: “EBITDA is defined as the group profit/loss before depreciation, amortisation, interest 
and taxation. This is a non-GAAP measure and may therefore not be directly comparable to the EBITDA of 
other companies.” 
Sources: Deutsche Telekom (2005), France Telekom (2005), Telecom Italia (2005), Telefónica (2005), British 
Telecom (2005a)  
 
The net adjusted debt/EBITDA ratios confirm that there is no relationship between state own-
ership and debt levels. 
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Germany 
Until the end of 1994 - before starting the privatisation program - the German state owned the 
telephone operator company completely.63 Initially 26% of the shares were issued after a 
major campaign to attract small private equity holders by offering them special conditions if 
they signed in for the IPO (initial placement option). Privatisation of the Deutsche Telekom is 
aimed at establishing a broader shareholder culture in Germany, because Germany was and is 
lacking such a culture, particularly when compared to the Anglo-Saxon-countries. Privatisa-
tion was based on a law (Postreform 2); this law decreed that the money earned by selling the 
shares could not be withdrawn by the state until the end of 1999. Due to this restriction im-
posed on the state owner, the capital base of Deutsche Telekom could be increased signifi-
cantly by the privatisation program. Afterwards the federal government reduced its share 
holdings by transferring the property rights of its holding to the state owned KfW (Bank of 
Reconstruction). The purpose of this move was mainly to receive cash to cover deficits in the 
state budget. In 1997, 13.5% of the federal state’s shares where transferred legally to KfW. 
The Bank was entitled to sell of part of these shares but had to take care that the value of its 
share holdings was not endangered by the selling of these assets. Through these transactions 
the shareholdings of the KfW of DT AG increased from 13.5% in 1997 to 23.9% in 1998. In 
1999 the government made a second public offering to reduce its share holdings from 48.1% 
in 1998 to 43.2% in 1999 (DT2).  
Since the New Economy bubble reached its final state in 2000, the government placed another 
public offering (DT3) reducing its share holdings to 60% (43.2% government and 16.8% 
KfW). After the bubble burst, the price of the DT AG stock fell dramatically, just as those of 
many other telecommunication companies, from € 103.50 in spring 2000 to less than € 20 in 
2001. This rapid devaluation put the privatisation process on hold. The government was hop-
ing for a recovery of the stock market and postponed further privatisation in 2001 and 2002. 
However, with the acquisition of Voicestream and Powertel by DT AG in the US via equity 
swaps and some cash payments, the German government’s share holdings of DT AG de-
creased further. In 2003, the government shifted its holdings again from the government ac-
count to those of KfW, increasing the Bank’s holdings from 12.1% in 2002 to 16.7% in 2003. 
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In 2004, the further privatisation of DT AG stocks was shifted from public offerings towards 
large scale sell offs to institutional investors. Through one of these operations KfW could 
reduce its holdings by about 4.7%, thus, lowering the overall holding of the state to 37.5%. In 
December 2005, 15% of shares were held by the government, 22% by the KFW. Institutional 
investors held 46%, while retail investors owned 17%.  
A further step towards privatization was taken in April 2006 when 4.5% of the shares held by 
KfW were sold to the private equity fund, Blackstone. Most recently, the switching of conver-
sion bonds into shares as well as the merger between T-Online and Deutsche Telekom has 
increased the number of shares that are freely available to the investing public. Currently, the 
government holds 14.8% and KfW 16.6% of shares.64 Furthermore, the government empha-
sises that while considering the requirements of the capital market it will reduce its sharehold-
ings further.65  
While the credit rating of Deutsche Telekom improved during 2005 and was raised to A- by 
Standard & Poors, the rating was decreased during 2006. In September 2006 Standard & 
Poors changed the forecast for the long term rating A- from stable to negative. This down-
grade was justified by expenditures for US mobile licenses that were higher then expected. 
The longterm ratings of Fitch and Moody’s remained unchanged A- and A3, respectively.66  
With respect to state interventions in business activities, it should be noted that the German 
federal government has taken an active position when considering that the CEO Ron Sommer 
was replaced by Kai-Uwe Ricke. However, press reports at this time informed the public that 
the final decision was made by the former chancellor Gerhard Schröder himself, which illus-
trates that the government took a very strong interest as to who was staffed as CEO. The re-
cent replacement of Kai-Uwe Ricke by René Obermann was mostly forced by Blackstone but 
supported by the German government.67 The additional claim of Blackstone to displace Klaus 
Zumwinkel, chairman of the board and head of Deutsche Post, however, was rejected by the 
German government.68  
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Considering the influence of the German government on the business activities of Deutsche 
Telekom, there were no reports that high ranking government officials influenced other stra-
tegic decisions. This has particular importance with respect to restructuring plans which also 
involve a reduction of staff.  
France 
Privatisation timetable 
In the case of France Telecom, the full privatization process had four steps.  
1 – The first one was the transformation of the post and telecommunications administration 
into two para-statal entities – this has been done by an act voted in on July 2, 1990 (Journal 
Officiel de la République Française (1990a)) creating La Poste and France Telecom. La Poste 
and France Telecom became “exploitants publics”, a special kind of EPIC (see box below). A 
large-scale public debate was organized beforehand by the Ministry of PTT to prepare the 
move (Prévot (1989)). The unions were satisfied by the guaranteesthat, the personnel would 
remain mostly public servants and that no further change was prepared, except for another act 
voted in on December 29, 1990 (Journal Officiel de la République Française (1990b)) intro-
ducing the changes needed by the new European regulatory regime after the 1987 Green Book 
on telecommunications. However, more changes soon were needed to cope with the decision, 
taken in 1993 at the European level to have full competition by 1998 in the telecommunica-
tion sector. The French government, pushed by the top management of France Telecom, de-
cided to go public in 1995. The change of statute was mainly justified by the international 
ambitions of France Telecom, after several promising deals abroad (Argentina, Mexico, and 
above all a strategic alliance with Deutsche Telekom and Sprint). However, the IPO was de-
layed by protests from the trade unions and the many social difficulties encountered by the 
government at that time. In 1995, after the general elections, a new CEO was named (Michel 
Bon) with a clear mandate to manage the change of statute and the IPO. To prepare the intro-
duction of full competition in 1998, a second telecommunications act was passed in 1996 to 
transpose European directives.  
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An EPIC (Etablissement public à caractère industriel ou commercial) is a state entity with 
mixed features. On one hand, it belongs to the state system: its mission is defined by law and 
cannot be easily extended (this is called the “specialty principle”); it cannot default finan-
cially as it benefits from state backing; it does not always pay taxes like a normal company; 
it has a Board nominated by the state and all its main decisions have to be approved by a 
posteriori. While on the other hand, it conducts quasi-normal commercial operations, can 
enter partnerships and own subsidiaries. Variations exist in the actual statute of the many 
EPICs found in France. From 1991 to 1996 France Telecom was an “exploitant public” 
(public operator), a special kind of EPIC. 
 
The telecom regulation act (Journal Officiel de la République Française (1996a)) of 26 July 
1996 was accompanied by another act which was also adopted in 1996 transforming the para-
statal entity France Telecom into a quasi-standard private company (Journal Officiel de la 
République Française (1996b)).  
2 – These changes opened the way for the second step in the privatization process, the Initial 
Public Offering (IPO) of France Telecom in 1997. The IPO was planned for the spring of 
1997 and a lengthy internal communication process took place to overcome the strong opposi-
tion from the unions despite the promise of the government that the state would keep control 
of the firm. However, the centre-right Juppé government lost the legislative elections at that 
time and was replaced by the Jospin government (socialist). The new Prime Minister asked 
for a “social audit” of the whole process (the socialists being traditionally against privatiza-
tion) but finally gave a green light to the IPO, understanding that the government was unable 
to finance the development of France Telecom in the new international competitive context. 
The IPO took place in the Fall of 1997 and amounted to € 29bn. The state kept 75 % of the 
capital; 4 million individual shareholders asked 3 times the number of available shares and 
finally got 10.55 % of the capital. Financial institutions obtained 11.95 % (they had asked 20 
times the number of available shares) and 70 % of the personnel of France Telecom bought 
2.5 %. A second public offering took place in 1998 and amounted to € 9bn. 
The percentage of France Telecom owned by the state has not decreased since 1997. In 2002-
2003, the government had to rescue France Telecom, due to its enormous debt (see below). 
On this occasion, part of the state participation was allocated to a state-owned financial hold-
ing company, originally devoted to the oil sector, ERAP. At the end of October 2003, the total 
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3 – The third step happened when the Raffarin government (center-right) asked the Parlia-
ment to permit the percentage of France Telecom shares held by the state to be below 50 %. 
The law was voted in 2003 (Journal Officiel de la République Française (2004a)). In Septem-
ber 2004 the government sold 10.58 % such that the share of capital held by the state was 
41.08 % on January 1
st, 2005.  
4 – The last step will be in effect when the state sells its last share of France Telecom. The 
government has declared it was to keep a significant share of the capital of France Telecom in 
the middle-term. There is no “golden share” rule. 
Role of the state as a shareholder of France Telecom 
Until 2004, the majority of members in the board of directors of France Telecom were state 
representative. They were mostly high-ranking officials from the ministries of economics, 
finance, industry and external trade. France Telecom, as all other large state firms, is under 
the permanent scrutiny of “contrôle d’Etat” (state controller, part of the Ministry of finance).  
Table II-49 
State representatives  
  2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
State representatives on 
the incumbent board 
10 out of 
21 
10 out of 
21 
10 out of 
21 
7 out of 
21 
7 out of 
21 
5 out of 
16 
Note: Until 2003, 7 members of the board were representing France Telecom employees; in 2004, this number 
decreased to 3, in 2006 it is up to 4. 
 
However, as the government has been consistently promoting the introduction of competition 
in the telecommunications sector, it has been difficult for the state to act as an active share-
holder (Diefenbacher (2003)). Any move by the state could, indeed, be interpreted as too 
favourable or too detrimental to France Telecom. 
This uncomfortable situation was acceptable as long as France Telecom was reasonably prof-
itable. Unfortunately, in 2002, France Telecom incurred enormous losses (€ 20.7bn) due to 
several factors: purchase, in cash, of Orange for € 42bn; purchase of UMTS licenses in Ger-
many and the UK; drop of market value making all additional creation of shares impossible. 
The debt level became unacceptable at € 63.4bn, representing 5.6 times the EDITDA in 2002. 
The CEO, Michel Bon, was fired and replaced by Thierry Breton. The latter launched a dras-
tic rescue plan called to cut costs and restructure the debt. In December 2002, the French 
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taken by the financial markets clearly as a signal that the government would not let France 
Telecom default. 
On January 30, 2003, the European Commission launched an inquiry regarding this promise 
of a € 9bn loan as state aid is regulated by competition law. Some lawyers believed that 
France Telecom had benefited from psychological, or virtual state aid and should be fined. In 
a decision published on July 20, 2004, the Commission has ruled that the loan was incompati-
ble with the European regulation of state aid, but has not imposed any fine. In October 2004, 
the French government asked the European court of justice to cancel the decision of the 
Commission. The French government believes it is its right, as shareholder, to support the 
companies it owns. Eventually, the EC approved € 9.6bn Government bailout. 
State ownership of France Telecom was down to 31% in 2006. No further plans for the future 
have been made public at the moment. 
Italy 
A few years before the privatisation process of Telecom Italia, Law 474/1994 attributed spe-
cial powers (the so called golden share) to the Treasury (now Ministry of the Economy and 
Finances). 
Such powers consisted of: 
•  Necessity of government approval of each shareholder holding 3% of the capital; 
•  Necessity of government approval of any pact among shareholders holding 5% of the 
shares; 
•  A right to veto certain arrangements such as mergers, transfer of the company, dissolution 
of the company itself, change or abolition of the special powers attributed to Treasury. 
•  The government’s right to name one member of the board and one auditor of Telecom 
Italia. 
The Treasury’s special powers were introduced in the statutes of Telecom Italia on 26 March 
1997, a few months before privatisation, which took place in October 1997. 
Moreover such statutes required that each single shareholder could not own more than 3% of 
the shares of the company. This limit was removed on 10 August 2000. DIW Berlin: Politikberatung kompakt  44 
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In May 1999, just after the successful take-over bid for Telecom Italia from the group of in-
vestors led by Roberto Colaninno, a decree of the Prime Minister (D.P.C.M. 4 May 1999) and 
then a further Decree (D.P.C.M. 11 February 2000) redefined the special powers of the Treas-
ury, somewhat reducing their scope. According to these decrees, the special powers were 
bound to safeguard the vital interests of the State, in the fields of public security, public order, 
health and defence, and had to be coherent with the objectives of privatisation and of competi-
tion policy. 
On 22 May 2003, in the framework of merger between Olivetti and Telecom Italia, the Minis-
try of Economics has modified the golden share rule, eliminating two of the original items, 
that is: 
•  The necessity of government approval of any shareholders acquiring more than 3% of all 
shares. 
•  The right to name one member of the board and one auditor. 
Then, the Law 350/2003 modified another aspect of the golden share rule. In its original defi-
nition, the Government had to agree with new shareholders acquiring participation over the 
ceiling of 3%. Now, the Government must express its opposition to the admission of new 
shareholders, if this admission would damage vital interests of the State. 
It is clear from what has been said so far that, despite the full privatisation of Telecom Italia, 
the state still keeps a “limited”, but “real” involvement in Telecom Italia, in defiance of rul-
ings by the European Commission. 
This involvement does not concern day-to-day decisions, not even strategic issues (such as 
acquisitions or foreign alliances) but is a sort of public statement that Telecom Italia is a na-
tional asset. 
It is interesting to note that the government approved the two take-overs which have consid-
erably shaped Telecom Italia (the first rather openly, the second in a more reserved way). This 
means that in case of crisis the government would use its “influence” on banks, investors and 
financial institutions to help the company, and prevent bankruptcy or a sell-out to foreign 
interests. DIW Berlin: Politikberatung kompakt  44 
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Table II-50 
Shareholdings of Telecom Italia 
Indicator  State as shareholders 
















Bank of Italy 1,14
Employees 0,36
22.849 12.226











2002  The Ministry of the Econ-
omy has sold its residual 
shares on 9/12/2002 














50.587 (1)  14.528 (1)




43.416 (2)  12.864 (2)




52.101 (2)  12.987 (2)
(1) Drawn up according to the accounting principles of IT GAAP 
(2) Drawn up according to the accounting principles established by the Accounting Standard Board and ap-
proved by the IFRS 
 
The recent events in September regarding TI are a good example of intrusiveness into the life 
of the major Italian telecom operator. On the 11
th of September, the Chairman and main 
shareholder of TI, Mr. Tronchetti Provera, announced a plan to split the company in three 
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•  A utility business which would own the fixed wire network; 
•  A media company, combining the wholesale and retail activity of the fixed network with a 
content division, in order to transform the new entity in to a media company, which would 
become the core of T.I’s activity; 
•  A third company, running the mobile business. 
Public opinion has been very negative: all the observers have tried to understand the meaning 
of a project that implies a radical U-turn of the strategy, which led, in 2005, to the merger 
between TI and TIM, its mobile company, the real cash-cow of the group. Even the Govern-
ment expressed its dissatisfaction of this radical change of strategy and for a plan, that accord-
ing to a spokesman of the Government, had not been disclosed to the government, despite the 
fact that only one week before the announcement Mr. Tronchetti Provera, had met the Prime 
Minister, Romano Prodi. The statement of the Prime Minister’s spokesman and of other gov-
ernment’s members created much uproar, since the government wanted to reaffirm its right to 
take part in decisions affecting “the vital interests of the country”. 
Mr. Tronchetti Provera reacted harshly, leaking a document to the press from the Prime Min-
ister’s Office and prepared by the economic advisor of the Prime Minister, in which it was 
envisaged that the Cassa Depositi e Prestiti, a financial institution controlled by the Treasury 
(similar to Kfw) could acquire the fixed network of TI, in order to solve the financial prob-
lems of TI, and prevent it from selling the mobile company. After this clash, Mr. Tronchetti 
Provera resigned, and was replaced by Mr Guido Rossi, a well reputed business lawyer, 
linked to Mr. Tronchetti , but politically close to the Government. 
From the end of September the debate has calmed down, Mr. Rossi has withdrawn the former 
restructuring plan, and the Government and Telecom Italia have started a policy of appease-
ment while it is still not clear which will be the strategy of Telecom Italia in the near future. 
What is clear to everybody is that the Government intends to play a central role in the future 
of a company considered “vital” for the country. 
Since the privatisation of TI, intrusiveness no longer means interference in daily activities of 
the company, but the necessity of strong ties with the government, as the incumbent is still 
considered a national champion. DIW Berlin: Politikberatung kompakt  44 
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Spain 
If we compare Telefónica´s debt ratios with those of other telecom companies, Telefónica 
exhibits much better performance. Nevertheless the burst of the Internet bubble, and its im-
pact on the TMT sector, have impelled the debt ratio of Telefónica in the years 2000 and 
2001. Two kinds of explanations can be put forward. First of all, Telefónica had better ratios 
before the crisis because:  
(i)  It was very sensitive to financial ratios because for a long time Telefónica acted as a 
private firm in raising funding in international financial markets, both debt and equity. 
Moreover, Telefónica quotes its shares in foreign stock markets (New York, London, 
Paris and Tokyo) since 1985. International financial activity means that Telefónica is 
permanently under surveillance by institutional investors. 
(ii)  Telefónica carried out a lot of acquisitions in the years prior to the crisis. This could 
have triggered the debt ratios. However, a lot of these acquisitions (Endemol, Lycos and 
some Latin American transactions, for example) were paid by issuing new Telefónica´ 
shares. These new shares were delivered to the stock sellers in exchange for its shares. 
Therefore, Telefónica did not increase its debt yet simultaneously increased its equity. 
Telefónica managed its financial issues appropriately during the years of the TMT crisis. 
Some comments might underline this:  
(i) Telefónica stopped services that were not mature and even abandoned some of the riskier 
ones: mobile UMTS in Europe (Germany, Austria, Italy and Switzerland), content industry 
(for example Antena 3, a TV channel) and did not provide support to Terra, the emblematic 
subsidiary for internet business that had suffered the worst of the crisis. In doing so Tele-
fónica limited the contagion effect of the financial crash of Terra. 
(ii) Telefónica concentrated its main strategies in less risky business, such as ADSL deploy-
ment, and carried out a very selective strategy of acquisitions. 
Golden Share Rule 
The State is “proprietary” of a golden share in Telefónica since 1996. This golden share ex-
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•  Merger with another company 
•  Acquisition by another company 
•  Change in the social aim of the firm 
•  Selling strategic assets 
The golden share does not allow the government to intervene, neither directly nor indirectly, 
on management issues related to the investment policy or in any other day to day decision. 
Although the EU has watered down golden share rules (2002 European Court of Justice deci-
sion), Telefónica needed to have the permission of the government if it wished to carry out a 
merger with an other company. 
The government has threatened to use the golden share to impede the merger between KPN 
and Telefónica just before the TMT crisis began. However, the real question was a personal 
dispute between the chairman of Telefónica and some members of the Spanish government. 
On April 3
th of 2006, the Spanish parliament approved a law that suppresses the rights of the 
Spanish state as the owner of “golden shares” in Spanish firms. The new law satisfies the 
requirements made by the European Commission. The European court stated that the golden 
share limits market freedom. The initiative came from the Spanish government before the 
takeover bid launched for Endesa by the German company E.on. Nevertheless, even though 
the proposal was submitted to the Parliament after that bid, the government party supported 
the change.  
Therefore, the Spanish government gave up the right to veto in the E.on bid, although it will 
use other instruments in order to affect the final result of the takeover. With regard to Tele-
fónica, the removal of the golden share implies less protection by the state in case of a take-
over bid.  
Other major holdings of incumbent shares 
After complete privatisation in 1996, two Spanish bank entities (BBVA and La Caixa) appear 
as “hard core” stakeholders. Their current participations, both of them have been always 
around 10%, are as follows: 
•  BBVA: 6,63% 
•  La Caixa: 5.09% DIW Berlin: Politikberatung kompakt  44 
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These Spanish bank institutes are involved in the control of the company. They have six seats 
in the Board of Directors. One of them is the vice president of the firm. 
In addition to these tow banks several other financial institutions can be mentioned as share-
holders of Telefónica: The financial institution Citibank, NA holds about 231 million of 
shares, 4.66% of the stock of Telefónica. In addition to being shareholder, this bank acts as 
depositary of other shares. If we consider these shares, Citibank holds about a 10% stake in 
Telefónica´s stock. The Chase Manhattan Bank Nominees Ltd holds about 9.90% of shares, 
the State Street Bank&Co about 7.61%.  
The high participation of these three US banks as depositaries reveals the relevance of the 
ADR (American Depositary Receipt) for Telefónica. Therefore, US investors, both retail and, 
especially institutional, have a significant stake in Telefónica´s capital stock. 
Finally, it should be put forward that the new strategy of La Caixa, is to sell industrial partici-
pations. Therefore it is forecasted that, in future, its stake in Telefónica will decrease. 
General assessment 
What could the Spanish State do in favour of Telefónica if a strong crisis affected the com-
pany? There is no record of that issue in the Spanish telecom industry, and Spanish laws do 
not consider this problem. Nevertheless we could imagine what the role of the State will be in 
this potential situation. First of all, the state will provide funding as necessary in order to 
guarantee the telecommunication system in Spain if the problem arises suddenly. If the prob-
lem appears gradually, the state will try to solve it by promoting changes in the ownership of 
Telefónica and/or promoting mergers in the Spanish market. However, currently, we feel that 
there are no relevant possibilities of a financial collapse of Telefónica. 
United Kingdom 
There is no state shareholding in BT. A timeline that lays out the equity position of the UK 
government in BT can be found below: DIW Berlin: Politikberatung kompakt  44 
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Table II-51 
Timeline of government involvement in BT 
Date Event 
1981  BT created as a separate public entity 
1984, December  50,2 % of shares sold 
1991, December  25,6 % of shares sold 
1993, July  21,9 % of shares sold 
1997, July  Golden share relinquished by government 
Source: Curwen (1994). 
 
British Telecommunications, as it was originally called, was first privatised in December 
1984 and this was the first occasion when privatisation as a strategy could truthfully be said to 
have passed the point of no return. The details of the three-tranche privatisation – the other 
tranches were in December 1991 and July 1993 - were as follows: 
1.  Shares issued – 3012m; 1598m; 1312m 
2.  Percentage sold – 50.2%; 25.6%; 21.9% (rest set aside for bonus shares). 
3.  Amount raised – £ 3.916m (including a debt write-off of £ 1.280m); £ 5.240m; £ 5.335m. 
4.  Minimum investment – £ 260; £ 335; £ 492.  
A ‘special’ or ‘golden’ share was issued and kept in place throughout the three tranches. This 
stipulated: 
1.  Redemption – any time. 
2.  Special voting rights – no. 
3.  15% voting restriction per individual – yes. 
4.  15% foreign ownership cap – no. 
5.  Restrictions on winding up – no. 
6.  British CEO – yes in the first two phases; no in the third. 
7.  Government appointed directors – 2 during all three phases. 
Special shares were a fairly standard element of privatisation strategy, being applied to all 
utilities and the largest non-utilities. In terms of the seven categories above it may be noted 
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1.  Some were time limited whereas others, like BT’s, were not. 
2.  Special voting rights were used for all utilities bar telecommunications. 
3.  15% vote caps were normal for utilities. 
4.  Foreign ownership restrictions only applied to BAe, British Airways, Rolls Royce.  
5.  Requiring a British CEO was unusual. 
6.  Government appointed directors were very unusual. 
The ‘golden share’ effectively gave the UK government the ability to block any takeover of 
BT, and to appoint two non-executive directors to the company’s board69. The 1996 and 1997 
Annual Reports do not state whether any of the executive directors of BT were appointed by 
the UK government, though an ex-minister – Lord Tebbit – was a non-executive board mem-
ber of the company.  
Major shareholders of BT 
BT does not explicitly identify who its largest shareholders are. Instead its annual reports note 
the distribution of shares by size of holding and draw attention to a distinction between retail 
(private individuals) on the one hand and institutional shareholders on the other hand. No 
shareholder owns a stake of more than 5%.The table below, taken from the 2004 Annual 
Report, shows the distribution of BT shares. 
There has been a continuation of the trend towards the accumulation of stakes in the hands of 
the largest (institutional) shareholders during the past two years. 
                                                                          
69 See British Telecom (2005b) DIW Berlin: Politikberatung kompakt  44 
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Table II-52 
Analysis of BT’s shareholdings 
Ordinary shares of 5p each   









1 – 399  541,503  39,2  115  1,4 
400 – 799  404,779  29,3  226  2,6 
800 – 1.599   260,411  18,8  290  3,3 
1.600 – 9.999  169,048  12,2  489  5,7 
10.000 – 99.999  5,220  0,4  100  1,2 
100,000 - 999,999  824  0,1  306  3,5 
1.000.000 – 4.999.999  347  0,0  821  9,5 
5.000.000 and above
a,b,c,d 216 0,0  6,288 72,8 
Total 1.382,342  100,0  8.635  100,0 
Notes: a) 31 million shares were held in trust by Illford Trustees (Jersey) Limited for allocation to employees 
under the employee share plans b) Under the BT Employee Share Ownership Scheme and the BT Group 
Employee Share Investment Plan, 7m and 39m shares respectively were held in trust on behalf of 105,657 
and 89,129 participants respectively who were beneficially entitled to receive shares. 137m shares were held 
in the corporate nominee BT Group EasyShare on behalf of 124,279 beneficial owners. c) 208m shares were 
represented by ADS. Analysis by size of holding is not available for this holding. d) 14.3% of the shares were 
in 1572571 individual holdings, of which 135432 were joint holdings, and 85.7% of the shares were in 31694 
institutional holdings. 
Source: British Telecom (2004) p. 143  
 
BT’s financial troubles 
The full story of what happened at BT can be found in Curwen and Whalley (2005). Summa-
rising this heavily: 
1.  BT was financially sound in the mid-1990s, having become much more efficient during 
the decade post-privatisation. 
2.  It fancied itself as a global powerhouse and acquired a large number of foreign assets, 
albeit largely via minority stakes, as well as attempting to create a global joint venture in 
the form of the first version of Concert (with MCI). 
3.  The plan began to unravel when BT was beaten to the post by WorldCom in October 
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4.  The strategic replacement, Concert version 2 with AT&T, proved to be more of a model 
of disharmony than the contrary, and failed utterly to resolve BT problems during the late 
1990s. 
5.  With revenues in decline at home – due to competition in basic telephony and BT’s per-
verse decision to ignore the Internet – and a global venture consisting largely of bits and 
pieces with no coherent strategy, BT’s response was to pump up its debt via further, 
mostly foreign, acquisitions (Cellnet, Esat Telecom, Yellow Books USA).  
6.  Due to the ramping of telecoms market valuations in 2000/01, BT became too expensive 
to buy, yet was simultaneously pumping up its debt by buying 3G licences in e.g. the UK 
and Germany while also investing heavily to upgrade its networks to cope with broad-
band. 
7.  Thus, when market valuations collapsed in 2001/02, BT’s debts became excessive in 
relation to its capitalisation. 
The debt reduction plan, as originally envisaged, appeared as shown in Table II-53. As can be 
seen, the rights issue, comprising 1.98 bn shares priced at £ 3, a 47% discount to the ruling 
market price, issued on a 3-for-10 basis, played a major role in the debt reduction strategy. 
However, a further crucial aspect was the IPO of mmO2 (subsequently O2) with only £ 500m 
of debt and with each BT share being split into one BT Group share and one mmO2 share. On 
19 November 2001, the latter began life at £ 0.83p, valuing it at £ 7bn. Subsequently, further 
disposals have taken place and the BT Group debt is now comfortably below £ 10bn. 
In essence, once the financial markets began to implode, the pressure on BT to clean up its 
balance sheet became intense. Needless to say, there was also a severe effect upon the board-
room resulting in a directors “merry-go-round” at the BT Group. 
The credit rating of BT is flexible but has been constant for some time. As noted, the net debt 
position is stable in absolute terms and hence is falling relative to other financial indicators. 
The present credit rating by the three main agencies – Moody’s, S&P and Fitch – is shown 
below (as of May 2005). 
According to the BT website (op cit), these ratings should be interpreted as follows: 
Short-term ratings by these agencies assess the ability of the company to repay short-
term debt obligations. A1/P1/F1 ratings (highest short-term rating) by Moody's, S&P 
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A2/P2/F2 indicates satisfactory ability and A3/P3/F3 indicates adequate ability to meet 
the short-term financial liabilities. 
In other words, BT is viewed as being able to repay its borrowings. 
Table II-53 
Contributions to debt reduction (2001-2002) 
in million $  
Current (effected or agreed end-June 2001) 
Debt outstanding                              -39.600   
Rights issue                                                                 +8.600 
Assets sold 
  Airtel                                                                          +1.600 
  Bharti Cellular                                                              +175   
  Japan Telecom/J-Phone                                             +5.300 
  Maxis Communications                                                +500 
  Rogers Wireless                                                            +380 
  Yell                                                                            +3.050  
  Telenordia                                                                       +15 




2)                                                                  + 3.500 
  Sites                                                                          + 3.000 
  Vehicles                                                                    + 1.500 
Pension shortfall (annual)                      -400 
TOTAL                                               -40.000           +19.715               +8.000        
Future 
Disposals 
Clear Communications                                                   +180 
Savings (2001-02) 
  Dividend reduction                                                    +1.600 
  Capital spending reduction                                           +730 
  Cost base                                                                       +850 
  Credit rating downgrade                        -50 
Additional charges (2001-02) 
  Pension costs                                        -900 
  Asset write-downs
3)                            
     Impsat/SmarTone/StarHub            - 1.000 
     Concert/AT&T Canada                  - 1.500 
Additional stake in Blu                             -95 
Potential sales/revenue raising 
  Syntegra                                                      offered then withdrawn June 2001 
  Cégétel  (26%)                                            worth, at best, $ 4bn 
  LG Telecom (22%)                                      under negotiation  
  SmarTone                                                    under negotiation 
  Eutelsat (18%)                                             under discussion for perhaps $ 350m 
  Further shares in BSkyB                              acquired in May 2001 and November 2002    
Notes: 1) Not counted as part of debt reduction process by credit rating agencies. 2) Delayed to November 2001 due to 
legal problems. The property transactions are discussed in detail in the BT Group Annual Report and Form 20-F 2002, 
pp.37-38. 3) Of which $ 750m was announced in September 2001 to include Impsat in Argentina, plus $ 1bn potentially 
arising against AT&T Canada depending upon the outcome of the Concert break-up, plus possible write-offs against Smar-
Tone in Hong Kong and StarHub in Singapore. The actual write-offs resulting from the closure of Concert are separately 
itemised. 
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Table II-54 
BT’s credit ratings 
  Moody  Standard & Poor  Fitch 
Long term  Baa1  A-  A 
Short term  P2  A2  F1 
Source: British Telecom (2005c)  
 
State protection 
BT’s special share was neither unusually liberal nor unusually restrictive, and no other priva-
tisation followed the exact same pattern. It is particularly noteworthy that: 
1.  The government did not want any individual party to obtain a significant slice of BT. 
2.  On the other hand, it had no objections to a widely dispersed share ownership held largely 
in foreign hands. 
3.  It was not prepared to state in advance when it intended to terminate the special share. 
The special share was eventually terminated in BT’s case in July 1997, and it may reasonably 
be asked whether it, or any other for that matter, had achieved any real purpose. Broadly 
speaking, the answer is ‘no’. One can understand that, launching the world’s first major priva-
tisation programme, the government did not want it to appear that it cared nothing at all about 
what happened thereafter, but it is of particular interest that the restriction of most concern to 
Continental Europeans – that on foreign ownership – was only used for companies with spe-
cific technological/defence interests/secrets that needed to be protected. BT did not fall into 
that category!  
Did the government ever expect to exercise its special shares other than to keep the sharehold-
ing registers limited in the ways suggested? There is little evidence to suggest that this was 
the case. Of course, it just so happened that the Conservative Party held on to power through-
out the 1980s and it is arguable that, had the Labour Party won an election during that period, 
it would have behaved differently. Equally, the present government, albeit Labour in name, 
appears to be largely indifferent to issues of ownership so some of the Tory philosophy of the 
1980s appears to have spread its tentacles! 
This then raises the issue of ‘National Champions’. By definition, a major utility such as BT 
is a national champion, but there are two wholly divergent views on this matter. In the first DIW Berlin: Politikberatung kompakt  44 
II Industrial Policy 
116 
place, it may be argued that ownership is an irrelevance, and that a company should be owned 
and run by whoever is willing to put the highest valuation upon it since that in turn obliges the 
owners to seek to achieve the greatest possible efficiency and, hence, profitability. Such an 
approach is also the only one compatible with efficient worldwide capital markets. Against 
this, there is the argument that ‘capitalists’ run companies for the benefit of shareholders and 
hence neglect the ‘public interest’, neglect the welfare of employees and are ultimately will-
ing to see the company go to the wall rather than struggle on unprofitably. 
It is not our role to discuss the merits of these views. Arguably the key issue is whether, if all 
alternatives had failed, the UK government would actually bail out a national champion. Here 
again, it may be thought that this boils down to a question of political leaning, but in the UK 
this no longer can be said to be the case. Wherever the current Labour government may con-
sider itself to be in the political spectrum, it learned one harsh lesson while out of office in the 
1980s, namely that the British people just want things to work properly without the need for 
them to pay higher levels of taxation. Its recent willingness to ignore the troubles at Marconi, 
and to do little more than pay lip service to the demise of Rover-MG (where the Chinese, 
extraordinarily, were seen as perfectly acceptable buyers), demonstrates this point clearly but 
it may be noted that so much of the utility sector is now foreign-owned – without a reciprocal 
enthusiasm for UK companies to invest in continental Europe in every case – and prices ap-
pear to be rising so sharply that there is something of a backlash against ‘excessive’ foreign 
ownership of utilities building up.  
So: would government allow BT to be taken over by a foreign company? Answer: ‘Yes’. In 
fact, it would have no legal grounds to prevent it and BT is unpopular so the general public 
would probably be enthusiastic – the recent takeover of O2 by Telefónica barely caused a 
ripple in the popular press. However, it might just prove to be one foreign utility takeover too 
far so the government might introduce some new regulatory controls (even retrospectively) 
although as noted elsewhere, there is a general view that BT’s regulatory regime is already 
fairly exacting. 
So: would it allow BT to go bust? This is somewhat hypothetical since BT is profitable and 
still controls 60% of local lines, but the issue is what is meant by going bust. In the first place, 
we could be saying that BT is inherently unprofitable because it is so inefficient that it cannot 
make a profit when others could, in which case presumably there will be a queue of potential 
buyers to buy the company from the administrators in the style of MCI. Who the buyers are DIW Berlin: Politikberatung kompakt  44 
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would not matter at all. If, however, we are saying that local loop provision cannot be pro-
vided profitably by any commercial operator because of competitive forces, end of story, then 
obviously the government must make arrangements for basic telephony services to be pro-
vided. Presumably, taking BT back into public ownership, the obvious response, would then 
be fully compatible with EU rules. This would not be an issue of whether or not BT was a 
national champion, but rather an issue of needing to prevent the telephony service from crash-
ing. 
II.6.2 The  Indicator 
To convey the development of the incumbents’ debt and the qualitative information about the 
influence governments exert on the incumbents we use the following reasoning:  
First, it seems to be impossible to show a clear casual link between shareholding of the state 
and the incumbents’ debt levels (see Table II-47 and Table II-48). However, the following 
argument nevertheless points to a beneficial effect of state shareholding: If a company takes 
on seemingly ‘excessive’ debt, its credit rating would be expected to fall, leading to higher 
rates of interest. This and the possibility of a collapse to ‘junk bond’ rating would seriously 
disadvantage existing lenders who would then insist that something radical be done to fore-
stall such an eventuality. For example, the sudden collapse of BT’s debt in 2002 as a result of 
the mobile subsidiary sale can be interpreted as a reaction to its ‘excessive’ debt that was not 
even considered in France and Germany. Hence, one benefit to incumbents with state share-
holders is that they can run up the debt in the first place without much prejudice to their credit 
rating and that they need not take short-term radical and strategic action to deal with the prob-
lem of ‘excessive’ debt – however, there will be pressure to look for longer-term solutions (in 
light of general improvement in incumbent finances post-2002, debt in excess of € 30bn can 
still be considered to be ‘excessive’). Using this argument and taking the levels of indebted-
ness tolerated by financial markets into account, there seems to be considerable advantage in 
the support incumbent firms can get if the state is a major shareholder.  
Second, while state shareholding can also lead to interventions in the incumbents business 
strategies, the general attitude a government has towards its incumbent tend to be more fa-
vourable the higher the government’s shareholding is. The same holds for a government’s 
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as national champions the more favourable governmental interventions should be. However, 
in both cases judgements have to rely on a case-by-case analysis. 
Considering state shareholding, state interventions in actual business strategies as well as the 
likelihood of state intervention in the case of strategic long-term decisions and in the case of a 
crisis as further criteria, the following scores have been attributed:  
Table II-55 
Shareholder indicator 





Italia  Telefónica  British 
Telecom 
State as shareholder  9,0  10,0  7,0  4,0  3,0 
 
The high score given to France relies on two factors: First, the high level of debt France Tele-
com relies in large part on state guarantees. Second, the controversial, but eventually EC 
approved € 9.6bn government bailout. Germany’s second rank is due to the relatively high 
state shareholding and the observation that there were no government interventions with re-
spect to business strategies or restructuring plans.  
The lower ranking of Italy and Spain is based on the following observations: In Italy the gov-
ernment intervened when the split of Telecom Italia in three parts was considered. While 
Telecom Italia is considered a national champion, the government did also show its willing-
ness to intervene in strategic long-term decisions. In Spain, the modest rights associated with 
the initial golden share and their removal in 2006 are taken as clear indications that the Span-
ish government has no specific instruments to protect its incumbent.  
Finally, the lowest rank of the UK is due to general attitude of the government towards British 
Telecom. There were no state interventions during the financial troubles British Telecom had 
starting in 2001 and there is no protection against foreign takeovers.   DIW Berlin: Politikberatung kompakt  44 
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III  Industrial policy indicators 
The indicators outlined in the previous chapters are combined to derive several overall indica-
tors. Two different approaches are used. The first approach relies on the distinction between 
incumbent and market related policy measures. The second approach combines all indicators 
to get one industrial policy indicator.  
III.1 Incumbent  and  market related indicators 
Among the policy measures discussed in the previous sections we consider the following 
measures as primarily affecting the incumbent: 
•  Tax burden of incumbents as measured by the average tax rates of the incumbents 
•  Employment flexibility represented by the development of main lines per employee 
•  Competition policy 
•  State as a shareholder 
The inclusion of competition policy is based on the observation that competition policies mainly 
affect the business strategies of large and dominant firms.  
Adapting the weighting scheme outlined in Table II-1 to this reduced set of indicators and using 
the respective indicator values we get the results shown in Table III-1.  DIW Berlin: Politikberatung kompakt  44 
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Table III-1 
Incumbent related indicator  
Weights Indicator  Germany France  Italy  Spain  UK 
0.14  Fiscal measures 
 Tax  payments  10,0  8,0  7,0  9,0  10,0 
0.29  Labour market 
 Employment  flexibility 7,5  10,0  8,0  6,2  10,0 
0.36  Competition  policy  3,0  10,0 2,0 8,0 5,0 
0.21  State as shareholder  9,0  10,0  7,0  4,0  3,0 
Total incumbent related indicator  6,6  9,7  5,5  6,8  6,7 
 
France stands at the highest position due to its high scores for competition policy and state as a 
shareholder. Spain benefits from relatively low tax payments as well as its high indicator value 
for competition policy. While UK shows the highest scores for fiscal measures and employment 
flexibility, Germany’s rank is due to relatively low tax payments and its second rank for state as 
a shareholder. Italy is ranked lowest due to the combination of low scores for tax payments, 
competition policy and state as a shareholder. 
Adding infrastructure aid and changing the weights accordingly leads to quite different results. 
Table III-2 shows that the relative position France is weakened as infrastructure aid and espe-
cially public private partnerships are used to spur competition. On the other hand, the relative 
positions of Spain, UK and Italy improve since there are explicit programs to extend broadband 
infrastructures on both countries. Moreover, the incumbents in these countries participate in 
these programs. 
Table III-2 
Incumbent related indicator including infrastructure aid 
 Germany France  Italy  Spain  UK 
Total incumbent related indicator  6,1  7,7  6,9  7,4  7,4 
 
Turning to the market related policy measures we consider average tax rates, tax exemptions as 
well as employment protection and state support as the relevant policy measures mainly affecting 
overall supply and demand conditions on the telecommunication markets. Adapting the weight-
ing scheme to this subset of policy measures we get the results shown Table III-3. DIW Berlin: Politikberatung kompakt  44 
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The market related indicator for Germany confirms the reluctance of the government to generally 
support telecommunication and ICT markets. There are no specific tax exemptions and the im-
pact of state demand is relatively low as compared to the other countries.  
Table III-3 
Market related indicator for industrial policy 
Weights Indicator  Germany France  Italy  Spain  UK 
0.17  Fiscal  measures   
  0.33  Effect. average tax rates 7,0  8,0  9,0  10,0  9,0 
 0.67  Tax  exemptions  3,0  3,0  10,0  7,0  7,0 
0.33  Labour  market   
 1  Empl.  protection  3,2  2,9  2,9  2,7  10,0 
0.5   State  support   
 0.5  ICT  support  6,0  6,2  8,8  5,5  7,2 
 0.5  State  demand  7,9  9,6  8,5  8,3  9,6 
Total market related indicator  5,2  5,7  6,9  5,7  8,8 
 
Again, the high score of the UK in the market related indicator reflects the indicator construction 
that rewards low tax burdens and government activities as boosting demand for telecommunica-
tion services. A similar explanation holds for Italy that has the second highest score for market 
related issues. While Italy’s scores for fiscal measures and state support are relatively high, Italy 
suffers from low scores for employment protection.  
III.2  The overall picture 
Table III-4 gives the weighting factors and the scores and then sums them up creating the 
overall industrial policy indicator.  
The resulting industrial policy indicator shows France and the UK as the countries with the most 
favourable industrial policy in a consolidated perspective. In the case of France, high indicators 
for state demand, for the role of the state as a shareholder and for competition policy have led to 
this outcome. The high position for the UK is somewhat surprising, as the country is not known 
for a particularly articulated industrial policy. However, the country has high scores with respect 
to tax burden, labour market issues and state demand. The rationale of the indicator implies high 
indicator values for a strong role of the state as a consumer of telecommunication services. The DIW Berlin: Politikberatung kompakt  44 
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indicator also awards low tax burdens and an abstinent state with respect to state intervention in 
the labour market. When these components are combined in one country, the seemingly paradox 
situation occurs where low intervention levels on the one hand and active support on the other 
lead to a favourable climate for the development of the incumbent operator.  
Table III-4 
Aggregate indicator for industrial policy 
Weights Indicator  Germany France Italy  Spain  UK 
0.1   Fiscal  measures   
  0.5  Tax  burden  8,5 8,0  8,0  9,5 9,5 
  0.5  Tax  exemptions  3,0 3,0  10,0  7,0 7,0 
0.2    Labour market    
 0.5  Empl.  protection  3,2 2,9  2,9  2,7  10,0 
  0.5  Empl. flexibility   7,5 10,0 8,0 6,2 10,0 
0.25  Competition  policy  3,0  10,0  2,0  8,0  5,0 
0.3   State  support   
  0.33  Infrastructure  aid  5,0 3,0  10,0  9,0 9,0 
  0.33  ICT  support  6,0 6,2  8,8  5,5 7,2 
  0.33  State  demand  7,9 9,6  8,5  8,3 9,6 
0.15    State as shareholder  9,0  10,0  7,0  4,0  3,0 
Total  Indicator  5,6 7,7  6,3  6,6 7,1 
 
The Spanish case marks a situation where the incumbent is not favoured by any influence stem-
ming from the times as a monopolist. Moreover, labour market conditions are not very favour-
able in general and state support is ranked as being relatively low. On the other hand, the Spanish 
incumbent benefits from a rather favourable competition policy and a relatively favourable situa-
tion with respect to its tax burden. 
Italy benefits from an active state in terms of ICT support, infrastructure aid and tax advantages 
as instruments to promote demand in telecommunication markets. However, the anti-trust au-
thorities are less favourable to the incumbent as compared to other countries. Anti-trust authori-
ties in Italy are traditionally characterised by greater independence from the political system. 
Furthermore, a rather strict regulation of the labour market also disadvantages Italy. DIW Berlin: Politikberatung kompakt  44 
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Germany is ranked among the lowest positions with respect to fiscal measures, labour market 
regulation, i.e., flexibility, competition policy and state support. Its low rank for the overall indi-
cator signals an attitude of the government which is reluctant to intervene in the market. Many 
measures targeting technological performance and the promotion of internet usage underlie the 
condition of financial neutrality. The conviction that telecommunication services should be pro-
vided in a free market regime adds to the relatively abstinent approach. Alternatively, the support 
experienced from state shareholding reduces the disadvantages as evidenced in the other sub-
indicators. Overall, Deutsche Telekom neither benefits substantially from a consequent free 
market regime (as British Telecom does from favourable labour market regulations) nor from 








Germany France Italy Spain  UK
 
 
III.3  Changing the weighting scheme 
Although there are strong arguments in favour of the weighting scheme adopted for the calcu-
lations for Table III-4, other weighting schemes may also bear a high level of plausibility. 
Therefore a second weighting exercise has been conducted which resulted in the figures pre-
sented in Table III-5 (the weights for the sub-indicators have not been changed).  DIW Berlin: Politikberatung kompakt  44 
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In the second weighting scheme, labour market issues have been given a higher weight in order 
to reflect the importance of these issues for incumbents. State support received a higher weight in 
order to take into account the current debate on infrastructure aid for broadband networks. Fi-
nally, the weight for competition policy has also been increased, because some experts held that 
incumbents’ essential strategic decisions were impeded by antitrust authorities.  
The changes in the weights do change the country ranking. The UK appears more favourable to 
the incumbent relative to the ranking of France. The relative scorings of Germany, Italy and 
Spain do not change. While there are some changes in the absolute scores, the differences in the 
indicators are rather small and remain within the limits covered by the generally rough method of 
indicator scoring.  
Table III-5 
Industrial policy indicators: weighting scheme II 
 weights  Germany  France  Italy  Spain  UK 
Fiscal  measures    0.05  5,8 5,5 9,0 8,3 8,3 
Labour  market  0.3 5,3 6,4 5,4 4,5 10 
Competition policy  0.3 3,0  10,0 2,0 8,0 5,0 
State support  0.3  6,3 6,3 9,1 7,6 8,6 
State as shareholder  0.05  9,0  10,0  7,0  4,0  3,0 
Total  indicator      5,1 7,6 5,7 6,6 7,6 
 
IV Summary 
The analysis of industrial policies in five European countries has revealed a great deal of 
similarities with only slightly differing priorities. However, the overall indicator shows that 
there is some variation between the extent up to which national policies are favourable to the 
incumbents. To understand these differences, the results of the five sub-indicators need to be 
taken into consideration. The individual indicator values can be substantiated by specific 
country scenarios observed. These qualitative descriptions are an essential part in the interpre-
tation of the final results.  
At first glance the positioning of France and the UK in relatively close proximity at the top of 
the indicator scores seems contradictory, as one country is characterised by a strong interest 
of the state in the incumbent and the other by a large institutional and political distance be-DIW Berlin: Politikberatung kompakt  44 
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tween the political layer and the incumbent operator. However, as the indicator system awards 
state protection for the incumbent in case of crisis (France) as well as liberal labour markets 
and favourable fiscal measures (UK), the result becomes plausible.  
Germany is characterised by low range positions and almost all scores are below average. 
This can be explained by modest state support in terms of fiscal measures and state demand as 
well as a rather unfavourable competition policy when compared to the other reference coun-
tries. A further liberalisation of labour markets and an increase in state support could quickly 
lead to a diminution of the gap.  
Best practice cases, such as the Italian state support for infrastructure aid, the British labour 
market regulation or the French state protection for the incumbent’s debt, are not easily trans-
ferable to the German case. These policies are either part of a longer reform process (labour 
market flexibility) or they are subject to EU scrutiny (direct support measures for the incum-
bent).  
A few points need to be mentioned, however, when interpreting the results: 
•  The indicator system leads to relative positions only and no absolute judgment can be 
deduced. 
•  Results presented in the form of intensity scales tend to create greater differences between 
countries than results based on quantitative figures. This effect is due to the construction of 
the indicator. Choosing a shorter scale would immediately reduce these differences and re-
sult in indicators that lie even closer together. 
•  The indicators are related to whether policies are favourable to the incumbent. No judge-
ment is implied as to whether the respective policies (or the support of a national cham-
pion) are beneficial for telecommunication markets or the economy as a whole. 
The analysis has clearly shown the need for a more thorough evaluation of basic determi-
nants. In particular, the following issues need closer attention: 
•  While the state demand indicator used here relies on e-government, the indicator does not 
say anything about whether the services are actually used by the addressees. It can be as-
sumed that many services might be available, but using them has not become general prac-
tice in companies and private households yet. Hence, only usage related indicators could 
document the actual relevance of an electronic government service. DIW Berlin: Politikberatung kompakt  44 
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•  State support in the form of ICT support and infrastructure aid could only be documented 
approximately. Again the institutional structures of support prohibit one-to-one compari-
sons. It can be assumed that a more detailed analysis might result in a more accurate pic-
ture of policy efforts.  
•  The assumption that market-related support eventually results in an advantage for the in-
cumbent needs to be verified. Its validity depends to a large extent on market conditions 
and the further development of competition in individual markets. 
The analysis has revealed scope for improvement in German industrial policy towards tele-
communication markets. In those fields where scores are higher in the reference countries, 
policy measures might be examined in the sense of identifying margins for better industrial 
policy. Measures that promote the development of telecommunication markets will benefit all 
market participants, therefore best practice cases, for example in infrastructure development 




The following tables show more detailed numbers on main lines and employees in the differ-
ent countries (all numbers in thousands). 
Germany 
Table V-1 
Main lines and employees in Germany 
    2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
PSTN+ISDN equivalent lines  49100  50200  49300  48700  47900  45000 
ULL lines  320  620  940  1350  1960  3240 
PSTN+ISDN+LLU  lines  49420 50820 50240 50050 49860 48240 
DSL connections (retail)  100  1400  2800  4000  5600  6300 
DSL connections (wholesale)  0  0  0  0  200  1600 
(DSL  total)  100 1400 2800 4000 5800 7900 
Total number of connections  49520  52220  53040  54050  55660  56140 
Employees
*    145,0 155,3 148,9 129,6 115,3 112,9 
* 2000-2003: Number of employees T-Com as of Dec. 31 of each year; 2004-2005: Average number of em-
ployees Broadband / fixed network 




Main lines and employees in France 
  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Network  connections  34200 34500 35500 37200 40100 48100 
Employees France Telecom SA  130,5  123,4  117,5  111,0  106,9  102,2 
Sources: France Telecom (2000 to 2005) 





Main lines and employees in Italy 
  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
PSTN+ISDN equivalent lines   27153  27353  27142  26596  25957  25049 
ULL  lines    6 125 539 840  1342 
PSTN+ISDN+LLU  lines  27153 27359 27267 27135 26797 26391 
DSL connections (retail)    258  683  1652  3412  4901 
DSL connections (wholesale)    132  167  388  598  890 
Total number of connections  27153  27749  28117  29175  30807  32182 
Employees  66,5 58,4 53,7 50,8 50,4 56,0 
 
The employment figures are given as full-time equivalents, and refer to 31 December of each 
year, they cover national activity and fixed line business only. 
Spain 
Table V-4 
Main lines and employees in Spain 
  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Network  connections  20316 20647 18706 19100 19835 20750 
Employees  43 42,2 43,9 38,4 36,4 35,1 
 
United Kingdom 
The following table includes all possible definitions. As can be seen, the number of exchange 
lines is broadly unaffected until broadband begins to be introduced on a widespread basis in 
2004. It is not known how many hours, on average, a BT employee works, and there may be 
more part-time work in recent years. Presumably, BT now outsources a significant amount of 
work to overseas call centres. UK-based employees are not necessarily employed on UK-
based business activities. However, in revenue terms, the UK/non-UK breakdown is currently 




Main lines and employees in UK
1) 
  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Total employees   136.8  137.0  108.6  104.7  99.9  102.1 
Exchange lines
2)  28485 28950 29165 29566 29661 29630 
UK employees  126.0  106.4  100.1  96.3  91.6  90.8 
Lines per UK employee  226  272  291  307  324  326 
Exchange lines
3),5)  28495 28966 29221 29646 29998 30567 
Exchange lines
4),5)  28500 28975 29224 29930 31297 33877 
BT Retail/Wholesale Employees
6  99.0 83.6 80.6 78.0 74.4 64.0 
Lines per R/W  288  347  363  384  421  529 
Notes: 1) All data as of 31 March of relevant year (end of the financial year). 2) Total retail connections in the 
UK comprising business plus residential connections. 3) Total retail plus service providers. Annual Report 2005. 
4) Total retail plus wholesale connections in the UK. Annual Report 2006. 5) The difference between the num-
bers in columns 6 and 7 appears to be the approximate number of broadband lines supplied to non-BT ISPs. 
This has surged since 2004. 6) Excluding BT Global Services and Other categories. 
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